When
the group got downstairs, Danjuma instructed the 4th battalion adjutant,
Lt. Garba Dada (“Paiko”), to arrange for both Fajuyi and Ironsi to be taken to
the guest house on the cattle ranch at Mokwa “pending date of full
inquiry”. Lt. “Paiko”, however, informed Danjuma that he was not a
party to the commitment he made to Fajuyi (or Gowon) about their safety and a
fierce emotional argument erupted between Danjuma and the
others. At this point a northern soldier tapped Danjuma
on the shoulder with a loaded rifle and, speaking in Hausa, said:
“These foolish
young boys. That is the kind of leadership you have given us and
messing us up. They killed all your elders and you are still fooling
around here. The man you are fooling around here with will disappear
before you know it.”
The
other soldiers agreed with this soldier and pounced on both Ironsi and Fajuyi,
wrestling them to restrain any movement. Danjuma, faced with one command crisis
after another all night, had finally lost control.
Fajuyi
turned to Danjuma and said: “You gave us the assurance.”
Danjuma
replied: “Yes, Sir. I am sure you will be all right.”
He
was wrong.
Two
landrovers took the captives away while Danjuma hitch-hiked back to the
barracks. Both Ironsi and Fajuyi were squeezed into the front seat of one
vehicle while Ironsi’s ADCs, Lts. Bello and Nwankwo were behind. Two
officers, Lts. Walbe and Dada, accompanied the group with one joining the
driver of the lead vehicle. The command vehicle led another vehicle
full of armed troops. Among those soldiers said to have been
present include the 4th battalion unit RSM Useni Fagge, Sergeant Tijjani
(from Maiduguri), Warrant Officer Bako, and other soldiers including
Dabang, Wali, and Rabo. Some of those involved were later to come to
prominence during the unsuccessful Dimka coup of 1976.
They
drove to Mile 8 on Iwo road, where the group dismounted and went into the bush,
crossing a small stream. Ironsi and Fajuyi were subjected to
beatings and interrogation. General Ironsi acted a soldier as he was
questioned, refused to be intimidated and remained silent, refusing to confess
any role in the January 15 coup. Indeed, according to Elaigwu, “It
was reliably learnt from an officer and a soldier on the spot that it was
Ironsi’s muteness amidst a barrage of questions that led to his being shot by
an angry Northern soldier.” Other sources suggest that the “angry northern
soldier” may have been Sergeant Tijjani. Details are murky.
Fajuyi
was also shot. Although the western region publication “Fajuyi the Great” published by the
Ministry of Information in 1967 after his official burial said he had offered
to die rather than “abandon his guest”, those involved in his arrest and
assassination insist that he was an even more critical target than Ironsi and
made no such offer to die with Ironsi. Lt. Col. William Walbe
(rtd) said:
“...We
arrested him as we arrested Ironsi. We suspected him of being party
to the January coup. You remember the Battle Group Course which was
held at Abeokuta….Fajuyi was the Commander of the Battle Group Course…All those
who took part in the January coup were those who had taken part in that
course. It gave us the impression that the Battle Course was arranged
for the January coup, so he had to suffer it too. I am sorry about that but
that is the nature of the life of a military man…”
General
Danjuma confirms this opinion. He says that at another training camp
in Kachia commanded by Lt. Col. Fajuyi, Major Nzeogwu rehearsed the assault on
Sardauna’s house in the presence of some northern mortar officers who did not
appreciate the significance of the exercise until after the coup. In
Danjuma’s words, “The chaps could not stomach Fajuyi such that if there was
anybody who should die first, as far as they were concerned, it was Fajuyi, not
even Ironsi.”
How
true are these claims about Fajuyi’s role in the January coup? I
found an answer in the book “Why we Struck” by Major Adewale Ademoyega, one of
the January mutineers and a Yoruba officer like Fajuyi. Ademoyega
states that Fajuyi supported the first coup, knew of it and made suggestions to
plotters on how it could be best carried out. According to Ademoyega, that
he did not actively participate was only as a result of his posting at the time
the coup was launched. However, Ademoyega eulogizes the late Colonel
for opposing all efforts in the Supreme Military Council to bring the January
15 coupists to trial.
IRONSI’S
ADC ESCAPES
According
to Madiebo:
"While
Ironsi was being shot, Nwankwo said he ran into the bush and escaped. He
emphasized that his escape was not due to his cleverness, but because his
colleague, the Hausa ADC who was also present, wanted him to
escape. Nwankwo explained that during the month of June, 1966, he
and his Northern colleague had discussed the possibility of another coup. The
Northern officer was emphatic the Ibos were going to do it again, but Nwankwo
swore it was going to be done by Northerners. According to him, at the end of a
long but heated argument, they came to an agreement that whichever side did it,
the man on the winning side should save the other's life. Based on this
agreement, the Northern ADC whispered to Nwankwo to escape while Ironsi was
being shot, and also discouraged the soldiers from chasing after him. Nwankwo
said he later made his way to Lagos and contacted this Northern officer again,
who not only hid him for a couple of days, but eventually took him out of Lagos
in the boot of a car."
BACK
AT THE 4th BATTALION
Later
that morning, on Friday July 29, back in the barracks, T/Lt. Col Joe Akahan,
Commander of the 4th battalion , who had essentially been ignored all
night by junior officers, tried to reassert control. He (or someone
acting in his name) apparently called a meeting of all officers at 10am which
Akahan did not attend. By this time, Lt. Pam Nwadkon’s Ferret group
had arrived from Abeokuta bringing more news about how Igbo soldiers there had
been hunted down and killed. At this meeting surviving Igbo soldiers
were allegedly rounded up by NCOs and later killed, some say by being packed
like sardines into a tailor’s shop and then blown up with
grenades. The intelligence officer of the battalion, Lt. Jasper,
from the delta part of the Midwest, was killed based on an allegation that he
had been an informant for senior Igbo officers in Lagos. NNDP
detainees at the Ibadan prison were released.
Later
in the afternoon around 4 pm, weary from negotiations with rebels at Ikeja,
Gowon called from Lagos and spoke to Akahan, seeking to establish the status of
the Supreme Commander. Akahan passed the question on to Danjuma who
then informed Gowon that Ironsi had been snatched from him by officers of the
4th battalion. When Danjuma confronted the Battalion adjutant
with the same question, he says the adjutant “told me one story after the
other. But I saw the officers in twos and threes whispering to each
other and it was running to about 7pm.”
At
this point let me address a pertinent question. Is there any
independent corroboration for Danjuma’s story that he arrested Ironsi but did
not order or partake in his torture and execution? Yes, at least
two. In the book “Power with Civility”, Rear Admiral
Ndubuisi Kanu says: “In fairness to Danjuma, his mission was
to arrest the Head of State in a bloodless coup, but having accomplished it
successfully, he was shoved aside by a mob who had reserved a fatal fate for
their captive.” General Gowon (rtd) also confirmed in an interview
with Elaigwu that then Major Danjuma was very sad when he later learnt about
the deaths of both Ironsi and Fajuyi, having given his word that no harm would
come to them.
On
Saturday, July 30, T/Lt. Col. Akahan finally came to grips with the situation,
albeit temporarily, ordering all soldiers to be disarmed in response to direct
orders from Lagos. But the 4th battalion, incidentally the direct descendant
of “Glover’s Hausas”, was not done yet. In time it would
acquire a reputation as the most unruly battalion in Nigerian history. On
August 16, a detachment of the unit staged a raid on the Benin Prison, followed
by a riot in Ibadan. Later that month when a decision was made to transfer the
battalion enmasse, now under Major Danjuma’s command, to Kaduna, NCOs and
junior officers again went berserk. Using tactics reminiscent of the
Japanese in Burma, they went to hospitals all over Kaduna to look for sick Igbo
officers, one of whom was killed. Another officer, then Major
Alabi-Isama of the NMTC, who had actually served with the 4th battalion
before the January coup narrowly escaped back to the Midwest. He was
smuggled out of Kaduna by the Military Governor, Lt. Col Hassan
Katsina. Detachments of the 4th battalion deployed to other
northern towns continued their acts of lawlessness everywhere they
went. The infantry company based in Makurdi was instrumental to the
outbreak of savage slaughter in September of Igbos fleeing from other parts of
the North. It is not for nothing that the vehicle and railway bridge
over the River Benue at Makurdi was nick-named the “Red Bridge”.
About
5 days after their deaths, the corpses of Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi and Lt.
Col. Fajuyi were retrieved by the Police Special Branch (including CSP J. D.
Gomwalk) from a makeshift grave near the town of Lalupon outside Ibadan and
transferred to the Military cemetry where they were specially marked for future
identification. It was not until after the Aburi conference in
January 1967 that their deaths were announced (by Lt. Col Ojukwu), following a
pattern that had originally been established by General Ironsi himself by
refusing to announce the deaths of or allow official funerals for most of the
victims of the January coup (including his military colleagues) throughout his
six month long regime.
After
yet another exhumation, General Ironsi was finally reburied with full military
honours at Umuahia on January 20, 1967 while a few days later Lt. Col Fajuyi
was reburied at Ado-Ekiti (capital city of modern Ekiti State).
CASUALTIES
OF JULY 29, 1966 REBELLION AND AFTERMATH
According
to an Eastern Regional Government publication titled “January 15: Before and After; No. WT/1003/3674/40,000,
1967”, the casualty list of the counter-rebellion included 33 Eastern, 7
Midwestern, and 3 Western Officers and 153 Eastern, 14 Midwestern and 3 Western
Other ranks (NCOs). Of the 33 Eastern officer deaths, there was one
Major General, one Lt. Col, nine Majors, eleven Captains, eight Lts. and three
2/Lts. The Midwest lost one Lt. Col, two Majors, two Lts, and
two 2/Lts. The West lost one Lt. Col and two
2/Lts. Of the 153 Eastern other ranks who died, eleven were Warrant
Officers, twelve Staff Sergeants, thirty Sergeants, twenty five Corporals,
twenty-two Lance Corporals and fifty three Privates. The
Midwest lost one Warrant Officer, six Staff Sergeants, four Sergeants, two
Corporals, and one Lance Corporal. The West lost one Warrant Officer
and two Staff Sergeants.
The
grand military total, according that report was 213
casualties. However, names of newly trained or single soldiers who
were killed could not be ascertained, so the figures will always remain an
estimate. In any case the Eastern list was contested by the Federal
Government and to this day no-one has publicly confirmed the full reconciled
list of all those who lost their lives. Most observers, though, feel
the list provided by the Eastern regional Government was as close to the truth
as any list will ever get. Pensions and gratuities have been paid
over the years to many families. Indeed those spouses who did not
remarry and maintained their dignity as widows continued to be supported for
many years. In special cases children were awarded special
scholarships up to University level.
Over
the years, I have been able to gather a list of the officers who were confirmed
killed. It includes one or two names missing from the Eastern list:
Major
Gen. J.T.U.
Aguiyi-Ironsi`
Lt.
Col. F.A. Fajuyi`
Lt.
Col. I.C.
Okoro
T/Lt
Col G. Okonweze
Major
Christian Anuforo~
Major
Donatus O. Okafor ~
Major
T.E. Nzegwu (NAF)
`
Major
J.K. Obienu`
Major
Ibanga
Ekanem
Major
P.C. Obi (NAF)
T/Major
C.C.
Emelifonwu
T/Major
B. Nnamani
T
/Major J.O.C.
Ihedigbo
T/Major
O.U. Isong
T/Major
A Drummond
T/Major
A.D.
Ogunro
Capt.
J.I. Chukwueke
Capt.
H.A.
Iloputaife
Capt.
A.O. Akpet
Capt.
S.E. Maduabum
Capt.
G.N.E. Ugoala
T/Capt P.C.
Okoye
T/Capt. I.U. Idika
T/Capt. L.C.
Dilibe
T/Capt. J.U. Egere
T/Capt. T.O.
Iweanaya
T/Capt. H.A. Auna
T/Capt. R.I.
Agbazue
Lt. G. Mbabie
Lt. S.E.
Idowu
Lt. E.C.N. Achebe
Lt.
S.A.
Mbadiwe
Lt.
F.P. Jasper
Lt.
P.D.
Ekedingyo
Lt.
S.E. Onwuke
Lt.
J.D.
Ovuezurie
Lt.
A.D.C. Egbuna
Lt.
E.B.
Orok
Lt.
J.U. Ugbe
Lt.
Francis Musa*
2/Lt A.O.
Olaniyan
2/Lt.
A.R.O. Kasaba
2/Lt.
F.M. Agronaye
2/Lt.
P.K. Onyeneho
NOTE:
*Some
of the names here (like Musa) appear northern in origin but are actually names
of Igbo officers who had joined the Army using northern names.
~Active
participant in January mutiny
` Major
T.E. Nzegwu was the AirForce officer approached to help organize a plane to
fetch Chief Awolowo from Prison in the event that the January 15 coup should
succeed. Major John Obienu is alleged by some to have initially agreed to
take part in the January coup but changed his mind at the last
minute. Although there was a rumor that it was he who tipped Ironsi
off about the January plot, Ironsi himself said he found out about the mutiny
from the wife of Lt. Col. James Pam (some say Pam himself) when he returned home
between 2 and 3 am on January 15 from a second party following the earlier one
at Brigadier Maimalari’s house. Lt. Col. Fajuyi is confirmed by one
of the January 15 plotters (Ademoyega) to have provided ideas on how it should
be carried out although he did not take part directly.
POST-SCRIPT
When
he came to power in 1975, late General Murtala Muhammed –coup leader of
the July 1966 uprising –went to great lengths to look after the family of the
late Major General Aguiyi Ironsi.
In
1993, General Ibrahim Babangida –a participant in the July 1966 revolt –named
an Army Barrack after the late General and post-humously awarded him the Great
Commander of the Federal Republic (GCFR).
Some
streets in a few towns are named after the late Lt. Col F
Fajuyi. The Barracks where the Headquarters of the Nigerian Army
Armored Corps and School is based in Bauchi is named after Major John
Obienu. NAF Majors Nzegwu and Obi have names of streets at certain
AirForce Bases named after them.
President
Obasanjo, on the other hand has also recently named certain streets and
monuments in Abuja after the military officers who were killed during coup of
the January 15, 1966.
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