OWERRI,
1969
All
through recorded history, armies, small and great have not only recorded
victories but also disasters. Military History buffs will recall great
examples from antiquity such as the loss of an entire 50,000 strong Army by
Cambyses II, the First Persian Ruler of Egypt near the Siwa Oasis circa 523 BC
, the Roman military disasters at Trebia (218 BC), Lake Trasimene (217 BC) and
Cannae (216 BC), the thrashing of British General Charles MacCarthy
during the First Ashanti War in 1824, British General Elphinstone’s retreat
from Kabul in 1842, the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in 1854,
General Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg in 1863, American 7thCavalry
Commander George Custer’s last stand at the battle of the Little BigHorn in
1876, and General Charles George Gordon's death in 1885 at the hands of
the Mahdi in Sudan, among others.
In more
recent history, major military disasters also abound, as was the case with Arab
armies during the Six-Day war of 1967 or the American Ranger debacle of October
1993 in Somalia.
During
the Nigerian civil war, many disasters occurred (from the point of view of both
sides). According to then Colonel Oluleye, who was GSO (I) at the AHQ,
from the federal point of view, in 1967 they included early reversals at Eha
Amufu, the Biafran Midwest invasion, various abortive and disastrous federal
attempts to take Onitsha via an assault river crossing, and the loss of
previously captured ground like Oguede and Abalambie Coconut estate. In
1968, there were catastrophes like the loss of numerous logistic vehicles at
Abagana, reversals at Onne, Arochukwu, Esukpai, Aletu, Amaseri, Afam,
Enugu-Aku, Ikot-Ekpene, Oguta, Umuahia (Operation OAU), Adazi and
Imu-Ikwu. In 1969, reversals and/or disaster befell federal troops at Otoro,
Uzuakoli, Owerri, Obetete, Obokwe, Omoko, Umuakpu, Ozuzu, Elelele, Omo Nwa Ami,
Ovom, and Ipo.
Numerous
factors at strategic, operational and tactical levels can lead to disaster,
including inept decision making, poor intelligence, mediocre command and lack
of detailed staff work, not to mention ill-trained and equipped troops, weather
and bad luck. In his Book, “Military Blunders”, Saul David focused on
five such factors. They are, namely, incompetent command (as was the case in
1942 with General Percival at Singapore); failure to plan for trouble (as was
the case in 1944 at Arnhem during Montgomery’s Operation Market-Garden);
interference by political leadership (as occurred in 1942/43 with the German
Sixth Army at Stalingrad); misplaced confidence (as afflicted the French in
1954 at Dien Bien Phu); and sheer failure to perform (as was the case in 1943
with the American II Corps at Kasserine Pass).
However,
one factor that has stood out most frequently in history is when an army or
unit has its supply chain cut or threatened. This is precisely what
befell the beleaguered 16th Brigade under the valiant Lt. Col. E. A. Etuk
of the 3rd Marine Commando Division under Colonel Benjamin A.M. Adekunle
of the Nigerian Army at Owerri from January to April 1969 during the civil
war. More than any other, this single disastrous development directly led
to the change of command of the 3rd Marine Commando. An Army HQ
Operational Order to this effect was dated on May 9, 1969. It was then
publicly announced on May 12, 1969 that Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo had replaced
Colonel Benjamin Adekunle as GOC 3 Marine Commando. On May 16,
1969, Obasanjo physically took over the Division.
Crack
Biafran troops of the 60th, 52nd, and 63rd Brigades, along with the
68th Commando Battalion detachment of the "S" Division, all
under the 14 Infantry Division, led by Colonel Ogbugo Kalu carried out the
Owerri pincer operation – which proved to be a huge boost to Biafran
morale. However, remnants of the badly mauled 16 Brigade of 3MCDO later
miraculously slipped out of encirclement under the brilliant command and
leadership in crisis of Col. Etuk – widely regarded by former Biafran
commanders as the best Nigerian field commander of the war. It was at
Owerri that Major Ted Hamman, Etuk’s second-in-command, lost his life
Background to the Siege of Owerri
The year
1968 opened up in earnest, continuing a pattern that had been set on September
2nd 1967 when Major General Yakubu Gowon declared “total war” against
Biafra in response to the Biafran invasion of the Midwestern Region/State of
Nigeria. Up until that time, “Operation Unicord,“ as the federal
“internal security” operation against the breakaway Biafra (Eastern region of
Nigeria) was called, was described as “Police action.” Increasingly
violent shooting went on side by side with increasingly cynical talking.
As the
war raged, various external actors sought ways to resolve various elements of
the crisis in favor of one or the other of the contending forces. These
included the Commonwealth, World Council of Churches, Organization for African
Unity, and various nations, among other state and non-state actors. Both
Nigeria and Biafra conducted a furious war to influence international opinion
by various means. Both entities send delegations abroad for this purpose as
well as to shop for weapons and ammunition. For example, former Eastern Region
Premier Michael Okpara and former Nigerian President Nnamdi Azikiwe were roving
Biafran ambassadors to some East African and Francophone countries.
In the wake of Azikiwe’s diplomatic offensive, Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and
Zambia recognized Biafra. Importantly, on August 1st, General
de Gaulle of France openly acknowledged already ongoing support
for Biafran self-determination. But there were other pro-Biafran forces
in the background. Biafra also sought and got support (of varying
quantity and quality) from Israel, Portugal, Rhodesia, South Africa, the
Vatican and non-state actors like Joint Church Aid, Holy Ghost Fathers of Ireland,
Caritas International, MarkPress, US Catholic Relief Services, etc.
Meanwhile,
federal delegations visited many other African countries to stem the tide of
Biafran recognition and obtain official OAU backing, considerably enhanced by
the sympathy of the OAU Consultative Committee on the Nigerian crisis.
(The members of this committee, led by Emperor Selassie of Ethiopia were
Cameroun, Congo Kinshasha, Ghana, Liberia and Niger). At the same time
Nigeria was negotiating with countries like Belgium, the United Kingdom,
Netherlands, Italy, West Germany, Hong Kong, Spain, Poland, the USSR, and the
United States for weapons and other items of military ordnance. In August, for
example, Dr, Okoi Arikpo was dispatched to the USSR on what was described as a
goodwill visit coming exactly one year after a “cultural pact” between both
countries – negotiated by Soviet Ambassador Alexandr Romanov - had resulted in
the supply of Mig-17 fighter aircraft to Nigeria. The Nigerian
international shopping list in 1968 included Artillery, Armoured fighting
vehicles, shells, battle rifles, rifle ammunition, machine guns, side arms,
etc. In the background, peace talks were stuttering in London, Kampala,
Niamey, and Addis Ababa, as international concern increased about relief for
civilians caught in the fighting.
 |
| Col. Adekunle with somed artillery officers |
On the
battlefield, however, facts were being created and recreated on the ground and
in propaganda. In March, Onitsha finally fell to federal troops of the
2nd Infantry Division, after many bloody unsuccessful attempts. In
April, Abakaliki was captured, followed in May by the fall of Port Harcourt to
troops of the 3rd Marine Commando Division. On July 30th, an
increasingly confident Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, GOC of the 3rd Marine
Commando Division announced to the Press that he would capture Owerri, Aba and
Umuahia (O.A.U) within two weeks. Nevertheless, it was not until August 15th,
1968, that Major General Gowon announced that the “final offensive” which would
bring the war to an end would begin on August 25th. Following this
announcement, Aba fell to federal forces on September 4th followed on
September 16th by Owerri. But by the time Okigwe was taken on
October 1st, it was evident that all was not well with the “final offensive.”
For quite
some time, federal radio reports notwithstanding, it had not been all losses
for the Biafran Army. In April, Biafran troops overran federal units at
Onne, Arochukwu, and Aletu, followed in May by another of the many recaptures
of Afam Power Station. This pattern was to continue when Ikot-Ekpene,
Oguta and Enugu-Aku were seized from federal troops in September and Colonel
Adekunle’s Operation “OAU” ended in calamity near Umuahia in October. In
fact, unknown to the public, the scale of the loss was such that the
3rd Marine Commando Division was reduced to one-third of its original
35,000 man size before Operation OAU! By November, Owerri’s line of
communication was being threatened, and as Colonel Oluleye put it, the
3rd Marine Commando Division was “reeling back to east and south.”
Interesting reports surfaced in the international Press that the federal “final
offensive” was being stoutly resisted by Biafran troops, courtesy of French
weapons and ammunition.
Indeed,
the French operation, beginning in September 1968 and directed by M. Jacques
Foccart was code-named “Operation Mabel”. Foccart was the
Secretary-General of the Franco-African Community. In collaboration with
the French Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, he used Ivory Coast,
Gabon, and Sao Tome as staging and resupply points for gun running to Biafra
with the full connivance of the French Secret Service. However, following
aggressive diplomatic representations from Nigeria, Fernando Po (now
called Equatorial Guinea), and Cameroun refused to cooperate with Foccart.
Indeed, none of Nigeria’s Francophone neighbors – Benin, Cameroun, Chad, and
Niger – supported Biafra.
But it
would be simplistic to think that it was all about French weapons and
ammunition. Long before General de Gaulle publicly declared support for
Biafra and began sending in large consignments of weapons, the federal Army had
already begun betraying bad habits that would eventually be brilliantly
exploited by cunning Biafran commanders and determined Biafran troops
thoroughly familiar with the ground. First was the
sheer size of the area of responsibility allocated to the 3rd Marine
Commando, for example. They were stretched across a vast area of jungle
and riverain creeks called the “southern front” extending 150 miles from the
Orashi river through Owerri, Aba and Ikot Ekpene to Itu along the
Cross-River. The second factor was the federal tendency to rely on main
roads for advance. The third was the notorious tendency (particularly
among units of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions) to rush in to seize
objectives without securing and vigorously patrolling lines of communication
and flanks. The 2nd Division took Onitsha like that with no contingency for
securing control of the Onitsha-Enugu road. During the 3rd CDO
Division dash to Umuahia, no effort was made to secure lines of communication
either.
To amply
this dangerous tendency, fourthly, federal battalions, brigades and divisions
rarely acted in coordination and GOCs often-disobeyed higher command from
Lagos. Fifthly, the many hastily recruited and trained federal troops,
although initially enthusiastic, were unfamiliar with the ground and
superstitious about darkness, making nighttime operations highly unattractive,
for fear of “juju”. Lastly, such daytime operations as were carried out,
again, particularly in the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, were characterized
by heavy expenditure of ammunition and poor fire discipline. The sheer
volume of fire they could deliver ‘at anything that moved’, was the basic
source of motivation for the average federal soldier as he carried out
“clearing operations.” Junior tactical level leadership was
seriously lacking outside the 1st Division, which had the benefit of
retaining the core of the old Nigerian Army. Planners, for
example, projected 5 million rounds of ammunition for the 3rd Marine
Commando Division alone at the beginning of Operation OAU in
1968. But even more startling, in planning for offensives after May
1969, the AHQ projected a minimum of about 15 million rounds of 7.62-mm rifle
ammunition for each division, supplemented by another 15 million rounds held in
reserve in Lagos. All of this was to be purchased from the USSR, Spain
and the UK. In other words, enough ammunition to kill the entire 60
million strong population of the country at that time! This does not
include Mortar and Artillery shells, etc. This
“ammunition mentality” was amplified by reassurances that Biafran soldiers were
unarmed or poorly armed. But as federal casualties mounted and it became
apparent that Biafran soldiers could also be well armed (albeit only from time
to time), federal soldiers became increasingly reluctant to take risks on
patrol – unless numerical and firepower advantage were overwhelming.
To these
‘bad federal habits’ must be added certain “good habits” and advantages of the
Biafran soldier. The first was that they were very highly motivated and
determined, fighting on home ground. To federal troops the battlefields
might have been little more than places on maps and abstract names of hamlets,
villages, and towns populated by misguided civilians. To Biafran troops
they represented the safe haven of ancestral lands held by generations of their
people, homes, farms, burial grounds, places of ritual significance
etc. The role of such motivation became increasingly apparent as
federal divisions crossed from the usually pro-federal or neutral minority
areas of the eastern region into the core Igbo areas whose fear of “genocide”,
dating back to the events of July – September 1966, was constantly reinforced
by Biafran radio. Biafra clearly had the edge in psychological
warfare. The second was the enterprising and recurrent
ability of Biafran units and sub-units to penetrate federal lines, sometimes
even operating far in the rear of supposedly captured federal areas – where
they could rely on a sympathetic population. The third was the
ability of some Biafran commanders to resourcefully exploit the natural terrain
in defensive positions (including concrete bunkers) well connected by
all-weather communication trenches. Such defensive positions were often
set up to cover strategic roads and demolished bridges as well as any lines of
federal retreat from pre-positioned Biafran home-made minefields. The
problem, though, was that the defensive positions were often not deployed in
depth, and Biafran soldiers were chronically short of weapons and ammunition,
inspite of heroic scientific efforts to produce their own.
By Nowa Omoigui
Comments
Post a Comment