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| Lt. Col Muritala Mohamed (2nd Left), Gen. JTU Ironsi (Centre), Col. C Ojukwu (2nd right) and some unidentified NA officers |
In the Nigerian Army's official history of the Civil War, Major General IBM Haruna
(rtd), said:
"The dominance of the NPC and the perceived dominance of the North in the centre were like a threat to the presumed more enlightened and better educated Southerners who believed they were the backbone of the movement for Nigerian independence but did not succeed the colonial power to run the affairs of the state. So with that background one can now lay the foundation of the perception of the military struggle in Nigerian politics."
Reflective, therefore, of certain repeatedly articulated viewpoints in sections
of the Press, the opinion matured among a small budding caucus of already
politically inclined officers after independence, that every military
deployment for internal security in aid of the civil authority whose political
orientation they did not share, even if constitutional, was just another
provocation.
These include:
1. 'Operation Banker', a joint Army-Police operation in the Western region, led by then CO, 4th battalion, Lt. Col. Maimalari, allegedly at the behest of
the pro-NPC regional Premier (Akintola) culminating in the declaration of a
state of emergency in May 1962 after a fracas in the House of Assembly and the appointment
of an administrator. Interestingly, the General StaffOfficer
(2) at the Army HQ in charge of Intelligence was none other than Captain
Patrick Chukwuma Nzeogwu who, as a Major, was later to play a key role in the
coup of January 1966 in which Maimalari lost his life.
2. The arrest on September 22, 1962 and subsequent imprisonment of the opposition leader, Chief Awolowo, on suspicion of planning a civilian overthrow of the government. It was alleged that 300 volunteers were sent to Ghana for 3 weeks militia training. Certain accounts hypothesize two
separate plots, one by Dr. Maja and the other by Awo himself. But there
is a body of evidence that indicates that Dr. Maja was actually collaborating with the government. The real plotters planned to exploit the absence
from the country of three out of the
five Army battalions to seize key points in Lagos and arrest leading figures of
the government. The absent battalions were in or on their way to and from the
Congo. One available military detachment at Abeokuta was out on military
training exercises, while the newly formed federal guard in Lagos was essentially
ceremonial. Thus, there was an internal security vacuum which the
plotters intended to exploit.
Court records also indicate that an attempt was made to recruit Brigadier Adesoji Ademulegun for the scheme but he refused to cooperate with the plotters, choosing instead to remain loyal to the traditional military hierarchy and government, which had just promoted him from Lt. Col. to Brigadier. Whether this later played a role in his subsequent assassination in January 1966 is unknown.
3. Army Stand-by during the acrimonious reactions to the National Census of 1962/63 and 1963/64.
4. Army Stand-by during the Midwest referendum of 1963.
5. Mobilization of the Army to provide essential services during the General Strike of 1964. Even this apparently innocuous deployment in support of
the civil authority attracted criticism from some of the would-be plotters of the
January 1966 coup. Captain Nwobosi (rtd), for example, has said that as a
young officer deployed to the railways as an escort, he was troubled by the
fact that the Prime Minister left Lagos for his home town in Bauchi during the
strike, leaving crucial matters of state to assistants in Lagos as well as the
Army which was fully mobilized. (I have not been able to independently
verify the validity of this accusation against Balewa, but it does provide
insights into the expectations of soldiers of their civilian masters when they
are drafted by civil authorities to stabilize the polity). A perception of lack
of a "hands on" approach, even if false, can undermine authority and
the culture of respect.
6. Tiv Crises: As far back as April 1960 and July 1961 the Army had been placed on standby in Tiv land. This became necessary again in February 1964.
However, on November 18, 1964 the 3rd battalion under Lt. Col James Pam which was just returning from Tanzania was deployed in full for internal security operations there. The choice of Pam's unit was a deft move
because he was of middle belt origin and the battalion had been out of the country training another Army, and thus insulated from acrimony. The Nigerian
Army actually emerged from this operation with high marks because the local people saw Pam's unit as more neutral than the Mobile Police. Interestingly, Major Anuforo of the Recce unit at Kaduna was deployed in support of Pam for this operation. This is the officer who later shot him during the January
1966 coup. Other would-be plotters who served in Tiv land were
Ademoyega and Onwatuegwu.
7. Constitutional crisis of January 1965: Following the controversial Federal
Election of December 1964, ceremonial President Azikiwe of the NCNC, urged by
radical intelligentsia, refused to invite Prime Minister Balewa of the NPC to
form a government and issued orders mobilizing the Army to enforce his
authority to suspend the government, annul the elections and appoint a
temporary interim administrator to conduct elections. However, the oath of
allegiance of the officer corps was not only to the Commander in Chief but also
to the government of Nigeria. The Army Act (#26 of 1960) and the Navy Act (#9
of 1960) were also clear on lines of authority and control.
While the Army and Navy were "under the general authority" of the
Defence Minister in matters of "command, discipline and administration", the authority for operational use and control was vested in the Council of Ministers
and the Prime Minister. President Azikiwe and the service chiefs were so
advised by the Chief Justice and Attorney General of the Federation. Thus the
Navy Commander, Commodore Wey politely told the President that the Navy (under
him), the Army (under Major General Welby-Everard) and the Police (under Louis
Edet) had decided to refuse his orders. After a week of cliff
hanging tension, in which the military stood aside, a political compromise was
eventually reached and a government of "national unity" formed under
Prime Minister Balewa.
In the US Diplomatic Archives: Nigeria 1964-1968, the
situation was characterized in this manner:
"Very complicated African politics, in which tribes, religions and economics all play a part, are involved in the situation. The Northern Premier is at odds with the Eastern Premier in whose region large oil deposits have been discovered. In the heat of the election campaign, there have been threats of secession by the east; threats of violence "that would make Congo look like child's play" from the north.."At the same time, strong rumuors of an impending Army coup purportedly planned for the annual Army Shooting competition were also heard in political circles. But the status quo held, albeit temporarily.
8. Army Stand by during the ethnic leadership crisis between Yorubas and Igbos at the University of Lagos in March 1965.
9. Army Stand-by during the Western regional Election of October 1965 which led to a break down of law and order. Political pressures and
recrimination resulting from this exposure finally cracked the façade of political neutrality
among some officers exposing deep personal, ethnic, regional and political
schisms in the process. To quote Captain Nwobosi again, "When I was
in Abeokuta, my soldiers were being detailed to go somewhere towards Lagos from
Abeokuta to guard ballot boxes that were not opened. They were not opened
but somebody had already been declared the winner. Everyday, they would
go and come back and in the process, I lost one of my corporals. You know
soldiers are soldiers and sometimes like children, you have your favourite ones
and this was personal."
10. A subsequent alleged plan to bring the situation in the West under control
by the NPC controlled federal government in support of its regional ally, using
the Army as had been done in 1962, allegedly brought forward the date of the
January 15 coup. The coup was organized by predominantly Eastern officers
sympathetic to the UPGA alliance of political parties that had lost the 1964
federal elections and the October 1965 regional elections in the West.
The majority of casualties were Northern politicians and senior military
officers from the same alma mater all of whom were deemed to represent the NPC
or its interests. Others were politicians and officers from the western region
viewed as being in alliance with the NPC leadership. The coup failed to bring
the "young turks" who led it to power but it did result, through a
complex and controversial series of events, in the emergence of a military
regime led by General Ironsi.
There is a tragic post-script to the widely held (but false) presumption that
the January 15 coup pre-empted an inevitable military operation to crack down in
the West. This presumption is based on a reported meeting between
key NPC and NNDP political leaders as well as certain senior military officers
said to have occurred in Kaduna on January 14. However, the last
interview granted to the magazine 'West Africa', by the late Prime Minister
Balewa on January 14, a few hours to his death, went like this:
"Question: Do you see the solution as taking the form of a coalition government in the West?
Balewa: Yes, it would have to be that ...The Action group has accepted my mediation, but the NNDP has asked for more time. If I use real force in theWest - and make no mistake about it, I haven't yet - then I could bring the people to their knees. But I don't want to use force like that.
Force can't bring peace to people's hearts.
Question: Would you consider the release of Chief Awolowo as part of a political solution of the West's troubles?
Balewa: I think that might be part of it; yes, obviously we would have to see."
[This interview was not published until January 29, 1966]
My Review
The major factors I could point out that caused the first coup in Nigeria were tribal allegiance of the political class and misplaced aggressive patriotism of the military. One of the best decisions taken by former President Olusegun Obasanjo upon his inauguration back in 1999 was the de-politicisation of the military. Effectively, he retired all political soldiers (serving officers and men of the armed forces who have held any political position in the past). This singular step purged the Services and restored discipline, professionalism and patriotism of the military which had been bastardised during their incursion into politics. Apparently Obasanjo himself, a beneficiary and largely a major actor of the incursion, well understood the dangers and challenges of having officers and men who have at one time or the other "tasted" the national cake retained in the Armed Services.
Probably, just probably, the British underestimated one singular fact when the British Crown illusorily left Nigeria a "united" & independent country in 1960: everyone sees himself as Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Kanuri, Itshekiri etc. more than a NIGERIAN. Each owes his allegiance to his/her tribe than to the Nigeria. Unfortunately, this clannishness runs deeper than the tribal blanket (for example) for when push comes to shove, Ekitis are different from Egbas, though they are the same Yoruba. According to some Igbos, Ebonyi people are not pure Igbos though they are curiously needed to boastfully complete the South Easter states. Also the Itshekiri identifies with the Ijaw when agitating for 13% derivation fund under the umbrella of NigerDelta, but the crack would suddenly appear during the sharing formulation.
Fifty years later, this same malaise still feverishly bind us in a collective suffocating rivalry as we typically view every national issue through the tinted lens of tribalism, religion and "we versus them". Not a single sphere of our national life is spared from this viral mentality;
...in religion: certain tribes can never rise to the head of some churches or mosques
....in banking: certain banks are classified as Igbo banks hence, other tribes dont get promoted to certain levels
...in education: Unilorin for example, admits more moslems applicants than christian ones while an Igbo man would not be allowed to become the VC of (say) Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
...in society: certain neighbourhoods are for non-indigenes e.g. sabon-gari, sabo, etc
The lesson I have personally learnt here is that the (in)actions of some few political, religious or social leaders can foist disasters untold upon the generality of the people. Therefore, everyone must rise and speak against leaders who continue to play us against each other using the card of ethnicity and religion just when it suits their purpose.
© Nowa Omoigui MD (www.dawodu.com)
The major factors I could point out that caused the first coup in Nigeria were tribal allegiance of the political class and misplaced aggressive patriotism of the military. One of the best decisions taken by former President Olusegun Obasanjo upon his inauguration back in 1999 was the de-politicisation of the military. Effectively, he retired all political soldiers (serving officers and men of the armed forces who have held any political position in the past). This singular step purged the Services and restored discipline, professionalism and patriotism of the military which had been bastardised during their incursion into politics. Apparently Obasanjo himself, a beneficiary and largely a major actor of the incursion, well understood the dangers and challenges of having officers and men who have at one time or the other "tasted" the national cake retained in the Armed Services.
Probably, just probably, the British underestimated one singular fact when the British Crown illusorily left Nigeria a "united" & independent country in 1960: everyone sees himself as Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Kanuri, Itshekiri etc. more than a NIGERIAN. Each owes his allegiance to his/her tribe than to the Nigeria. Unfortunately, this clannishness runs deeper than the tribal blanket (for example) for when push comes to shove, Ekitis are different from Egbas, though they are the same Yoruba. According to some Igbos, Ebonyi people are not pure Igbos though they are curiously needed to boastfully complete the South Easter states. Also the Itshekiri identifies with the Ijaw when agitating for 13% derivation fund under the umbrella of NigerDelta, but the crack would suddenly appear during the sharing formulation.
Fifty years later, this same malaise still feverishly bind us in a collective suffocating rivalry as we typically view every national issue through the tinted lens of tribalism, religion and "we versus them". Not a single sphere of our national life is spared from this viral mentality;
...in religion: certain tribes can never rise to the head of some churches or mosques
....in banking: certain banks are classified as Igbo banks hence, other tribes dont get promoted to certain levels
...in education: Unilorin for example, admits more moslems applicants than christian ones while an Igbo man would not be allowed to become the VC of (say) Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
...in society: certain neighbourhoods are for non-indigenes e.g. sabon-gari, sabo, etc
The lesson I have personally learnt here is that the (in)actions of some few political, religious or social leaders can foist disasters untold upon the generality of the people. Therefore, everyone must rise and speak against leaders who continue to play us against each other using the card of ethnicity and religion just when it suits their purpose.
© Nowa Omoigui MD (www.dawodu.com)
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