As Head of State, Buhari's
isolation from the military was gradual but relentless. It began almost
as soon as he came to power in 1984. While he was fixated on purely
political national issues with religious fervor, he did not notice that
specific officers were being quietly placed in specific operational positions
to lay in wait like 'sleepers' until they would be called upon to strike by the
very service chiefs he had naively placed his trust in to run the armed forces
on his behalf.
A classic example was the way
then Lt. Col. Halilu Akilu, already a Grade 1 Staff Officer in the Directorate,
was inserted into the office of Director of Military Intelligence while the
regular person on seat, then Lt. Col. MC Alli, was away to Britain and the US
for a very brief official assignment establishing liaison with other military
intelligence groups. MC Alli had been deputising for Col. Aliyu Mohammed
who had left for a course at the Royal College of Defence Studies after
assisting the overthrow of President Shagari. [Aliyu Mohammed later
returned to start up the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) with Col. S.
Anthony Ukpo as his deputy - although the DIA was not formally established in
law until June 1986 when Decree Number 19 was promulgated]. Akilu was
Babangida's mole in the intelligence community, a counterweight to Alhaji
Muhammadu Lawal Rafindadi, Buhari's loyal Director of the Nigerian Security
Organization (NSO).
Officers who would be crucial to
Babangida's take-over in 1985 had been cultivated for many years dating back to
their days as cadets in the Nigerian Defence Academy between 1970 and 1972 when
then Major Babangida, having recovered from war injuries suffered at Uzuakoli
as CO of the 44th battalion in the 1st division under Colonel Shuwa was made an
Instructor and Company Commander in the Short Service Wing (pairing up with his
coursemate and rival, Major MJ Vatsa of the Regular wing).
Simultaneously, over the years, aided by the convenience of his permanent
military posting to the Federal capital interrupted only by foreign courses
from late 1973 until 1985, Babangida developed intricate connections with
civilian contacts in business, the media, civil service, academia and religious
circles. He even devoted his thesis at the National Institute for Policy and
Strategic Studies (NIPSS) in 1979 to the question of civil-military
relations. He also skillfully manipulated the military sub-culture of
"welfare", through personal generosity and expressions of interest in
the personal lives and problems of junior officers, endearing himself to many.
Referring to Babangida (above),
Buhari said "He was head of the armoured corps; he could move
". What Buhari meant was that Babangida's clout increased as the
size, power and complexity of the Nigerian Army Armoured Corps (NAAC)
increased. To clarify this point, a brief history of that Corps -
in parallel with Babangida's own career history - is in order. First, let me explain a basic
concept. In American doctrine, the Army is organized into three main
areas (or "arms") of specialization;
i.
COMBAT
OR "TEETH" ARMS, like Infantry, Field Artillery, Armour, Army
aviation, and Combat Engineers (sappers), consist of branches involved in
direct combat;
ii.
COMBAT
SUPPORT ARMS, like Air Defence Artillery, Military Police, Intelligence,
and Signals are those which directly aid Combat Arms; while,
iii.
COMBAT
SERVICE SUPPORT ARMS, like Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Medical,
Chaplain, Supply and Transport, Ordnance, and Finance include those branches
which provide logistic or other forms of support to the Army. It should
be noted, however, that there is a school of thought (of British origin) that
classifies Intelligence and Signals as "Teeth" arms. Nigeria
subscribes to the latter thinking.
According to Encyclopedia
Brittanica, the Infantry ". has borne the brunt of human conflict through
the ages, and has been called the 'Queen of Battle.'" Infantry officers
often refer to excerpts of a famous Fort Benning quote that goes:
"I
am the Infantry.. Queen of Battle! Where the fighting is thick, there am I . .
. I am the Infantry! ...Follow me!"
No one "Arm" is
independent. However, although the infantry understandably likes to call
itself the "Queen of Battle", of all the 'teeth' arms in the Army,
the Armored corps is arguably the most powerful and decisive, uniting the
concepts of firepower, mobility and protection. This was brilliantly
exploited by German General Heinz Guderian in developing the
"Blitzkrieg" strategy of World War 2. All through modern history, the
decisive defeat of Armored units and/or their predecessors or variants in the
Cavalry has been a key element of finality in the military equation. In
armoured corps circles in the world, they think of themselves as the
"Combat Arm of Decision". In the 20th century, from an
internal security perspective, Tanks on the streets increasingly became
recognized as the ultimate symbol of the power of the State.
The combination of this basic
military fact with the geo-historic inevitability of Ikeja cantonment in Lagos
as a crucial pawn in Nigerian military political power tussles has proved to be
an issue again and again for victors and vanquished alike. It used to be
said that he who controls Ikeja controls Nigeria. Examples include the
quest for control of the 2nd infantry battalion at Ikeja supported by the Recce
Squadron at Abeokuta in January and July 1966, 9th infantry brigade and
4th reconnaissance regiment in July 1975, 4th reconnaissance regiment in
February 1976, 9th mechanized brigade and 245 Recce Battalion in December 1983,
201 Armour HQ Administrative, and the 245 Recce and 123 Infantry battalions in
August 1985. Even during the Vatsa Conspiracy Trial of 1985/86, the
question of what to do to neutralize the armored vehicles at Ikeja cantonment,
proved to be a thorn in the side for alleged conspirators in the Army and Air
Force who were even reported to have briefly discussed air strikes as an
option. A major reason why the April 1990 coup attempt failed was largely
because its proponents failed to get control of the Armoured vehicle shed at
Ikeja.
In half-jest, following a spate
of recurrent coups and attempted coups involving armoured corps officers it
later became fashionable to simply refer to them as "Fellow
Nigerians." - the typical start to a radio broadcast announcing a
coup. However, General Abacha, in no mood for jokes regarding
matters of security, was sufficiently wary of the Armored corps that he
redeployed Recce and Tank units to border regions away from centers of
political power in the mid-nineties.
The Nigerian Army Armored Corps
began with humble origins with a decision in late 1957 by the Federal Defence
Council (FDC) to disband the Artillery regiment and set up a Recce unit in its
place to better patrol the open lands of the north. Until the Artillery
regiment was again reconstituted, young first generation Nigerian artillery
officers (like Alexander Madiebo) were briefly transferred to Recce before
Recce began developing its own dedicated officer corps. From one Recce
Squadron based in Kaduna, it evolved into two Recce Squadrons (Kaduna and
Abeokuta) in the Recce Regiment. The earliest Nigerian Recce officers included
Christian Anuforo, John Obienu and Hassan Katsina. The regiment was later
redesignated an Inspectorate of Recce, primarily armed with Ferrets.
Although there were quite a few second generation eastern officers (like Isong
and Ugokwe), it was - like the Infantry and Artillery - mainly attractive to
second generation northern recruits (like M Remawa, DS Abubakar, Pam Jungdam
Mwadkon, MJ Gin, I Babangida, S Ifere, G Duba, Saliu Ibrahim, J Dogonyaro etc.)
while southerners generally preferred technical arms like Signals, Combat
Engineers, Electrical Mechanical Engineers, Ordnance, Supply and Transport,
etc. As role models for younger northern entrants, the early northern
Recce officers naturally established an informal mechanism for a self-recycling
elite which gave the corps an unmistakable geopolitical configuration - the
significance of which will be clear later on.
Along with the late Major General
Mamman Vatsa, General Babangida (rtd) entered the Army on December 10,
1962. When he completed basic officer training at the Indian
Military Academy, he began his career in the 1st Recce Squadron Kaduna
(1964-66) before his sojourn as an infantry battalion commander and
instructor. He has indicated in interviews that he was involved (as a
Recce Lieutenant) in the Kaduna zone of the northern counter-rebellion of July
1966 - while then Lt. Buhari was also active in the revolt as the Motor
Transport Officer of the 2nd battalion at Ikeja Barracks in Lagos. In
1974, upon return from the Armoured Training School in the US, Babangida
assumed command of the 4 Recce Regiment in the Lagos/Epe area. In early
1975, then Lt. Col. I.B. Babangida was the Head of a team of umpires at a
Guards Brigade military exercise ('Exercise Sunstroke') along the Lagos-Lanlate
axis which is thought by some to have provided a platform for some of the plotting
that led to the overthrow of General Gowon in July. As commander of
the 4 Recce Regiment in the federal capital area Babangida (along with his
neighbour Lt. Col SM Yar'Adua, then a Staff Officer at the Lagos Garrison) was
instrumental to the success of that coup and would have been a key
contingency factor in any fighting had Colonel JN Garba of the Guards Brigade
refused to cooperate. Babangida's role propelled him to membership of the
Supreme Military Council in the post-coup regime. As the acting Director
of the Corps of Supply and Transport, Lt. Col. Buhari was also an insider in
that coup, but was not a member of the SMC, having been transiently posted away
from the Army to a position as Military Governor of North-Eastern State before
later assuming a role in the federal executive council as the country's Oil
minister.
As a member of the SMC and one of
the pivots of the Murtala Muhammed regime, Babangida - although not the most
senior armored officer - became Inspector (and later the 1st Commander) of the
Armored Corps. In fact he held the position continuously, even after the
advent of civil rule in 1979, interrupted only by courses, until he became
Director of Army Staff Duties and Plans (DASDP) at the AHQ in 1981 - while
Buhari bounced from command to command as GOC of the 4th, 2nd and 3rd
Divisions. Simultaneously, in May 1981, MJ Vatsa, former Secretary of the
Dimka coup inquiry, now a Brigadier, having since commanded the Brigade of
Guards and the School of Infantry, was asked to take charge of border
operations against Cameroun during the fracas resulting from the ambush of
Nigerian soldiers on the Akpa Yafi river. How Vatsa's AHQ and Defence
Council approved plans for the invasion of Cameroun leaked and found their way,
first to French intelligence, and then on to Cameroun, remains a mystery.
As DASDP, accelerated by some
curious retirements of other senior officers like the late Major General JN
Garba (rtd), Babangida was second only to the Chief of Army Staff, Lt.
Gen. Inua Wushishi at the AHQ, and was, therefore, still able to monitor and
control Armored Corps affairs while spreading his goodwill and patronage to
other corps and power brokers in the capital. Indeed, anytime politicians
were alarmed by innocuous armored vehicle movements in Lagos - such as during
rehearsals for Independence Day celebrations - they would call Babangida for
clarification. On one occasion in 1980 he jumped into a Peugeot 505 after
such a call and intercepted a column of tanks near Tafawa Balewa Square,
scaring the bewildered junior officers and NCOs who could not understand what
the fuss was about. Not surprisingly, Babangida, as DASDP and de facto Deputy Chief of Army Staff, was
the critical operational element of the coup against President Shagari in
December 1983, securing General Wushishi's arrest (and resignation) and
mobilizing armored officers and units in Lagos and Kaduna/Abuja for the coup -
while Major General Vatsa, then Quarter-Master-General, was away on vacation.
Incidentally, during Abuja operations, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako, another key
conspirator, died in cross-fire under circumstances that have never been
clearly explained.
 |
| IBB & Abacha |
As may be surmised by integrating
and extrapolating the above two paragraphs, Babangida oversaw the maturation
and massive expansion of the Armored corps including huge foreign armament
purchases, training opportunities and career development for upcoming junior
officers and soldiers during the heydays of the late seventies and early
eighties. The unsuccessful Dimka coup attempt of February 1976 also
helped him foster a public image of gallantry when stories circulated of how he
risked his life allegedly retaking the Radio Station from his friend Dimka - a
'feat' which some claim may actually have been achieved by then Recce Major
Chris Ugokwe. Indeed, some newspapers reported that Babangida initially
tried to negotiate with Dimka against the orders of then Army Chief Lt. Gen
Danjuma, who then sent him back from Bonny Camp to take the station by force.
As fate would have it, Dimka even escaped from the station - even though
surrounded by troops and armoured vehicles. (Many years later
General Obasanjo confirmed this story in an interview).
Anyhow, Babangida's name was
among those of a few members of the SMC (like Yar'Adua, Danjuma, Obasanjo and
Muhammed) who had been specifically targeted for elimination, in his case
supposedly by Lt. Peter Cigari, allegedly at the behest of Major General
Bisalla, then Defence Minister. This "victim status" cemented his
legitimacy in the regime, irrespective of what transpired at the radio
station. His friend and junior colleague, Lt. Col. J. Dogonyaro, at that
time the commander of the 1st Recce Regiment, was nominated to the Board of
Inquiry into the Dimka coup - concurrent with his new posting to Lagos as
Babangida's Principal Staff Officer at the Armoured Corps HQ. This
investigation Board, which raised charges that were later tried by
courts-martial led by Major General J Obada and Brigadier Pius Eromobor, was
under the chairmanship of Major General Emmanuel Abisoye. Its members
were Mr. Adamu Suleiman (DIG), Navy Captain Olumide, NAF Lt. Col. Muktar
Mohammed, and two Army officers whose careers would eventually rise and fall on
their relationship with Babangida - Lt. Cols. MJ Vatsa and Joshua
Dogonyaro. In contrast to Babangida's shifty transaction at the radio
station, Vatsa, as commanding officer of the 13 Brigade in Calabar had
been the first to publicly dissociate his unit from the coup. Quite
interestingly a third panel member, then NAF Lt. Col. Muktar Mohammed was
destined to clash with Babangida in 1985. Just after the coup against
Buhari, Air Vice Marshal Muktar Mohammed openly expressed disagreement with the
motives for the coup and was retired from the Air Force.
Going back to the late seventies,
coincidentally, the most senior Armour officer at that time - Brigadier
Remawa (rtd) - who had already been displaced from the Armour chain of command
- found that his career in the Army slowly but surely came to a screeching halt
merely because his name was obliquely mentioned to the Dimka coup investigation
panel during reference to a game of scrabble he played with one of the alleged
plotters at Onitsha.
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