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| Gen. Benjamin Adekunle with his commanders |
Enveloping
maneuvers seek to surround (envelope) the enemy using ground troops, airborne
or amphibious forces. In single envelopment, the
maneuver, using ground troops, is directed against one enemy flank or around
one enemy flank to attack the rear. In double envelopment, two attacking
groups of ground troops swing around the flanks of the enemy position either to
attack the flanks directly or destroy targets in the rear primarily to disrupt
communications or retreat, while a secondary or diversionary group attacks the
enemy from the front. In vertical envelopment, airborne troops
are dropped behind enemy lines to seize important targets, disrupt coordination
and communications, and/or prevent retreat. In amphibious
envelopment, the same objectives are attained using amphibious (sea or river
borne) forces. Double envelopment is also called "pincer movement"
because of the shape of a pincer.
The fall of Owerri in 1968 and the creation of the
Owerri salient
The
initial assault and capture of the strategic town of Owerri – which was then in
part the capital of Biafra - was conceptualized in 1968 by Colonel Benjamin
Adekunle (aka “Black Scorpion”) along three axes assigned to the 14th,
15th and 16th Brigades of the 3MCDO, under Majors George Innih, Yemi
Alabi (later Makanjuola) and E.A. Etuk, respectively. Etuk had previously
been the successful Commanding Officer of the 8th Battalion along the
Calabar-Itu-Ikot Ekpene axis before being redeployed to his new Brigade command
for the push into Port Harcourt and dash to Owerri.
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| Battle Strategy for Op. OAU by 3CMDO |
Supported
by mortars and artillery, Captain Isemede’s 12 Bde was to protect the left
flank of Major Shande’s 17 Bde as he crossed the Imo River, ultimately taking
the market town of Aba on September 4th. Meanwhile, Etuk’s 16
Bde was to charge head on from Port-Harcourt in a ‘penetration of the center’
toward Owerri. Innih’s 14th Bde was to protect Etuk’s right flank by
advancing on to Owerrinta (between Etuk and Isemede) while Makanjuola’s
15th Bde was to swing left of Owerri, bypassing Ohoba in an ambitious
river-borne assault on Oguta. From here they hoped to simultaneously threaten
Biafra’s connection to the outside world at Uli-Ihiala airstrip six miles away,
cut off Biafra’s source of fuel at the Egbema oil field, and prevent Biafran
reinforcements from reaching Owerri. Innih and Isemede would
then swing north and left and later link up with Makanjuola, north of Owerri,
securing the position of Etuk inside Owerri, effectively ending the war.
Unfortunately, as is so often the case in war, the plan did not survive contact
with opposing Biafran forces.
Led by
its 33rd Battalion, supported by armoured vehicles, mortars and artillery,
the 16th Bde pushed into Owerri on September 16, a day after Makanjuola
had to abandon his position at Oguta with heavy losses in the face of fierce
Biafran counter-attacks led by Colonel Nwajei, Captain Anuku and Colonel Joe
Achuzia. Major Asoya subsequently dislodged Federal units of the 15th Bde
from the Egbema oil field. Etuk, meanwhile, had advanced furiously against
units of the Biafran 14th Division (then under Colonel Nwajei) from
Port-Harcourt, through Elele, Awarra, Asa, Ohoba, Avu, Obinze, and finally to
Owerri itself. Although unintended, what Colonel Nwajei achieved by
default in failing to stop Etuk’s advance (allegedly due to lack of
ammunition) was to “retreat his base”, thus setting Etuk up for the kill as the
Biafran flanks on either side of Owerri moved forward against Innih and
Makanjuola. Nevertheless, Biafran leader Ojukwu replaced Nwajei, now
suspected of “sabotage”, as commander of the 14th Division.
Colonel Ogbugo Kalu, a one time Commandant of the Nigerian Military Training
College, who had earlier been branded a “saboteur” after the fall of Port
Harcourt, took Nwajei’s place.
On Etuk’s
right flank, Innih’s push against the Biafran 63 Bde to Inyiogugu, along the
Owerri-Umuahia road, north of Owerrinta, was bogged down one mile to
Inyiogugu. Counter-attacks by Biafran commandos against
Innih’s units were led initially by the mercenary, Colonel Steiner (until he
fell out with his hosts), and later the reinvigorated 63 Bde under Major
Lambert Ihenacho along with a battalion from the new “S” division led by
Colonel Onwuategwu. (The “S” Division had been created after the fall of
Aba). During the battle for Inyiogugu, Biafran home made “Ogbunigwe”
mines were used with devastating effect and French weapons began to arrive in
increasing quantity. The 14th Bde fell back southwards in disarray
all the way to Elelem and Amala.
For a
full twenty-one (21) days, the 16th Bde, now dug in inside Owerri could
not make any contact with nor get information about the 14th and
15th Bdes on either side of it. As noted above, the two
sister brigades were supposed to protect its flanks and prevent Biafran
counter-attacks. Instead they were concerned with their own very survival
at that point, retreating in chaos, thus exposing the 16th to an uncertain
fate inside the Owerri salient in the absence of an outright order to
evacuate. Nevertheless, Etuk tried to relieve pressure on his sister
brigades by attempting to use his momentum to puncture the outstretched
Biafran base and create an opening to attack Biafran forces on his left and
right from the rear. He did this by
1.
Pushing along the Owerri-Okigwe road toward Mbieri and Orodo aiming at Orlu and
Nkwerre.
2.
Pushing along the Ihiala road and exploiting beyond Ogbaku toward Oguta.
Both of
these moves were cut short by Biafran reinforcements but served the purpose of
temporarily stabilizing the situation of what was left of the 14th and
15th brigades. Etuk’s moves were indirectly assisted by the assault
from the north on Okigwe by elements of the First Division under Colonel
Shuwa. This initially served to distract Biafran efforts to contain Etuk.
However,
reserve troops from the 13th and 18th Brigades of the 3MCDO under
Majors Tuoyo and Aliyu that might otherwise have been available to secure the
Owerri situation and stiffen the assault on Oguta and ultimately Uli-Ihiala
airstrip were diverted on a suicidal mission to take Umuahia by the GOC,
Colonel Adekunle, against orders from AHQ. According to Major General
Oluleye (rtd), this troop diversion was done with the tacit support of the Head
of State, Major General Gowon (for details, see forthcoming essay about
“Operation OAU”).
Nevertheless,
during a wartime visit to Port Harcourt, the C-in-C, Major General Gowon
encouraged the 16th Brigade Commander by radio to sit tight and hold
Owerri until relieved. Like the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, the
16th Bde was ordered to “hedgehog.” (The hedgehog is a 6 – 9 inch
long mammal with white hair on its stomach and the hair on its back modified
into spines. Using the large muscle running along its stomach
it can pull its body into a compact, spiky ball for defense purposes).
The
44th battalion of the 16th Bde then secured the Owerri-Aba and
Owerri-Umuahia roads out to 12 kilometers. The 33rd Bn secured the
Owerri-Okigwe, Owerri-Orlu and Owerri-Enugu roads, while the 2nd Bn was
stretched out securing the western approaches to the town from Ohoba and
Oguta. The 11 kilometer radius away from the Owerri city
center of the defensive lines of responsibility allotted to the various
battalions of the Brigade was allegedly influenced by knowledge of the range
(or lack thereof) of Biafran artillery. If true, it was an odd decision,
considering that Biafra had a few 105-mm Artillery pieces in its inventory and
Etuk’s troops in the city center were clearly within sniper range, as will be apparent
later in the essay. It is more likely that actual defensive
positions were functionally related to the seriousness of Biafran pressure in
various sectors. Importantly, though, supply and communication routes
from Port-Harcourt were barely protected. Meanwhile, Biafran
troops were slowly but gradually ensnaring the brigade in a noose, all the
while monitoring federal radio communications.
On each
side of the 16th Brigade, Biafran troops had successfully rolled back
federal troops of Innih’s 14th Bde to Amafor and Makanjuola’s
15th Bde to Ebocha bridge, while sparing Etuk too much pressure along the
direct northern approaches to Owerri. Etuk – on orders from
Adekunle and Gowon - would not withdraw to straighten the Divisional line, nor
did he have the resources to break out in force to attack the flanking Biafran
positions from the rear. Nor, with limitations imposed by Adekunle’s
disaster at Umuahia, was there any relieving federal assault column aimed at
Owerri towards which he could fight his way out, as Von Manstein had tried to
convince Von Paulus to do at Stalingrad, countermanding Hitler’s
orders. The 16th Bde rolled into a spiky ball, like a
Hedgehog, and waited for relief as ordered.
Thus, the
wily Commander of the Biafran Army, Major General Alexander Madiebo, one time
coursemate to Major General Gowon at Sandhurst, was presented with an
irresistible opportunity to complete a classic “double envelopment” of the soon
to be beleaguered 16th Bde. He accepted the invitation with humility
and threw two arms of the Biafran Army around to the rear of the Brigade in a
killer Bear Hug aimed at closing the gap along the Owerri-Port Harcourt road.
By
Nowa Omoigui
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