BACKGROUND
In the early hours of January 15, 1966,
citing a laundry list of complaints against the political class, there was a
military rebellion in Nigeria against the first republic. Led by a
group of Majors who were predominantly of eastern origin, the Prime Minister, a
federal minister, two regional premiers, along with top Army officers were brutally
assassinated. A number of civilians were also killed.
The coup succeeded in Kaduna the northern
region capital, failed in Lagos the federal capital and Ibadan the western
regional capital, but barely took place in Benin the midwestern capital, and Enugu
the eastern capital.
The majority of those murdered were
northerners, accompanied by some westerners and two
Midwesterners. No easterner lost his or her
life. On January 16, rather than approve the appointment of
Zanna Bukar Dipcharima, a politician of northern origin, as acting Prime
Minister, the acting President, Nwafor Orizu, himself of eastern origin, handed
over power to Major-General JTU Aguiyi-Ironsi, the GOC of the Nigerian Army,
also of eastern origin. This was allegedly at the behest of the rump cabinet,
allegedly to enable Ironsi put down the revolt that, as of then, had already
failed in southern Nigeria. Until it became apparent recently in
separate testimony by Alhaji Shehu Shagari and Chief Richard Akinjide, it had
always been publicly assumed that the hand-over was voluntary although
unconstitutional - since no such provision existed in the Nigerian
constitution.
According to Shagari, in his Book
“Beckoned to Serve”,
“…....….At about 7.00 am, I returned to Dipcharima’s residence to meet with some NPC ministers who had gathered there. Dipcharima was then the most senior NPC minister available. We received the latest reports on the situation, first from Alhaji Maitama Sule, Minister of Mines and Power, who had visited the PM’s residence by bicycle! We then heard from Alhaji Ibrahim Tako Galadima, the acting Minister of Defence, who had brought along with him Chief Fani-Kayode. Chief Fani-Kayode said he had been fetched from Ibadan early that morning by rebels and locked up at the Federal Guard Officers Mess in Dodan Barracks, where the mutineers initially made their headquarters. Disguised in army uniform, loyal troops handed him over to Alhaji Galadima, who had called in at the barracks, which was a stone’s throw of his residence……
……….The acting Minister of Defence assured us that Major-General Ironsi was doing his best to arrest the situation. Maitama Sule and I were separately detailed to explore with our absent NPC and NCNC colleagues the possibility of naming someone to stand in for the PM. I was consulting with NCNC ministers at Dr. Mbadiwe’s residence when we heard that the Northern and Western premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola respectively, had been assassinated. Hence I rushed back to Dipcharima’s residence, where I found my colleagues in a state of shock and desperation. However, we decided to recognize Dipcharima, a Kanuri from Bornu, as our interim leader; and to ask the acting President, Dr. Orizu (President Azikiwe was away on leave), to appoint Dipcharima acting Prime Minister. We also summoned Major General Ironsi and gave him full authority to use every force at his disposal to suppress the rebellion. He moved his headquarters temporarily to the police headquarters at moloney street to facilitate easy communication with army units in the regions.
While at Dipcharima’s residence, we contacted the British High Commission and requested for military assistance in the event that our loyal troops should require any. The response was positive, but the British insisted that the request must be written by the PM; or, in his absence, by a properly appointed deputy. We, therefore, drove to the residence of Dr. Orizu, and requested him to appoint Dipcharima acting prime minister. Dr. Orizu requested to see our NCNC colleagues to confirm whether they supported our proposition, and they joined us soon afterwards. They had apparently been caucusing at Dr. Mbadiwe’s residence. He (Mbadiwe) was their choice of acting Prime Minister. This was naturally unacceptable to us since the NPC was the major governing party. While we were at Orizu’s residence, Major-General Ironsi, who had seemingly secured Lagos, came in with some armed escorts. He requested for a tete-a-tete with Orizu. The two had a 40 minutes discussion in another room, while we waited anxiously in the sitting room, with the armed soldiers standing and staring at us.
When Major-General Ironsi finally emerged, he talked to Dipcharima sotto voce; and then drove off with his troops. Dr. Orizu then joined us, regretted his inability in the circumstances to oblige our request. He suggested we all return to our homes and wait until we were required. All efforts to get any clarification failed, and we left in utter desperation. I was about to break the Ramadan fast on Sunday 16th January, when all ministers were asked to report to the Cabinet Office at 6.30 pm. The whole premises was surrounded by soldiers in battle order that some of us initially hesitated to enter. In the Cabinet chamber were Major General Ironsi, Bukar Dipcharima and Ibrahim Tako Galadima. There were no officials present. Major General Ironsi admitted to us that he had been unable to suppress the rebellion, which he said was getting out of hand. He stated that the mutineers were in control of Kaduna, Kano and Ibadan, and had killed two regional premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola. They had also murdered a number of his best officers, including Brigadiers Maimalari and Samuel Adesujo Ademulegun, the Commander 1st Brigade Headquarters in Kaduna. Ironsi was full of emotion and even shed some tears. When we asked him about the whereabouts of Sir ABubakar and Chief Okotie-Eboh, he said he still did not know but averred efforts were being made to locate them. At this stage Mbadiwe broke down and kept crying: “Please where is the Prime Minister?”
When we reminded Major-General Ironsi if he needed to avail himself of the British pledge of assistance, he replied it was too late as the army was pressing him to assume power. Indeed, he confessed his personal reluctance to take over because of his ignorance of government; but insisted the boys were adamant and anxiously waiting outside. He advised it would be in our interest, and that of the country, to temporarily cede power to him to avert disaster. Accordingly, we acceded to his request since we had no better alternative. Ironsi then insisted that the understanding be written. Surprisingly, there was no stationery to write the agreement; and all the offices were locked while no official was around. Alhaji AGF Abdulrazaq the Minister of State for the Railways (former NPC legal adviser), managed to secure a scrap paper on which he drafted a statement, which we endorsed. That was the so called voluntary hand-over of power by the Balewa Government to Major General Ironsi! It was agreed that the statement would be typed and Dipcharima would sign it on our behalf. We were then advised to return home and await further instructions.
I only got to break my Ramadan fast around 9:30 pm. Later at 11.50 pm, Dr. Orizu made a terse nationwide broadcast, announcing the cabinet’s voluntary decision to transfer power to the Armed Forces. Major General Ironsi then made his own broadcast, accepting the “invitation”. He suspended certain parts of the constitution; set up a national military government, with the office of military governors in each region; and briefly outlined the policy intentions of his regime. Nigeria’s first democratic experiment was effectively over. And although the mutiny had by then practically collapsed, military rule had arrived. It was a fact. The following morning, 17 January, Alhaji Kam Salem, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police (then also doubling for the Inspector-General, Mr. Louis Orok Edet, while on vacation), called at my residence to confide that both the PM and Chief Okotie-Eboh had been confirmed killed. He then hinted that Major General Ironsi was still negotiating with the rebels in Kaduna, led by Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu”
Then Lt. Col. (later General) Gowon, who
was not physically present when the rump cabinet was handing over, says Ironsi
and his assistants told him then that it was voluntary. He recalls
asking three separate times to be certain, but now says that had he known it
was not, he would have acted differently on that day as commander of the
2nd battalion which supported Ironsi in putting down the Ifeajuna- Nzeogwu
revolt. The substantive President, Nnamdi Azikiwe, also of eastern
origin, had left the country in late 1965 on a health cruise to the caribbean,
after allegedly being tipped off by his cousin, Major Ifeajuna, one of the
masterminds of the coup and, some say, overall leader. In fact his
personal physician, Dr. Idehen, abandoned him abroad when he got tired of the
“health trip”, unaware that there was a good reason why Azikiwe did not want to
return to Nigeria. Not even the Commonwealth Leaders Conference
hosted for the first time by the country in early January was incentive enough
for the President to return. After the coup, in a statement to the Press
in England on January 16, however, among other things, Azikiwe stated:
“Violence has never been an instrument
used by us, as founding fathers of the Nigerian Republic, to solve political
problems. ….I consider it most unfortunate that our 'Young Turks' decided to
introduce the element of violent revolution into Nigerian politics. No matter
how they and our general public might have been provoked by obstinate and
perhaps grasping politicians, it is an unwise policy……..As far as I am
concerned, I regard the killings of our political and military leaders as a
national calamity….”
The same Ifeajuna was later to be accused
by Major Nzeogwu, leader of northern operations, of bungling or ignoring an
apparent agreement to assassinate General Ironsi in Lagos - an oversight that
caused the failure of the coup. Indeed, Nzeogwu bluntly declared publicly that
the execution of the coup in the South was tribalistic.
Those who have defended the January
mutiny as being motivated by nationalistic, rather than tribal instincts, say
Ironsi escaped because he had gone for a party on a Boat along the Marina that
night and was not at home when mutineers allegedly came
calling. Tenuous explanations exist for why the Igbo speaking
Premiers of the Midwest and Eastern regions were spared and no Igbo commanding
or staff officer was specifically targeted. January apologists also
say that there were a few non-Igbo officers involved (although none were
entrusted with key targets and most were brought in at the last
minute). It is argued that the mainly Igbo speaking plotters
intended to release Chief Obafemi Awolowo (a westerner) from jail in
Calabar to make him leader. Others interpret the same information,
combined with the highly specific pattern of killings, to mean that officers
sympathetic to the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), although hijacked
by the GOC of the Nigerian Army carried out the coup.
On January 17, Major General
Ironsi established the Supreme Military Council in Lagos and announced Decree
No. 1, effectively suspending the constitution, although it was not formally
promulgated until March. Later that day Major PCK
Nzeogwu, the leader of the revolt in the northern region negotiated a
conditional surrender in which Ironsi agreed not to bring the mutineers to
military trial. The next day, military governors were appointed for
each of the four regions.
Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo was briefly
summoned back from the Imperial Defence College where he was undergoing a
course. Brigadier Babatunde Ogundipe, erstwhile Chief of Staff,
Nigerian Defence Forces, was made Chief of Staff, Supreme
Headquarters. Lt. Col Yakubu Chinwa Gowon, the most senior
surviving northern officer, who was in the process of assuming command of the
2nd Battalion at Ikeja on January 14/15, a unit which proved critical to
restoration of order in Lagos, was made Chief of Staff (Army).
Other early military appointments
include:
Chief of Staff (NAF), Lt.
Col. George Kurubo (East, non-Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 2 Bde, Lt. Col. H.
Njoku (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 2 Bn, Major H. Igboba
(Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Abeokuta Garrison,
Major G. Okonweze (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 4 Bn, Major Nzefili
(Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Federal Guards, Major
Ochei (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 1 Bn, Major D.
Ogunewe (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 1 Bde, Lt.
Col W. Bassey (East, non-Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 3 Bn, Major Okoro
(East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Depot, Major F.
Akagha (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 5
Bn, Major M. Shuwa (North)
It is said that there was initial
euphoria by the public, even in the far north, against old
ministers. However, there were some early problems too, which, to
discerning eyes, were pregnant with foreboding. In his book
“Years of Challenge”, Brigadier Samuel Ogbemudia (rtd) recalls:
“Before January 15, 1966, I had thought
that the Nigerian soldier was not blood thirsty, thus ruling out the
possibility of a bloody coup. Events proved me wrong and forced me to change my
opinion about the Nigerian soldier. Although the ordinary man on the
street welcomed the change of government, rejoiced and danced away in ecstatic
jubilation, the atmosphere was muggy.”
For example, in the West, AG/UPGA
supporters settled scores against supporters of former Premier Akintola’s NNDP,
creating a major crisis which evolved into an international refugee
problem. It is said that 2000 refugees fled across the border to
neighbouring Dahomey before the border was closed from January
16-26. No less than a thousand people were killed in the melee
before Lt. Col. FA Fajuyi, the new military governor, detained
surviving NNDP supporters allegedly for their own protection. In the
North, there were some subdued early signs of a recoil among civilian elite,
while unrest simmered in the Army. The net result was that Ironsi
quickly felt threatened by Nzeogwu's supporters on one hand, and upset northern
troops on the other.
REFLECTIONS OF AN IGBO DIPLOMAT
In his book, “No Place to Hide - Crises
and Conflicts inside Biafra”, Bernard Odogwu, then a Nigerian diplomat, but
destined to become Chief of Biafran Intelligence, reveals that shortly
after the coup of January 15, 1966 he and a fellow diplomat called Adamu
Mohammed at the Nigerian mission to the United Nations in New York had a frank discussion
about it. Odogwu wrote that “we were both in agreement that the so
called ‘revolutionaries’ had performed very badly, in view of the one sidedness
of the operation and the selectiveness of the killings.” Following
this discussion Odogwu made an entry on January 23, 1966 into his personal
notebook:
“With all the returns in, we now seem to have a complete picture of the coup, the plotters, and the casualties. Reading through the newspapers, one gets the impression that this national catastrophe, which is termed a “revolution”, is being blown greatly out of proportion. It does appear to me though, that we have all gone wild with jubilation in welcoming the so-called ‘dawn of a new era’ without pausing to consider the possible chain reactions that may soon follow…
…….I shudder at the possible aftermath of this folly committed by our boys in khaki.; and what has kept coming to my mind since the afternoon is the passage in Shakespeare’s MACBETH - ‘And they say blood will have blood’. First I ask myself this question; ‘What will be the position as soon as the present mass euphoria in welcoming the ‘revolution’ in the country fades away?’ There is already some rumour here within diplomatic circles that January 15 was a grand Igbo design to liquidate all opposition in order to make way for Igbo domination of the whole country. What then is the Igbo man’s defence to this allegation in light of the sectional and selective method adopted by the coup plotters? Although, sitting here alone as I write this, I am tempted to say that there was no such Igbo grand design, yet the inescapable fact is that the Igbos are already as a group being condemned by the rest for the activities of a handful of ambitious Igbo army officers; for here I am, with the rest of my Igbo colleagues, some thousands of miles away from home, yet being put on the defensive for such actions that we were neither consulted about, nor approved of. Our Northern colleagues and friends now look on us Igbos here as strangers and potential enemies. They are now more isolated than ever before. Their pride is hurt; and who would blame them?
Secondly, I ask myself the questions posed to me this afternoon by my colleague; what would I do if I were placed in the position of the Northerner? What do I do? How do I react to the situation? Do I just deplore and condemn those atrocities or do I plan a revenge? I do not blame the Northern chaps for feeling so sore since the events of the last few days. They definitely have my sympathy, for it must have been shocking to say the least, for one to wake up one fine morning to find nearly all one’s revered leaders gone overnight. But they were not only Northern leaders as such, and I am as much aggrieved at their loss as any other Nigerian, Northern or otherwise. I am particularly shocked at the news that Major Ifeajuna personally shot and killed his mentor, Brigadier Maimalari. My God! That must have been Caesar and Brutus come alive, with the Brigadier definitely saying ‘Et tu Emma’ before collapsing………”
“…….As for the new man at the helm of affairs, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, he too like the majority of the Majors is an Igbo, and that has not helped matters either. …..”
“…….Granted that he is such a good soldier as he is reputed to be, the question is: ‘Are all good soldiers necessarily good statesmen? Again how well prepared is he for the task he has just inherited?’ I do hope that he is also as wise as he is reputed to be bold, because if you ask me, I think the General is sitting on a time bomb, with the fuse almost burnt out. We shall wait and see what happens next, but from my observations, I know the present state of affairs will not last long. A northern counter-action is definitely around the corner, and God save us all when it explodes.”
MISUNDERSTANDING AND SUSPICION
Indeed, misunderstandings and suspicions
in Ibadan and Kaduna led to the deaths of Major S. A. Adegoke (who
was accused of running a checkpoint but was actually killed on suspicion of
cooperating with the mutineers) and 2/Lt. James Odu respectively, several days
after the Nzeogwu-Ifeajuna January mutiny had already been put
down. In the 4th Battalion at Ibadan, northern troops
drove Igbo officers out of the barracks and refused to cooperate with Major
Nzefili, a midwesterner from Ukwuani and the 2ic to late Lt. Col Largema, for
no other reason than he was ‘Igbo speaking’. Nzefili had absolutely
nothing to do with the January coup and, paradoxically, first heard of it via
early morning phone calls to the barracks from the American and British
embassies in Lagos looking for information. Nevertheless, four weeks
later, he had to be replaced by Lt. Col Joe Akahan, a Tiv officer from the
North, just to placate the soldiers. In exchange, Nzefili was made the
General Manager of the Nigerian Railway Corporation, where he had previously
worked in the days prior to joining the Army.
In Kaduna, when soldiers killed Odu,
several northern officers actually ran away from the barracks, fearful for
their lives. In the Federal Guards Company in Lagos,
northern rank and file fuming over the role of their commander, Major Donatus
Okafor, in the coup, refused to accept Major Ochei as their new commanding
officer unless Captain Joseph Nanven Garba was redeployed from Brigade HQ and
appointed his second in command. While all this was going on, about
32 officers and 100 other ranks were initially detained at KiriKiri prison on
suspicion of complicity in the coup. Captain Baba Usman, General Staff Officer
(II) Intelligence, was appointed military liaison to the Police and was
responsible for transporting them daily to Force Headquarters Moloney where
most were interrogated by a Police team on their part in the
coup. This team included Isa Adejo, MD Yusuf, and Mr. Trout, an expatriate
who was then Head of Special Branch. When the interrogations were completed in
March the detainees were distributed away from each other to other prisons, all
of which were in the South, but predominantly in the East - which proved to be
another source of suspicion. The report was then submitted to the government
and a panel nominated to court-martial the detainees, chaired by Lt. Col Conrad
Nwawo, the midwestern Igbo speaking officer and personal friend of Nzeogwu who
had negotiated Nzeogwu’s surrender in January. However, even this
panel found that every time it wanted to sit, the date was postponed by
directives from Supreme Headquarters, a process that repeated itself again and
again until overtaken by events in July.
On Friday January 21, acting on a tip
off, the decomposing corpse of the slain Prime Minster, Sir Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa, and others were discovered by Police at Mile 27 on the Lagos-Abeokuta
road. The only hint that gave away the identity of the late Prime
Minister’s body was the ‘frog and bridle pattern’ of the white gown he had worn
when arrested by Major Ifeajuna. The next day, coinciding with the
moslem festival of Id-el-fitr, the Prime Minister’s death was officially
announced and he was buried in Bauchi. However, the Ironsi government
decided not to publicly announce the deaths of others who had been killed in
the coup, including all the top military officers, leaving room for rumors and
innuendos. Indeed their deaths were not officially publicly
announced until Ironsi was overthrown.
The shape of Ironsi’s advisory team
became clear as time went on. Chief among them was Francis Nwokedi,
former permanent secretary in the ministry of external affairs, who had become
close to him during his days in the Congo. Others were Pius Okigbo
(economic adviser) and Lt. Col Patrick Anwunah who was later Chairman of the
National Orientation Committee. However, most of General Ironsi’s
advisers were faceless civilians. The most common complaint was
that, although highly qualified and distinguished, they were either all Igbos
or Igbo speaking. I have no way of verifying or refuting this
allegation. Knowing how other governments in Nigeria have behaved
(and continue to behave), it is hard to know what to make of these
observations, but they were recorded by observers across ethnic and regional
boundaries.
On February 12, Ironsi took his most
sensitive decision to date when he made Nwokedi the sole commissioner
for the establishment of an administrative machinery for a unified Nigeria
- even though he already appointed a separate Constitutional Review Panel under
Rotimi Williams which had not submitted a report. Four days later he
promulgated the Suppression of Disorder Decree making allowance for
military tribunals and martial law. About this time too, he
abolished the compulsory Hausa language test for entry into the northern
civil service - a decision which appealed not just to non-Hausa speaking
northerners but also to southerners eyeing northern public service careers as
well. Ironsi also authorized a counter-insurgency campaign
against Isaac Boro's "Peoples Republic of the Niger
Delta". The internal security operation in the Kaiama area of
present day Bayelsa state that captured Boro was led by Major John Obienu of
the Recce regiment supported by infantry elements of the 1st battalion in
Enugu, prominent among whom was then Lt. YY Kure. Boro was
eventually convicted of treason and sentenced to death only to be released by
the subsequent Gowon regime and die fighting during the civil war.
The fissures in the polity were becoming
increasingly glaring. For example, on the one hand, Peter Enahoro
(Peter Pan) criticized Ironsi's indecisiveness with national issues. On the
other, the murder of northerners in January and lack of prosecution of those
responsible was the focus of increasingly strident write-ups in Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, a Hausa
newspaper. In the background, increasing food prices as a result of
the delayed effect of 1965 crises in the west on planting was beginning to affect
the prices of food stuffs everywhere.
Anyway, on February 21st, General Ironsi
announced a bold reform policy. A few days later on the
25th the former President, Nnamdi Azikiwe, quietly returned to the
country, only to become the focus of controversy when subsequently dismissed by
Lt. Col Ojukwu as Chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
On March 7, sensing some heat, former
leading politicians in the Western and Eastern regions were detained, but those
of the northern region were left alone because of political sensitivities
resulting from the coup. Indeed, Ironsi made an effort - ultimately
insufficient - to walk on eggs with the North. The way his advisers
saw it, he had appointed and promoted the son of the Emir of Katsina as the new
military Governor, released NPC ministers who were detained by Nzeogwu in
Kaduna, reappointed Sule Katagum to the Public Service Commission
and placed Malam Howeidy in charge of the Electricity Corporation of
Nigeria. In May, among other promotions, he promoted three
substantive northern Captains (Ibrahim Haruna of Ordnance, Murtala Muhammed of
Signals and Mohammed Shuwa of Infantry) who were then acting Majors to the
ranks of temporary Lt. Cols. But he fell short on more culturally
sensitive matters. For example, the military governor of
the northern region, then Major Hassan Katsina, was discouraged by
the Ironsi government from attending the funeral of the late Prime Minister
Balewa in Bauchi. Proper funerals were not allowed for the other
victims of the January coup.
On March 31st, military governors were
asked to join the federal executive council, thus enlarging its
membership. On April 14, native authority councils and local
government entities in the North were dissolved. By then the concept
of unification was garnering controversial attention. Mustafa
Danbatta and Suleiman Takuma wrote strong public letters against unification in
April 7 and 19 respectively. Takuma was arrested, in part
because he raised the sensitive issue of trying the January plotters.
On 12 May, proposed Decrees 33 and
34 were discussed by the SMC. Decree No. 33 was a list of 81
political societies and 26 tribal and cultural associations that were to be
dissolved. Decree No. 34 divided Nigeria into 35 provinces and made
all civil servants part of a unified civil service. It is said
that there was opposition and that the final version was watered
down. Even then, although Ironsi did not legally require
approval of the SMC for decisions, there continues to be doubt about whether
Ironsi fully appreciated the depths of opposition, which Decree 34 would create
in the North. How vigorously did Katsina, Kam Salem, and Gowon, for
example, forewarn him of consequences? Had he by then become hostage
to a kitchen cabinet outside government?
The answer may have been provided by two
sources. According to Brigadier Ogbemudia (rtd) who was then Brigade
Major at the 1st Brigade, during a visit to Kaduna, 1st Brigade
Commander Lt. Col Bassey tried to advise General Ironsi to back off from the
controversial decree, but a civilian adviser who came along with the General
retorted saying: “Colonel, the General understands Nigerians
more than you here. You will find that the people will soon see him as the much
sought redeemer of our dreams. Do not worry. Everything is under
control.” It was claimed that national surveys had been done
to show that the decree was welcome all over the country. More
recently General Gowon has said the matter was still being discussed in the SMC
when the government suddenly promulgated the decree. That said,
Eastern region Governor Lt. Col. Ojukwu did not help matters for the
General when, the next day after promulgation on May 24, he publicly announced
in Enugu that on the basis of seniority, Igbo civil servants would be
transferred to other regions and Lagos. Needless to say, he
unintentionally sent shivers through the northern civil service because that
region was not only educationally disadvantaged but traditionally paid the
lowest salaries in the federation, automatically relegating northerners to the
bottom of any unified civil service.
Caught between radical (pro January 15)
and conservative (anti January 15) polarities, Ironsi could be said to have
promulgated the 24th May decrees to satisfy the radical intelligentsia in
the southern press while projecting vision, authority and
control. But funny enough the leading spokesman for the
January coup, Major Nzeogwu, was later quoted during his last interview in
April 1967 (with Ejindu) as saying the Unification decree was “unnecessary,
even silly”. It is also on record that a group of lecturers at the
University of Nigeria, Nsukka opposed unification. So it would seem
Ironsi was responding to other impulses.
According to Norman Miners, the unitary
concept advanced by Ironsi’s advisers was more likely motivated by ideological,
personal and economic agendas. In the book “The Nigerian Army
1956-66”, he expresses the opinion that the theoretical foundations date back
to the 1951 party congress of the NCNC. Indeed, the concept of federalism which
we now all sing about, was regarded by columnists in the West African Pilot in
the fifties as a colonial "divide and rule" contraption cooked up by
Britain as a concession to the North after the April 1953 riots in
Kano. The second plank upon which unification was built was the cost
argument. Unification was economically cheaper than multiple layers
of administration in the country - a position that was argued by Dr. Sam Aluko,
a notable economist. The third plank was the personal motive
factor. Unification offered southerners (including Igbos) vast new
employment opportunities in the “northern frontier”. The flip side of this was
the provocation of morbid fear of domination in the North, fear which united
hitherto antagonistic northern political constituencies.
PROVOCATIONS
While all of this was going on,
complaints about “Igbo provocations”, were increasing. Northerners
filed reports about parties being called by their Igbo colleagues to celebrate
what they called the “January Victory”. Offensive photographs
showing Major Nzeogwu standing on the late Sardauna of Sokoto were said to be
distributed in the open including market places. Some Igbos were
even alleged to have worn stickers to that effect and were eager, in
conversations with northerners, to point to Nzeogwu saying ‘Shi ne maganin ku”,
meaning “he is the one who can knock sense into you”. Grammophone
records with machine gun sounds were released, to remind Northerners, it is
said, of the bullets that felled their leaders in January. Celestine
Ukwu, a popular Igbo musician allegedly released a piece titled “Ewu Ne Ba
Akwa” meaning “Goats are crying” in Igbo (although there is an
account that claims that this song originated from a non-igbo artiste from
Rivers). Derogatory remarks about Northerners were reportedly
commonplace, even in Army Barracks. To compound matters, resentment
began building against Igbo traders who had allegedly raised the prices of
their foodstuffs to match the increases in the West. All
of these factors were shrewdly exploited by an unlikely coalition of
disenfranchised politicians, petty contractors, marketing board and northern development
corp debtors, civil servants and university students of northern
origin fearful of future career prospects in the public service. As
former President Shehu Shagari put it in his biography “Beckoned to Serve”,
…’From the northern viewpoint, the implications of all this in terms of
distribution of power, the allocation of public resources and amenities, the
prospect of Igbo and southern domination, and the threat to mainstream northern
ways of life were unmistakable.’ Opposition to unification in
particular was spearheaded by northern students and civil servants.
THE MAY RIOTS
Following General Ironsi’s broadcast on
Tuesday evening May 24, making Nigeria a Unitary State, initially peaceful
demonstrations by civil servants and students began on Friday May
27. On Saturday May 28 copies of the June edition of
Drum magazine arrived in the North , containing two provocative
articles; “Why Nigeria Exploded” by Nelson Ottah which allegedly derided
northern leaders, and “Sir Ahmadu rose in his shrouds and spoke from
the dead” by Coz Idapo, which allegedly featured a cartoon in which the
reverred late Premier was asking for forgiveness from Idapo. Some
authors have blamed these articles for the subsequent outbreak of wanton
violence and barbarity on Sunday May 29 continuing through to June 4-5 which
led to at least 600 Igbo deaths (according to the London Telegraph),
particularly in northern provinces like Kano, Bauchi, Sokoto, Katsina, and
Zaria. Indeed the Hausa phrase “A raba” meaning “Let us separate”
may first have been used by Bauchi rioters in
May. Interestingly, there were no May riots in Borno, Ilorin
and Makurdi. The riots were particularly bad in
Gusau. But in Sokoto township the combination of intervention by the
Sultan, the deployment of an Igbo dominated mobile Police Unit and the decision
by Igbo traders there not to fight back led to quick stabilization of the
situation.
One development during the May riots
which exposed the military vulnerability of the Ironsi government was the fear
to deploy troops for internal security duties. Back in March,
increasingly concerned about restive northern troops, General Ironsi had issued
an order that soldiers were not to be issued ammunition even for target
practice. During the May riots in the north, because of the
dominance of northerners in the rank and file of infantry units it was feared
that soldiers would not take orders to shoot against fellow northerners in
defence of Igbos.
The Ironsi regime, shaken by the riots
and unnerved by its lack of confidence in the state machineries of coercion,
reacted to the riots by blaming foreigners. It deported Major Boyle
(rtd) along with British correspondents Schwarz and Loshak, and took
the conciliatory position that the May decrees were only transitional measures
pending the return of civil rule. The government promised massive
assistance to educationally backward areas of the Country and sent campaign
vans to explain itself in vernacular all over the country. Unfortunately,
one of the deported British journalists (Walter Schwarz) went back to Britain
and wrote an article in the Guardian on June 25, titled: “General Ironsi’s
trust in his friends leads Nigeria back to tribal strife”.
On June 1st, General
Ironsi issued orders that anyone displaying provocative pictures or
singing offensive songs should be arrested for incitement and would face 3
months imprisonment or 50 pounds fine or both (Decree 40). Realizing
the folly of hitherto ignoring traditional lines of communication, he sought to
enlist the support of the Emirs to calm down the people. During a
June 1 conference of Northern Emirs and Chiefs with Lt. Col. Hassan Katsina,
the regime even went as far as saying that the May decrees did not affect the
territorial divisions of the country, and promise a constituent assembly and
referendum on any new constitution.
On June 8, the regime restated its
constitutional position. After this, the Sultan of Sokoto broadcast
an appeal for calm on June 17 and asked those who had left the North in fear to
return. On June 24, the government announced that it would set up
military courts to try nepotism and corruption. Simultaneously, nine
(9) northerners were detained (including the editor of gaskiya ta fi kwabo), and an Army company was deployed to Sokoto as
a permanent garrison allegedly under an Igbo Major. This
otherwise routine internal security move which resulted from intelligence
reports following the May riots caused apprehension locally since no such
military unit had been deployed there for many years going all the way back to
the days of the British and the Satiru rebellion. The editor and
cartoonist of the “Pilot” in the Eastern region were also detained for a
cartoon which showed the Ironsi government as a large Cock (which used to be
the NCNC symbol) crowing ‘One Country, One
Nationality’. Subsequently, on June 26, the Brett tribunal was
appointed to inquire into the May disturbances - to the consternation of the
North.
Still, the issue of what to do with the January boys remained a sore point and
mutual suspicion remained. On July 13, Ironsi announced military
prefects at local
level, and proposed rotation
of military governors. Northerners interpreted this as meaning that
Ojukwu, already being viewed with suspicion for his public pronouncements about
unification, was to be posted to Kaduna. There is, however, no evidence that
this is what was intended.
In the meantime, other than one
exploratory meeting with Lt. Col Hassan Katsina, old NPC politicians like
former Defence Minister Alhaji Inua Wada (who was also an uncle to Lt. Col.
Murtala Muhammed) and Aliyu Makaman Bida may have had unhindered access to
unaudited NPC funds. Wada is alleged by some to have wooed disaffected NEPU and
UMBC leaders like Aminu Kano and Joseph Tarka to share a common northern
political vision threatened by the new order. However, Military and
Police intelligence completely missed the boat when, based on nothing more than
his personal relationship with the late Prime Minister and Premier, Alhaji
Shehu Shagari was invited to Lagos in late July for 3 days of questioning about
disposition of certain NPC funds during the first republic. The
intelligence community was barking up the wrong alley - although it is also
true that the houses of Inua Wada, Daggash and others were searched.
This was not to be the only alleged
failure of intelligence in establishing the civilian linkages to and
sponsorship of the events of May and subsequent coup in July. Ojukwu
claims that he gave a tape of a conversation made in Kano about the planned
July 29 coup to Ironsi who then passed it on to acting Police IG Kam Salem (a
northerner), who by implication, buried it. Madiebo cites a flurry of other
intelligence failures in the North including an alleged leak from an informant called
Alhaji Suya who was supposedly a cousin of the late Sardauna.
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