All coups are usually justified in high brow terms designed
to appeal to the emotions and patriotism of the uninformed public. This was
no different. Each of the three speeches made that day - by Dogonyaro,
Abacha and finally by Babangida himself went to great lengths to rationalize
the Palace coup and make expedient gestures designed to appeal to cheap
populist instincts.
The official line was that the erstwhile Head of State and
his deputy (Major General Tunde Idiagbon) were guilty of dictatorial lack of
consultation with their military colleagues, gross abuse of human rights,
exemplified by mass detention of politicians and others without due process,
proscription of professional organizations, muzzling of the Press and
promulgation of retroactive laws (e.g. execution of drug peddlers). To
this was added insensitivity to respected leaders of thought in various parts
of Nigeria, the issue of counter-trade and alleged intent to take the IMF Loan
against popular wishes. The real problem, however, was a profound
personality clash and divergence of expectations and priorities among the
officers (and civilians) who originally conspired to effect (or benefit from)
the removal of President Shagari in 1983.
Indeed, Buhari, although peripherally involved in that plot,
was not an insider and was not critically operationally active by virtue of his
posting at the time in Jos - away from key centers of power. It has since
come to light that he may have owed his emergence as the new C-in-C on January
1, 1984 to the near solo effort of Major Mustafa Jokolo of the Military Police
who later became his ADC. Jokolo reportedly convinced his fellow middle
ranking inner circle storm troopers in Lagos to adopt the ascetic and
relatively clean Buhari, fresh from battle victories along the Lake Chad
border, as an acceptable national figure to unite the armed forces as a whole
behind the change and give it the façade of a patriotic putsch. Jokolo's
efforts were no doubt assisted by Babangida's lack of interest in the job at
that point in time - as well as the death of a key plotter, Brigadier Ibrahim
Bako, in murky circumstances. Unconfirmed news reports - never in short
supply in gossip rich Nigeria - quote Babangida as telling confidants that he
was "not yet ready to move over to the other (political) side."
Over the years, more mundane reasons for the August coup
have become public knowledge. For example, in a unpublished
thesis titled, "Military Involvement in Politics in Nigeria: The Effect on
Nigerian Army", written in 1989 at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, then Major Habibu Idris Shuaibu,
speaking as one of those who backed General Babangida's putsch, claims that the
reason for the coup against Buhari was that Buhari did not distribute positions
to junior officers. Another unconfirmed report, for example, suggests
that Colonel Dogonyaro's promotion to Brigadier may have been delayed by
Buhari. Clearly these were the perspectives (if true) of some of
the junior and middle ranking officers who were used to carry it out but does
not inherently explain the coup at the level of its originators.
Regarding civilian involvement, other unconfirmed reports
speculate profound displeasure on the part of Chief MKO Abiola, who was alleged
to have helped finance the 1983 coup. Abiola was upset not only with the
decision of the Buhari regime to seize and auction a large consignment of his
newsprint (which had allegedly been smuggled into the country) but also with an
inquiry into the possible role of a relative in the drug trade. This, the
story alleges, motivated Abiola to financially assist Buhari's removal.
But Abiola was not the only unhappy figure in the private sector, assuming such
reports are true. Unconfirmed reports identified other individuals with
business interests like Dantata.
Regarding the role of intellectuals, Professor Omo Omoruyi,
a self described personal counselor and friend to Babangida, has also written
that he was "privy and party to" Babangida's "personal
decision (not as Chief of Army Staff) to overthrow the government of Major
General Muhammadu Buhari". He has revealed that IBB "came to office
without a political programme and with no modality for putting one in
place."
Major General MC Alli (rtd) throws in another dimension. He
described the coup as "an enigmatic, sleek and sophisticated purge
received with press-inspired fanfare in August 1985" concocted by
Babangida "in consort with northern officers, particularly of Middle Belt
extraction based on the products of Regular 3 Officer's Course at the Defence
Academy." It was executed by a cabal of company and field grade
officers who, in due course, would come to be known as "IBB
Boys". Speaking with the benefit of insights gained as then Deputy
Director, Joint Services, at the Supreme Headquarters, Alli says that tensions
between the Army (specifically Babangida and Abacha) and the Buhari regime
(specifically Buhari and Idiagbon) came to a head when Ministry of Defence
contracts and accounts were placed under scrutiny.
Refining this further, in a recent interview in Kaduna on 20
March 2002, Major General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd) (MB) had the following
conversation with Antony Goldman (AG):
"AG: What prompted the coup in 1985?
MB: We had confirmed evidence
that for the second time Aliyu Mohammed had been making money from passing on
contracts to the tune of N1m, which was worth $1.4m at the time. It was brought
before the army council and Aliyu was retired. Some of those involved are dead.
But enough of us who were there are still alive and they know this is what
happened.
AG: Do you think you should have
found any way also of retiring Babangida?
MB: I had no idea, I had no
intention of retiring Babangida. It's just like what they cooked up. They said
I took away the passport of Sheikh Mahmud Gummi, aformer respected mullah here,
that I had stopped his salary, that I had ordered his house to be searched. But
all of these things I didn't do as Head of State. But it was part of the
campaign to subvert me and to subvert my authority.
AG: And that was the trigger for
the coup?
MB: Yes, Babangida felt
threatened, he was close to Aliyu and perhaps he was afraid. He was head of the
armoured corps, he could move."
It would seem, therefore, that from Buhari's perspective,
the retirement of then Colonel Aliyu Mohammed was the trigger factor for the
take-over - whatever else may have been brewing in the background. As Director
of Military Intelligence, Aliyu was Babangida's siamese twin in the coup
against former President Shagari. Some have claimed that "live
and let live" arguments were made to the effect that Aliyu Mohammed's
import license and other business activities were at least in part geared to
raise funds for the December 1983 coup, of which Buhari, although unaware of
the said transactions, was the eventual beneficiary. This line of
thinking allegedly found justification in the precedent whereby
'revolutionaries' may have to rob banks to raise funds in support of the
'revolution'. However, Buhari allegedly rejected this argument, declaring
that there could be no sacred cows or extenuating circumstances. By so doing he
profoundly upset the innermost cabal of officers who organized the 1983 coup -
and played into the hands of his alarmed Army Chief who had long laid the
groundwork for such a confrontation.
As things happened, assuming newspapers and magazines are to
be believed, Aliyu was actually retired by the office of the Military Secretary
(MS), at that time under Colonel Rabiu Aliyu, who was away on vacation.
However, one of his assistants, the Deputy MS II, then Lt. Col. Bashir Salihi
Magashi was on hand to complete the task. Along with Babangida, Aliyu
Mohammed Gusau was reportedly placed under intense surveillance (including wire
taps) by the NSO -prompting him to pressure the coup planners to stop
prevaricating, act quickly or leave him no choice but to escape. Buhari
was removed in the nick of time before his government could formally officially
gazette the retirement - which was revoked by executive order immediately
Babangida came to power.
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