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| Abacha & MKO |
Between
August 27th and September 17th Abacha made more critical decisions as
the effective political and operational Chief of all the Armed
Services. He publicly announced new Army postings in Lagos without
recourse to Shonekan who was ensconced at Abuja. Obviously the lame
duck Service Chiefs who owed him the decency of being properly retired with
adequate three-week notice and traditional pull out ceremonies did not question
his moves.
By September 20th, therefore, when the new “Service
Chiefs” finally took office, new officers adjudged loyal to General Abacha,
were occupying all the strategically sensitive commands in the
Army. Dangerous ‘IBB Boys’ were defanged, first by being posted out
to politically safe locations and then subsequently kicked out of the Army
entirely - in stages. Indeed nearly all the officers (and prominent northern
Traditional rulers) who helped Abacha to power eventually felt his jackboots.
Regarding
the September postings, at the Lagos Garrison Command, for example, Brigadier
Ishaya Rizi Bamaiyi took command. At the Brigade of Guards, Brig
Gen. Bashir S Magashi replaced Colonel JY Madaki, who was then posted to the
Depot in Zaria. At the 1st Infantry Division, Brig. Gen. MC
Alli, erstwhile DMI, replaced Brig. Gen. John N Shagaya, as GOC. Shagaya was
then posted to ECOMOG in Liberia as acting Major General. At the
2nd Division HQ in Ibadan, Brig-Gen. Godwin Osagie Abbe replaced Brig-Gen.
John Inienger as the GOC. At the 3rd Armoured Division, Brig Gen.
Tajudeen A Olanrewaju replaced Brig Gen. Ahmed M Daku. At the 82
Division, Brig (later Maj Gen.) Timothy M Shelpidi replaced Brigadier (later
Maj Gen.) Chris Abutu Garuba. Brig Gen. Ahmed Aboki Abdullahi
replaced Brig-Gen M Chris Alli as DMI. Colonel Lawan Gwadabe had
taken over from Col. Abdulmumuni Aminu as Commander, National Guard - a
controversial para-military outfit viewed as a duplication of the regular
military. Lt. Col. Sambo Dasuki was in the Military Secretary’s
office. Most amusingly, Brigadier Halilu Akilu, erstwhile powerful
Director-General of the National Intelligence Agency, was posted to the Oshodi
Resettlement Scheme to rehabilitate disabled and retiring soldiers.
The Lagos
group had began preparing actively for the overthrow of the Shonekan government
right from the moment he was sworn in. Nominations were accepted and
votes counted at meetings of the entire caucus or an inner caucus within the
outer caucus. In this manner, General Sani Abacha was “elected” by
this self appointed military Electoral College to take over as Head of State,
C-in-C and Minister for Defence. Lt. Gen. Diya was ‘voted’ to be his Chief of
General Staff, beating Lt. General Aliyu Gusau. Major General
Abdulsalami Abubakar beat Major Generals Edward Unimna and Cyril Iweze for the
position of Chief of Defence Staff. Then Brigadier (later Major
General MC Alli) was told that “the scenario had been set” for the position of
COAS to fall on him. This implied that Lt. Gen Aliyu Gusau Mohammed who had
been appointed to that position by out going President Babangida, was to be
prospectively frozen out of any top military position in the planned Abacha
dispensation. Similarly, Rear Admiral Suleiman Seidu was later edged
out as Chief of Naval Staff in favor of Rear Admiral Allison Madueke in a high
stakes game of ethnic balancing championed by Brigadiers MC Alli and Aboki
Abdullahi.
In his
book “The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army”, Major General MC Alli (rtd)
explains how he dealt with his personal doubts about Abacha’s quality as the
designated incoming Head of State. When he raised the issue with
General Diya, Diya assured him that Abacha would “change his
habits.” Diya also reportedly said that Abacha “would not succumb to
his intense acquisitive instinct that utterly was no respecter of systems and
order.” Alli also says that then Director of Military Intelligence,
Brigadier Aboki Abdullahi, on the other hand, “explained that “the ‘North
knows’ Sani Abacha, more so, he was the ‘most senior northern officer.’ In
fact, he emphasized that Northern Emirs approved of his ascendancy to power.”
Lt. Gen.
Diya later summoned the Abacha Military Caucus to his office in
Lagos. It was tasked to produce a very detailed Top Secret report
regarding the state of the Nation, issues of National Security, the state of
the military and the political stalemate occasioned by the annulment of the
June 12 elections. The Chairman was Brig-Gen MC Alli and the
Secretary, Colonel Lawan Gwadabe. Other members were Brigadiers Aboki
A Abdullahi, Ishaya Bamaiyi, Bashir Magashi, and Patrick Aziza, Commodore F.
Porbeni and Air Commodore MA Johnson. They subsequently met in the
office of Lagos Garrison Commander, Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi, broke up into
subcommittees and came out with what was titled “The Report: The Way Forward”. Major Gen. MC
Alli (rtd) reveals that he sampled the opinion of officers like Lt. Gen.
Aliyu Gusau, then COAS, and Major General Abdulsalami Abubakar, then Commandant
of the War College. General Gusau expressed the opinion that a full
military regime at that stage would be unwise and might destroy the
military. General Abubakar questioned the rush into removing Chief
Shonekan who had only just been installed. It is not, however, clear what either
officer did with the information Brigadier Alli shared with them.
Meanwhile
on September 13, Chief Gani Fawehinmi told The African Guardian:
“Whether
Shonekan likes it or not, God has ordained his regime as the shortest in
history of Nigeria. And it will be suddenly terminated by God, because June 12
has a connotation and denotation which Nigerians have not understood. Until
they know the extent of June 12, they will be beating about the bush...”
On
September 24th, a few days after Abacha had fully consolidated military
control, Chief Moshood Abiola returned to Nigeria from Britain. A large crowd
of supporters received him at the presidential wing.
From the
airport, his first stop, even before he went home, was Defence House in Lagos
where he met secretly with General Abacha behind closed
doors. Knowledgeable insiders say that both Abacha and Diya
encouraged Abiola to return home - against Shonekan’s wishes. Since
both Abacha and Abiola are deceased, it is hard to confirm the report that
Abiola and Abacha agreed to a military take over of the government as an
interim measure before final hand-over to him down the road. But
several witnesses confirm that Abiola actively suggested names to General
Abacha for inclusion in his first cabinet. It seems clear, however,
that Abacha was taking the Abiola along for a ride and that Abiola fell for
it. Maj. Gen. MC Alli testifies that when he later asked General
Abacha whether he had a pact with Abiola regarding the June 12 election,
Abacha’s reaction was: “MC, you
should know better.”
THE
COLONEL ABUBAKAR UMAR PLOT AND THE NIGERIA AIRWAYS HIJACK
In early
October 1993, the Army became engaged in internal security duties in the
dispute between Ogoni and Andoni in Rivers State. Such operations
later became highly controversial and eventually led to the execution of Ken
Saro-Wiwa and others by General Abacha. However, during the last
week of September and first week of October, Colonel Abubakar Dangiwa Umar,
Commander of the Armoured Corps Center and School, began making contacts
regarding a military coup which he said was aimed at removing Chief Shonekan
from power and installing Chief Abiola. He made an attempt to recruit the new
GOC of the 1st Division in Kaduna, Brigadier MC Alli, into his group by
claiming that his plan had the support of the Army hierarchy, including General
Abacha himself. Alli apparently contacted his crony Brigadier Aboki
Abdullahi who had taken his place as Director of Military Intelligence in
Lagos. Umar was subsequently arrested on suspicion of treasonable
felony or about October 7th 1993. Because of his very close
personal relationship with former President Babangida, there was an unstated
suspicion that he may have been involved in some kind of pro-Babangida
conspiracy. Luckily for him he was not
charged. Following appeals on his behalf by Brig MC Alli to
Generals Aliyu Gusau and Sani Abacha, he was released, after which he resigned
his commission.
It is
important to note that in deciding to release Colonel Umar without charge,
Abacha was being savvy. He did not need the diversion at that point
from his main focus; did not need to upset General Babangida unnecessarily at
that stage by pushing for one of his closest “boys” to face possible execution
or prolonged imprisonment; and did not want to deal with the practical
implications of granting the Shonekan regime unnecessary legitimacy by trying
an officer for conspiracy against what he himself considered an illegal
government which would soon be removed anyway. So he chose to deal
with the matter administratively within the military, rather than
legally. Colonel Umar Dangiwa was quietly replaced as the Commander
of the Armoured Corps by Colonel M. A. Garba who acted in that capacity until
January 1994 when Colonel Peter Sha took over as the substantive Director.
Shonekan
meanwhile, on the advice of a local kitchen cabinet of close associates, was
beginning to behave like a head of state and attend foreign
meetings. For example, he addressed the UN General Assembly on
October 7th, even as he was being sued at home for releasing moneys to the NEC
for the purpose of conducting fresh elections and for setting up a panel of
inquiry into the annulment of the elections. Even the late musician,
Fela Anikulapo Kuti publicly described the Shonekan government as “neocolonialist”
and as a “western stooge”. During this period Shonekan asked
security agencies to investigate corruption in Nigerian parastatals like the
NNPC, NEPA, Nigeria Airways, Central Bank, Customs etc. Abiola was
in the meantime asking Nigerians to fast and seek God’s intervention in the
affairs of Nigeria.
Shonekan
attended the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) from
October 21 - 25, 1993 at Limassol, southwest of Nicosia, on the south
coast of Cyprus. At the CHOGM, Shonekan was embarrassed by an appeal
from Sir Douglas Richard Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, to "reach an
accommodation with Moshood Abiola, the unofficial winner of the poll."
From
Limassol he was reported to be making calls incessantly to Abacha in Nigeria
regarding the security situation. The former UAC Chief
Executive may have been unnerved by back-channel reports of Colonel Umar’s
arrest and perhaps even alleged whispers from Lt. Gen Gusau about other
conspiracies lurking in the shadows. However, Abacha - in a move
reminiscent of how he treated General Buhari in 1985 - apparently refused to
take most of the calls, citing Shonekan’s lack of authority over him as the
Defence Secretary. Interestingly, the ING announced on October 21, that it
planned to scrap the National Guard, a decision that was popular with the
mainstream military and was already recommended by the secret Brigadier MC Alli
Military Caucus report. Then on the last day of the conference, four
members of the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD) led by Jerry
Yusuff hijacked a Nigerian Airways Airbus A310 (5N AUH) with 137 passengers and
11 crew bound from Lagos to Abuja. The plane ended up in Niger republic where
it was later stormed by Nigerien paramilitary commandos. It
was Nigeria’s second aircraft hijacking incident, the first having taken place
back in April 1967 during tensions leading to the Nigerian civil war. At that
time a Nigeria Airways Fokker Friendship F-27 bound for Lagos was hijacked from
Benin to Enugu by Sam Inyang and Onuorah Nwaya of the "Special Task
Force", the militant wing of what later became the Biafran Directorate of
Military Intelligence.
The
manner in which the Shonekan régime handled the hijack matter raises serious
questions in my mind about the civil-military-external affairs relationship at
that time. For one the government sent a delegation led by the
Transport and Aviation Secretary, Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, to Niamey to negotiate
for the release of the hostages. Secondly, the ING allowed Niger
republic to carry out a military operation to rescue Nigerian hostages in
a Nigerian plane that was hijacked from Nigeria. The almighty Nigerian military
was not in the loop either for lack of Special Forces expertise, lack of
command consensus, or lack of trust. This writer viewed the
development with consternation back then and interpreted it as a sign that
certain elements within the military were unwilling or unable to undertake a
potentially messy international rescue operation which might undermine its
credibility on the eve of a coup at home. Fortunately for most of
the hostages, the rescue operation was carried out professionally by
the Nigeriens and went well. Ordinarily, no serious
country would have allowed another nation unilaterally take such momentous
responsibility for its own citizens.
On
October 31st word leaked in the Nigerian Press about efforts by some
influential Nigerians to get the ING to dissolve both political parties and all
existing political structures. Coincidentally, such a recommendation was
indeed part of the MC Alli secret report. This was followed soon
after by dramatic events at the National Assembly following which the Senate
President was impeached. Pro and anti-ING factions in the legislature,
guided by a strategic desire to support or oppose Presidential hopeful Major
General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (rtd), sparred on the floor of the
Chambers. This dispute eventually led to the impeachment of Senate
President Dr. Iyorchia Ayu on November 2, by pro-ING Senators led by Chuba
Okadigbo. Senator Ameh Ebute replaced Ayu. All of this
came against background plans by the new NEC led by Professor Okon Uya to
organize party primaries from January 7 - 9, 1994 followed by Presidential
elections on February 19, 1994.
On
November 3rd, social critic Gani Fawehinmi was quoted during a Book launching
ceremony as saying: “The military must intervene to stop this war of Shonekan’s
government against the people”. On the
contrary, three days later on November 6th, Northern Elders led by former
President Shehu Shagari met to find ways to ensure that Nigeria remained
united. They expressed support for the ING as the midwife for a
stable transition.
Under
these circumstances, Chief Shonekan, taunted by some for “lack of power”,
symbolically moved into Presidential Villa from the Presidential guest house in
early November - against his original understanding with former President
Babangida - and to the consternation of Abacha. General Abacha was increasingly
worried about Shonekan’s growing confidence and irritated by security reports
to Shonekan that he was planning “something”.
Under
pressure from declining international oil prices, Shonekan’s government chose
at that inauspicious time to withdraw the petroleum subsidy on November 8th,
and raise the price of petrol from 70 Kobo to 3.50 Naira, a massive increase
with predictably dramatic effects on inflation. Not
surprisingly, it led to street protests and plans for a full-scale resumption
of industrial action by pressure groups.
THE FINAL
DASH
Two days
later, on November 10, 1993, the Shonekan-led ING was declared illegal in a
ruling at the Lagos High Court presided over by Justice Dolapo
Akinsanya. Back in October, as previously noted, a case had been
brought by Moshood Abiola and Baba Gana Kingibe to declare the ING illegal,
null and void. The lead Attorney for the Federal Ministry of
Justice, Mr. Dele Jegede, advised the court that Decree # 61, which was
supposedly the legal basis of the ING, did not exist. Decree #56 had
previously fixed August 27, 1993 as the date of commencement of the 1989
constitution. Justice Akinsanya reasoned that since Babangida had
divested himself of power by signing Decree # 59 of August 26th, he had no
power to sign Decree # 61. All of this dovetailed nicely into
General Abacha’s original skillful backdating of the effective date of
Babangida’s retirement to August 26th.
The day
after the Court Judgement, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi publicly pleaded with
General Sani Abacha to rescue Nigeria from a "terrible political and legal
quagmire". But Abacha, ever so patient and disciplined regarding the
timing of coups resisted being rushed before crossing his “Ts” and dotting his
“Is”. After all the ING was contesting the Akinsanya judgement in a higher
court and Abacha still had to watch his flanks within the military
carefully. There was still the matter of how to handle the Chief of
Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Aliyu Gusau Mohammed, who was not a man to be underrated.
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| Dipo Diya |
On
November 15, 1993, however, the Nigerian Labor Congress called a General
Strike. On November 16, 1993, the Senate began open hearings on the
fuel price increase by the Shonekan Administration while the House of
Representatives asked the ING to rescind the price increase.
The next
day, on November 17th at about 10 am, Generals Sani Abacha, Oladipo Diya
and Aliyu Gusau arrived at the Presidential Villa in Abuja accompanied by
truckloads of fearsome looking soldiers. These troops were under the
command of two “Lagos Group” conspirators, namely Colonel Lawan Gwadabe of the
National Guard and Brigadier Bashir Magashe of the Brigade of
Guards. Magashe was almost certainly there to make sure Gwadabe
followed the Abacha script and no other. Following a ‘private
meeting’ with Chief Ernest Shonekan, Shonekan was graciously allowed to deliver
a farewell speech to the ING after 82 days of controversy, following which he
was flown to Lagos.
After
waiting patiently for so many years, Abacha, “the successor”, had finally
struck.
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