RUMORS OF WAR
In the months before the August coup,
Nigerians came to be familiar with routine announcements about this or that
politician sentenced to jail, usually for 21 years, often in concurrent
sentences. But many were released too - although one would not suspect so,
given the spate of disinformation that greeted the take-over.
Like various military rulers before
him, General Buhari also embarked on State visits to various States, admittedly
with less pomp and pageantry. In early August, however, he took a
publicly announced two-week vacation and returned to his hometown in Daura.
Shortly after he returned to Lagos, his Chief of Staff (Idiagbon) left the
country, accompanied by some senior officials like Major General MJ Vatsa, then
Minister for the Federal Capital Territory, enroute to Mecca for
pilgrimage. Against guidelines issued by the regime, Idiagbon's underage
son went along for the ride.
Underneath all of this, however, to
discerning observers, fate beckoned. Within the diplomatic
community, for example, it was widely rumored as far back as March 1985 that
all was not well in the Supreme Military Council. Such tensions were
amplified by restiveness in the barracks over the decision to proceed with a
large-scale reduction in the size of the Army to reduce defence
expenditures. Such demobilized soldiers, however, let loose from the
protections afforded by military life, were viewed by civil society as threats
because of an alleged increased risk of armed robbery. But while the
regime was pulling in this direction in order to free itself strategically for
more social spending, while at the same time dealing with pressures from the
IMF, Major General Babangida, in a public speech, said: "Those who advocate less spending on defence cannot win."
He also advocated making Nigeria a major arms-manufacturer to enhance foreign
exchange earnings.
Some key officers even stopped
attending meetings. Indeed, before August 27, a rumored military take-over was
speculated at least once and then later said to have been postponed. One
well placed Defence Attache in Lagos was overheard in a conversation, asking "Apart from Idiagbon, who is on his
side?" - referring, as can be surmised, to Buhari. In
retrospect, some of this diplomatic chatter would appear to have been
deliberately spun by military intelligence operatives working for the coup
planners. Such operatives were likely seeking on the one hand to sound
out the attitude of some important foreign countries toward another coup, while
at the same time carefully distancing the Army from Buhari's head on collision
with Britain - where many senior Army Officers kept private bank
accounts. Such targeted pre-coup "leaks" are usually designed
to passively ensure there won't be unexpected resistance from the international
community once operations begin. They do not imply any connivance by
Britain or any other foreign country in what transpired, just an affirmation of
official attitudes in those countries to possible scenarios.
But the diplomatic community was not
the only circle in which coup rumors were swirling - and not all rumors were
intended. Major General MC Alli, for example, says in his memoirs that
Mr. Alex Ibru, a leading business entrepreneur, expressed concern about word on
the streets that Babangida was not seeing 'eye to eye' with the Buhari/Idiagbon
dyad. Accompanied by then Lt. Col. MC Alli, Ibru even met with Gen.
Idiagbon in his house to discuss the matter, but Idiagbon chose to project a
veneer of calm, playing down the risk and falsely assuring Ibru that all was
well. On yet another occasion, Lt. Col. MC Alli heard rumors from other
sources that a coup was in the offing. However, like many Nigerian rulers
before him, Idiagbon blew off the warning, saying, "Let them try".
General Buhari himself may have been
warned too. He said during an interview many years later that the
intelligence was vague. Vague, yes, and even deceptive too. At one
point, in what was a high stakes game of deception, the Directorate of Military
Intelligence deliberately fed the Press with rumors that Colonel Tanko Ayuba
was under surveillance or arrested for coup plotting. The story was
milked for what it was worth in throwing the Nigerian Security Organization off
track and off the scent of the real planners (as was the case with Barrientos
in the movie "Power Play"). Ayuba later emerged
'indignantly' to deny it all, when in fact, he was an insider in the
conspiracy. The Press was warned to stop spreading rumors.
It is said (but not confirmed) that
Major General MJ Vatsa may also have made discrete efforts to warn both Buhari
and Idiagbon about rumors of a coup led by Babangida. Some sources
say Vatsa was hesitant to go all out in repeatedly reporting his suspicions
about Babangida's moves because he did not want to be seen as lobbying for
Babangida's position as Army Chief.
Nevertheless, this point proved to be a
political albatross around Vatsa's neck when he was later charged in December
1985 for the Vatsa conspiracy against the post-coup Babangida government. Indeed,
in a newspaper interview in January 2001, Babangida said: "Despite the fact that he was my friend, play mate and course
mate, he had to be executed. Vatsa was like a scorpion in one's pocket. If he
had been retired he could still have planned a coup from outside..."
THE
PLAN
Investigating a successful coup is not
easy. Some aspects are obvious but the trail of more detailed evidence
(and names of convicts) that is usually left in the public domain after the
official investigation of a failed coup attempt just is not there. Based,
however, on multiple sources of information of varying quality, including
conversations with a few of those who actually took part or directly witnessed
the event, it is possible to reconstruct events to some degree, although the
full picture may never be known. The investigation, however, is ongoing, and
further details may well come to light in time to come - particularly if all
the insiders go on truthful record in their memoirs, so that appropriate
lessons can be drawn by future generations.
Some writers like to describe the
August 27 Palace Coup as an unusually brilliant operation. However, the truth
is that coups hatched at the level of Army or Defence Chiefs often succeed in
history - although there have been some sensational failures like Venezuelan
coup of April 2002 and the Soviet Coup of August 1991.
Having pre-positioned selected officers
in strategic units since early 1984, it was not too difficult to formulate a
plan for the coup de grace against Buhari. The plan was driven by the
capabilities offered by penetration of key units - either for full mobilization
or passive neutralization, aided to a large extent by the authority structure and
prerogatives of the Office of the Chief of Army Staff. In other words,
the means were in place and the motive had been fine-tuned. What was left
was the opportunity.
Various sources claim that planning
took place in Lagos, Minna and London. In Minna, capital of the home
state of the COAS and principal location for the conspiracy, the Military
Governor, Lt. Col. David Mark, allegedly provided cover, guest houses and other
resources for such activity. Obviously the local Brigade Commander, Lt.
Col. Olurin, was not ignorant. Other sources say small groups of plotters and
enablers also milled in and out of London - particularly around a certain
apartment in Kensington. Lastly, under cover of a nationwide tour of
military formations in July, General Babangida was said to have tied up loose
ends.
Deception
and PsyOps
Deception operations –targeted at the
Nigerian Security Organization and psychological operation –targeted at the
Nigerian public to undermine the legitimacy of the regime in the public eye,
have already been discussed. The cynical manipulation of the diplomatic
community in Lagos has also been alluded.
Funding
Many will recall the problem Major PCK
Nzeogwu had in Kaduna in January 1966 when he sent a military task force to
Kano to physically get money from the Central Bank - only for Lt. Col. Ojukwu
to detain the group. Nzeogwu suddenly found that in the event of a showdown
with General Ironsi he had to keep the men paid, and fed. In other words,
"troop welfare", a key ingredient of morale, had to be
organized. It was not enough to make revolutionary speeches on
radio.
As the country has evolved over time,
with a larger Army and more units to visit in coordinating treasonable
activities, other nuances appear to have emerged such as the cost of travel,
hotel, feeding, etc. for planners. As the society has become more corrupt
and socially insecure, the role of money in helping reluctant officers or
soldiers (or their wives and concubines) support the conspiracy has also
crystallized in accounts of post-1970 plots. Obviously, questions from potential
recruits like, "What would happen to
my family if I die or I am caught?" need answers from
recruiters. Then there is the problem of securing logistic items outside
the Army chain of command - particularly if Intelligence operatives closely
monitor the official system.
Specifically, in 1986, for example, it
was alleged during the Vatsa Conspiracy Trial that late General Vatsa provided
100,000 naira as a first installment for the plot under cover of a "farm
loan". Even more recently, in December 2000, during controversial
testimony before the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC)
sitting in Lagos, General Bamaiyi, former Army Chief, alleged that General
Diya, former Chief of General Staff, provided two million naira for the aborted
coup attempt against late General Abacha in December 1997. Coming back to 1985,
it has already been noted that some civilians were said to have provided funds
for the August plot.
Concept
of Operations
A Dictatorship is like a poisonous
snake. To kill it requires a direct hit on the head, not a body scratch
or tail step. The basic concept, therefore, was to isolate and
arrest the Head of State very early, disconnecting him from the chain of
command; neutralize likely avenues of sympathetic resistance and simultaneously
occupy vulnerable points such as Radio and TV stations, telephone exchange,
police signals installations, airfields and civilian administrative
establishments. Sources say General Buhari initially left Lagos for Daura
for the Sallah break but then returned to Lagos, right into the jaws of the
Tiger.
Although he had a stern image among
civilians, the Chief of Staff (Maj. Gen Tunde Idiagbon) had gone from a
Staff position as Military Secretary (1981-83) to that of COS, SHQ. Even
before his tour of duty as Military Secretary, it had been a long time since he
directly commanded troops. Therefore, he had no recent command link
with or visceral connection to any viable body of troops that he could use to
fight the plotters. This factor of prior command, also raised as an issue
with Buhari, is not trivial. When President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was
recently briefly overthrown, it was the crack paratrooper unit in which he had
previously served that first dissociated itself from the plotters and began the
process of returning him to power within 48 hours.
Nevertheless, Idiagbon had traveled out
of the country on pilgrimage, and was, thus, one less major target to be
bothered about. Indeed some sources say he was accompanied by Chief MKO
Abiola (who was allegedly well aware of the plot and may have gone along for
the pilgrimage as a form of deception and a source of intelligence).
Other prominent military officers on the delegation allegedly included Generals
Nassarawa, and Vatsa. Some sources claim that the NSO Boss, Alhaji
Rafindadi was also in Mecca, but I have not yet been able to definitely confirm
this because of conflicting accounts.
Certainly, none of the small
neighboring African countries would want to risk offending the new regime by
allowing Idiagbon use them for an opposed return - even if he had troops to
use. Saudi Arabia (where Idiagbon was visiting) had no record of getting
physically involved in military adventures outside the Middle East. In
any case if they had any such inclination, the Buhari regime's apparent actions
against respected Moslem clerics like Alhaji Abubakar Gumi, and the Emir of
Kano would be cause for pause. Nevertheless, it was helpful (as a back up) to
have a few respected civilian Islamic scholars and Leaders from highly
respected royal families in the far north, or their children in the Army, on
the side of - or neutral toward - the coup. As for Britain, Nigeria's
former colonial master, it was clear that the Buhari regime could not expect
any sympathy from that direction, after all the flap about Umaru Dikko and
withdrawal of Ambassadors.
In the years since the coup, some have
speculated that the coup would have been more difficult if Idiagbon was in the
country. The truth is that if the Chief of Staff had been around (or if
he returned unexpectedly as happened with Lt Col. Walbe in 1975 from Kampala),
his arrest would likely have been handled in the usual way others had been
handled in the past. Units of the Guards Brigade, which had already been
penetrated, supplied guards at his residence. Other officers deemed to be
potentially hostile were to be arrested very early, by key conspirators, using
various methods of subterfuge at just after H-hour - the specific time the
operation was to begin - probably just after midnight.
The question of political and military
timing, as always, was important. An elaborate military exercise was
contrived at about that time, allowing the concentration of many Armoured
Personnel Carriers (APCs) and Armoured Fighting vehicles (AFVs) at the Ikeja
Barracks - which were actually on "standby" for almost a week before
Babangida struck. Although the coup took place in the early hours
of the 27th, much of the final mobilization actually started in the morning,
between 8am and 9am, just before Mosque time on August 26, 1985, the Muslim
festival of Eid-el-Kabir. Being Sallah Day, it would theoretically be
least expected and alertness not at peak. The Eid-el-Kabir is the day
when Muslims all over the world celebrate the conclusion of the annual
pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj). In most Muslim societies, it is the single most
important religious day, celebrated by the slaughter of rams, merry making,
exchange of gifts and visits. In Nigeria, it was and remains one of the major
national holidays.
{To be continued}
© Nowa Omoigui
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