Could the August Coup
Have Failed?
Most
coups planned and executed by Army Chiefs have succeeded in history but, as was
noted earlier, there have been some spectacular
failures. Passing reference was made to the Soviet and
Venezuelan coup attempts of 1991 and 2002. However, what transpired
in Ethiopia in May 1989 is well worth recalling in some detail.
In
February 1989, during the Ethiopian civil war, the Tigray Peoples Liberation
Front, with support from the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, launched an
attack against the town of Inda Silase in western Tigray, nearly annihilating a
20,000 man Ethiopian force. This forced a humiliating tactical withdrawal of
Ethiopian units from much of the rest of Tigray province without a shot being
fired. The embarrassment and frustration of this defeat was a major factor in a
subsequent unsuccessful coup attempt against Lt. Col.
Mengistu. On May 16, as he departed on a State visit to East
Germany, the Armed Forces moved against him. Air Force General Fanta
Belay, supported by the Air Force Chief, General Amha Desta, coordinated the
coup. Those involved included the entire Ethiopian Army Headquarters
Heirarchy led by the Chief of Staff, General Abiy Negussie. In
addition to the Army Chief, the Commanders of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th
revolutionary armies in the field took part. And yet it
failed! Why?
It
failed for several reasons. First the plotters failed to arrest
Mengistu on his way out of the country or shoot down his plane - an error it is
said, that resulted from miscommunication between two Air Force commands. Secondly,
plotters assumed that opposition to Mengistu was universal in the Ministry of
Defence. So they made the mistake of involving the Minister of
Defence, Major General Haile Giorgis Habte Mariam in the
scheme. While they were debating further measures in his office
(such as whether or not to kill Mengistu now that they were in power), General
Habte Mariam secretly alerted Mengistu's political deputy, Fikre Sellassie
Wogderes, who had not been arrested. Wogderes in turn alerted East
German authorities as Colonel Mengistu's plane began the final landing approach
in their country. Mengistu landed, got his plane refueled and then
turned around to return to Ethiopia to crush the
rebellion. Meanwhile, aided by reliable intelligence from East German military advisers on the ground inside Ethiopia, Mengistu maintained surveillance on coup activities but the plotters did not know his whereabouts and movements. He also had the loyalty of the Presidential Guard, which, incredulously, had not been neutralized. Using the plane as a command center, Mengistu ordered the Presidential Guard, supported by militia units, to surround the Ministry of Defence, isolating the key plotters. Upon arrival he proceeded to detain the entire Ministry of Defence as well as the Commanders of the four Ethiopian Armies; grounded the Ethiopian Air Force and summarily executed hundreds of officers. The Commander of the 2nd Army, General Demissie Bultu, was beheaded. Needless to say, the decimation of entire generations of officers eventually led to the collapse of the Ethiopian war effort and Mengistu's eventual fall from power two years later. But it shows that a ruthless despot can take on his entire defence establishment, aided by a few key personalities and critical units, supported by a foreign intelligence outfit.
In
contrast, General Buhari of Nigeria was isolated early in the game in August
1985, and had no foreign intelligence outfit on ground to shield himself from
the intrigues of Army Intelligence, which was able to cocoon itself from the
prying eyes of the NSO. Like many Nigerian leaders before him,
intelligence at his disposal from other sources was vague about the impending
coup. He had no independent foreign security guard outfit either, and
“sleepers” at battalion level had long undermined his control of the indigenous
Brigade of Guards. Units he could rely on in Jos - particularly if
he had chosen early enough to leave Lagos for Abuja - were
neutralized. It is not clear either that he was cut out of the kind of
ruthless protoplasm Lt. Col. Mengistu was made of. Otherwise, based
on vague intelligence, with enough paranoia, he may well have moved
pre-emptively against the Army, declaring a state of emergency, freezing
movements and ordering massive redeployments, followed by a purge.
Military And
Security Implications Of The Coup
1.
Spy Games and Body Guards
Other
than the initial decisions to release politicians and accused drug peddlers,
while repealing draconian decrees and throwing open the debate on an IMF loan,
the new Babangida regime singled out the Nigerian Security Organization (NSO)
for humiliation. Led by Deputy Inspector General of Police Mohammed
Gambo, the dungeons of the NSO were thrown open to the Press and plenty of hay
made out of its alleged abuses – even as arrangements were being quietly made
for security reorganization that would later prove to be much more
malignant. Its erstwhile Director, Alhaji Lawal Rafindadi, not
particular popular within the organization anyway, was detained for three
years.
 |
| Gen. Joshua Dongoyaro |
In
1979, however, President Shagari appointed Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi, a
sophisticated Policeman and Lawyer with a background in Intelligence and
Interpol, to the position. Thus the original rationale for the
creation of the NSO and intent for the position to be held by military
officers, parallel to military intelligence, got lost between the cracks.
When
General Buhari came to power, he appointed a career diplomat, Ambassador
Rafindadi to the post, further confusing issues – although the Ambassador
obviously had some strengths on the external intelligence front, having
previously served in the “special intelligence unit” of the Ministry of
External Affairs. But as Buhari’s relationship with the military deteriorated,
the relationship between Rafindadi and the military (specifically Aliyu
Mohammed, Babangida and Akilu) correspondingly deteriorated, amplified by his
peculiar background as a “bloody” civilian diplomat, intensely personal loyalty
to Buhari and image as an upstart in the domestic intelligence
community. His lack of previous military service later proved to be
a disadvantage when Military Intelligence began playing games – complicated by
internal NSO purges he carried out which cost the organization the service of
some very highly qualified and experienced Shinkafi-era operatives.
Piqued
by the pervasive nature of its operations, including wire taps which allegedly
even recorded telephone conversations made by his daughter, Babangida’s first
instinct when he came to power was to crush the organization. But as
Blair noted in the movie “Power Play”, the new regime soon discovered that it
too would need a security apparatus. In June 1986, therefore, following
an inquest led by Umaru Shinkafi, Babangida finally issued Decree Number 19,
disbanding the NSO (under Brigadier Aliyu Mohammed and Lt. Col. AK Togun) and
decentralizing Nigeria's security community. Three new organizations
were codified. They were:
1. The
State Security Service (SSS) responsible for domestic intelligence (under
Ismaila Gwarzo and Lt. Col. AK Togun);
2. The
National Intelligence Agency (NIA) for external intelligence and
counterintelligence;
3. The
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) for military-related intelligence both
outside and inside Nigeria (under Rear Admiral B. Elegbede and Colonel MC
Alli).
They
all reported to the Adviser for National Security and Chairman of the Joint
Intelligence Board, Brigadier Aliyu Gusau Mohammed – who had himself been the
first Director of the embryonic, some say experimental DIA under Buhari.
2.
Paranoia in High Places
In
the aftermath of the August coup, acutely aware of the way he had undermined
Buhari, Babangida ensured that sensitive positions in the military were
occupied by hand-picked officers who were either “IBB Boys” or apolitical types
with no known membership of other client networks within the
Army. He did not risk performance evaluation driven random (or not
so random) assignment from the Office of the Military Secretary under the COAS,
then Major General Sani Abacha. A good example was the way the new
Officer Commanding the 6th Guards Battalion in Bonny Camp was
selected to replace Lt. Col JM Madaki who had been elevated to the Command
of the Brigade of Guards. JM Madaki had been a reliable ‘IBB Boy’
not only during the coup against Buhari but also during the coup against
Shagari back in 1983. And so Major Tobias Akwashiki, a pleasant
apolitical officer who was in the process of making arrangements to take
up a new assignment as a Battalion commander in Minna was personally
approached outside normal military channels by the new C-in-C’s ADC and offered
the command of the sensitive 6th battalion. As things
happened, this ‘opportunity’ almost cost him his life on trumped up charges
during the Vatsa conspiracy trial.
This
method of personalizing Army appointments and extracting debts of appreciation
was to become a pattern in the years to come. But it did not stop
there. Babangida knew he had to build a wall around himself to
insulate the regime from the same Army he had used so skillfully to undermine
others. In addition to a liberal policy of patronizing pay-offs
(also known as “settlement”) he, therefore, toyed with creation
of new paramilitary organizations such as the National
Guard. This was commanded until he left office in 1993 only by the
likes of his most intimate loyalists like Gwadabe and Aminu, for
example. He invited Israeli security experts to help him train
personal security men at Ojo cantonment. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs under Col. Shagaya was encouraged to maintain an independent Security
and Civil Defence Force. Indeed, Babangida even granted the Minister
of Internal Affairs the authority to arrest and detain suspects without trial,
independent of the Chief of General Staff and the Inspector General of
Police.
He
also resuscitated the old concept of a Lagos Garrison
Command. Subsequently, in 1989, after a review by Rear Admiral
Murtala Nyako, the Federal Investigation & Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) was
set up to replace the Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation of the
Nigeria Police. Babangida also tried to decentralize (regionalize) the Defence
HQ by relocating the Army, Air Force and Naval Headquarters to Minna, Lagos and
Kano, respectively, a decision that was stoutly resisted by many retired
officers who looked in bewilderment as he was systematically dismantling,
disorienting and distracting the Defence establishment. The worst
was yet to come, however. The Ministry of Defence HQ, housed in the
historic Independence Building in Lagos was nearly destroyed in a mysterious
fire. A C-130 Hercules aircraft accident – allegedly caused by fuel
contamination - claimed the lives of approximately 150 middle ranking officers
in September 1992.
In
later years, when he became the C-in-C, General Abacha, having patiently
understudied Babangida, acted in much the same manner when it came to stifling
the Defence establishment. He purged the more dangerous coup addicts
among his fellow IBB boys (whom he had never trusted anyway). He
also defanged the National Guard but then later replaced it with the Special
Bodyguard Unit and Strike Force, a well armed Korean and Libyan trained
parallel security organization under his Chief Security Officer, Major
Hamza.
Other consequences
The
August 27 coup had other short and long term consequences. Former
Army Chief General MC Alli is of the opinion that the Army, in collaboration
with a vocal minority in the civil class, sold its soul to the highest bidder.
The core coup planners, he says, "introduced an upcoming bunch of coup d’état
practitioners, mostly junior officers of the rank of Major and below" whom
he called "political officers or 'militricians'." The core
membership of this curious group were known (as noted previously) as "IBB
Boys", a collection of characters whose relationship with the Boss varied
from the intimate to the opportunistic. General MC Alli says membership of this
exclusive club "opened all material and official doors to them”. They were
a hotchpotch of scramblers for notice, office and bootlickers with a convoluted
understanding of their obligations to the constitution and the state. Loyalty
to an individual was their credo, and self interest was their tenet."
His
eloquent characterization of the so-called "IBB Boys" notwithstanding,
I respectfully disagree with General Alli that the 1985 coup in particular
"introduced an upcoming bunch of coup d'Etat practitioners, mostly junior
officers of the rank of Major and below". Many of the company
grade officers of August 1985, particularly in Lagos, had already taken part in
the coup against President Shagari in 1983. In other words they had
already been "introduced" into the business –if it may be so
called. Indeed the heritage of coup merchants of the 1980s can be
traced back to 1966. Most of the subalterns of July 1966 were the
main field grade officers of July 1975. Infighting among the
original July 1966 coup cabal led to the February 1976 shoot-out - otherwise
known as the Dimka coup. The field grade officers of July 1975 were
the Brigadiers of 1983. Infighting among the Brigadiers of 1983 gave birth to
August 1985. In other words, over a twenty-year period, the same
group of officers and men provided the infrastructure for repeated coups and
coup attempts and (knowingly or unknowingly) established a pipeline to sustain
the tradition.
Beginning
the day of, and shortly thereafter, details of what transpired on coup day
became the stuff of conversations in officers’ messes and mammy markets all over the country. Many of the storm troopers
of August could hardly hold back from flaunting their
"gallantry". Tales of how this or that road junction was
"seized", or how the Police was "overrun", or how civilians
looked on in awe of Tanks on the move became the stuff of legends laced with
hyperbole. Particularly disturbing though were bravado accounts of
how specific officers were arrested, beaten and/or
humiliated. Obviously, these officers, specifically Major General
Muhammadu Buhari, Brigadier Salihu Ibrahim, Colonel Sabo Aliyu,
along with Majors Mustafa Jokolo and Adesina, were luckier than the unfortunate
Policemen at Ikeja who were killed and many of their military forebears in
previous coups in Nigeria who were brutally murdered. And most could
not have failed to recognize the fact that the notion of arresting, stripping,
beating or killing senior officers - or looting their property - was not by any
means new, as had been graphically demonstrated in the January and July
rebellions of 1966. Those with even more distant
memories will also recall that there were several discrete investigations of
looting by Nigerian officers and soldiers during UN peacekeeping operations in
the Congo from 1960-64. During the civil war, looting was common
too. In December 1983, President Shagari's personal effects and lifelong
records were plundered after the coup.
But
the culture of bragging about it publicly and toasting to such a serious
assault on the ethos and value system of the military was bound to undermine
the institution. It was followed by thinly disguised rewards for
participants in the form of juicy political and military appointments. A few
examples will suffice.
Major
General Ibrahim Babangida became President and C-in-C and two years later, a
full General. He “stepped aside” under tense circumstances in August
1993. Brigadier Sani Abacha was promoted Major General and became
Chief of Army Staff, later Chairman, Joint Chiefs, Defence Minister and Head of
State – as a full General. Colonel JN Dogonyaro was promoted
Brigadier and became GOC, 3rd Armoured Division in Jos, and later GOC,
2nd Division, Ibadan. Although his desire to be Chief of Army
Staff was frustrated by Babangida he later commanded ECOMOG in Liberia, as well
as the tri-service Command and Staff College, and was Chief of Defence Staff
(as a Lt. General) for about 24 hours in 1993 before Abacha outmaneuvered
him. Colonel Aliyu Mohammed Gusau was recalled from retirement,
promoted Brigadier, and became National Security Coordinator, later a GOC of
the 2nd Division, Chief of Army Administration and much later, Chief of
Army Staff under Ernest Shonekan as a Lt. General. He too fell out
with General Abacha during the Abacha years. Lt. Col. Halilu Akilu
was promoted Colonel, retained Directorship of Military Intelligence and became
a member of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). He remained a
power broker and one time Coordinator of National Security until Abacha
cynically redeployed him to command the uninspiring Army Resettlement Scheme at
Oshodi in 1993, before booting him out of the Army altogether.
Lt.
Col. Tanko Ayuba was promoted Colonel, later became a Minister for
Communications and Kaduna State Governor. He eventually retired as a Major General.
Lt. Col. David Mark was promoted Colonel, later commanded the Signals Corps,
gained membership of the AFRC and also held the position of Minister for
Communications. Following the emergence of General Abacha in 1993,
retired Col. Mark escaped into exile for his own safety. Lt. Col.
John Nanzip Shagaya was promoted Colonel and became Minister for Internal
Affairs and later, as a Brigadier, GOC, 1st Division. He too, got the
short end of the stick from General Abacha in 1993. He recently
celebrated his 60th birthday, publicly announcing that he was proud to be
called an IBB Boy. Lt. Col. Chris Abutu Garuba was promoted Colonel
and became Governor of Bauchi for three years before returning to the Army to
hold a string of good local and foreign appointments, eventually rising to the
rank of Major General. Lt. Col. Raji Alagbe Rasaki was promoted
Colonel and became Commander, Corps of Signals and later Governor of Ogun and
Lagos. He was retired as a Brigadier. Col. Anthony Ukpo became a
Federal Minister, later Governor of Rivers and then Principal Staff Officer to
the President. He was retired as a Brigadier.
Lt.
Col Joshua M Madaki was made Commander, Brigade of Guards, promoted less than
two years later to Colonel and later became a Governor of Plateau State. He was
retired as a Major General. Major John Y. Madaki was initially left
at the 123 Battalion, then later promoted Lt. Col. became Governor of Katsina
State and later returned for two tours of duty as Commander, Brigade of Guards.
He was retired as a Colonel. Major Abdulmumuni Aminu was promoted
Lt. Col. and became Governor of Borno. After being cashiered as a
Colonel in 1993, he found solace in the Nigerian Football
Association. Major Lawan Gwadabe assumed Chairmanship of the
National Shipping Line, was promoted Lt. Col., then became Governor of Niger
State and later Commander of the embryonic National Guards before a stint as
Chief of the Gambian Army, succeeding another IBB Boy, late Brigadier Abubakar
Dada. He returned to Nigeria after the Yahya Jammeh coup in Gambia, was briefly
PSO to General Abacha and later Commander of an Armoured Brigade in
Yola. He was tortured, convicted and jailed for the so-called
Gwadabe/Bello-Fadile conspiracy of 1995.
Major
Abubakar Dangiwa Umar left the Federal Housing Authority to become Governor of
Kaduna State and was later promoted Lt. Col. In the turmoil that followed the
annulment of the June 12 elections in 1993 he was detained but not charged on
suspicion of another coup conspiracy. He later resigned his
commission – as a Colonel and Armoured Corps Commander. Major
Mohammed Sambo Dasuki became ADC to the Head of State, but was later shepherded
out of the country for Staff College training at Fort Leavenworth, followed by
a US based degree program in part to insulate him from the wrath of General
Abacha with whom he clashed. His father became the 17th Sultan
of Sokoto under Babangida, only to be deposed later by General
Abacha. As a Lt. Col., Sambo Dasuki was declared wanted in
connection with the 1995 Gwadabe/Bello-Fadile conspiracy and found solace in
Brunei. Major Maxwell Khobe was later promoted Lt. Col, and went on
to distinguish himself during ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone,
eventually dying from encephalitis as a Brigadier. Major UK Bello was later
promoted Lt. Col and became ADC to the Head of State. He was killed
during the so-called Orkar coup. In addition to these overt appointments,
numerous not so overt appointments of junior officers into Federal Parastatals
followed. Many other more discreet “IBB Boys”, like Buba Marwa, Zakare, Ogbeha,
Dada, Hart, Daku, and others were also quietly rewarded. A “Caucus”
of middle ranking officers was formalized outside the Armed Forces Ruling
Council. This caucus was more powerful than the
AFRC. Majors could decide the fate of Generals.
Not
surprisingly, this arrangement badly affected the morale of the more regimented
apolitical professional element in the military. It may be recalled
that after the July 1966 rebellion then Lt. Col. M. Muhammed urged the
innermost members of the conspiracy to keep sealed lips about what they had
accomplished. Muhammed reminded them that coup plotting, even when allegedly
forced by circumstances, was hardly honorable and did not have the moral status
of a war against an external enemy. There was nothing, he remarked,
to be proud about. But for the players of August, nearly 20 years
later, such high-minded considerations did not rise to the level of
consciousness. It was bad enough that many officers who were not
involved thought the circumstances of and reasons for the coup were dubious at
best. But coup planners and their collaborators broke bottles of
champagne and toasted. In fact, in years to come they would
repeatedly confront the authority of the traditional Army hierarchy and would
one day arrogate to themselves the right to decide who could rule or not rule
Nigeria.
Anyway,
cracks within the coup merchant family of ‘IBB boys’ appeared many years
later. General Abacha, instrumental to the annulment by Babangida of
the June 12, 1993 election that might have resulted in the assumption of the
Presidency by Chief MKO Abiola, turned on many of his former fellow coup
conspirators. He first did so during a series of deft purges in
August 1993 (Dogonyaro, Aliyu Mohammed, Akilu, JY Madaki, etc..) and then later
when, tipped off by Colonel Shuaibu, he arrested and/or declared a
group of officers wanted on charges of conspiracy to overthrow his government
in March 1995 (Gwadabe, Dasuki, Bulus, Mepaiyeda etc..). Interestingly,
therefore, ten years after the events of August 27, 1985, most of the officers
who carried out the coup and toasted their success with champagne were in
exile, had died, been jailed, retired or dismissed from the military. General
Abacha also deposed the 17th Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim
Dasuki, who, some people felt, had been installed by General Babangida
over the wishes of the Kingmakers. In June 1998, General Abacha
himself died in furtive circumstances, followed soon after by Chief MKO
Abiola.
In
May 1999, shortly after taking office as Nigeria’s new President, Olusegun
Obasanjo, as part of an uphill task to re-professionalize the military, purged
the Armed Forces of most of the few remaining IBB and Abacha Boys. On account
of lobbying and informed political hesitation, however, a few former personal
assistants to key figures in those regimes remain within the establishment.
Given the depth of professional decay over the years, combined with clouds over
the political horizon, insightful observers and military historians continue to
hope that the Nigerian Military’s re-professionalization effort will not merely
prove to be a reenactment of the myth of Sisyphus.
By
Nowa Omoigui
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