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| Gen. Sani Abacha |
The
complex military intrigues associated with the Sani Abacha led Palace coup of
November 17, 1993 and its aftermath reminds me of three lines in Chapter IV
of "The Art of War" by the Chinese Military
Philosopher Sun Tzu, under 'TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS':
“1. Sun
Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility
of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.
2. To
secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of
defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
15. Thus
it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory
has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards
looks for victory.”
COUNT-DOWN TO THE NOVEMBER 17 COUP
FROM 1985
- 1990
When
Major General Ibrahim Babangida came to power after the Palace Coup of August
1985, he rewarded then Major General Sani Abacha, GOC of the Army’s
2nd Division with the position of Chief of Army Staff - the position from
which Babangida had launched himself into power. Abacha reportedly
negotiated for this position as a condition for supporting the coup.
However,
Abacha was not well regarded professionally. He was thought of as a
very dull officer, who was prone to late coming, disliked staff meetings, kept
odd hours, enjoyed exclusive private parties and loved entertaining himself
with curious personal interests. There were rumors that he had not
made it out of the Staff College at Jaji with honor, that some of his old
confidential reports were much below par and that he had been saved on several
occasions from retirement during his military career. One such occasion was a
controversial bloody clash with the Police when he was the Brigade Commander in
Port Harcourt in the late seventies. Nevertheless, he was a key coup
conspirator in December 1983 and August 1985 - which is what counted in the
Nigerian Army of that era.
According
to sources, soon after he became Army Chief in 1985 one of the first things he
did was intimidate many local and foreign Army contractors into arrangements
from which he would benefit personally. Some of those who met
him then say he seemed to be driven by a fanatical desire to compete
financially with his rival and protégé, General Babangida, who had been the
immediate past holder of that office. A source told me that Abacha -
without providing any evidence - had a mental fixation that Babangida was very
wealthy and that he (Abacha) could also be wealthy if contractors “do for me as you did for him”. The
dysfunctional manifestations of this rivalry dogged Abacha throughout his
career as a Service Chief and later Head of State. Allegedly he
always felt that he needed to stash away huge sums of money as a way to
guarantee his personal security. It remains unclear to this day why
he felt that way.
He was
also very state-security conscious and regularly took a hard line against
soldiers suspected of disloyalty. He was party to the decision to
execute General Vatsa and others in March 1986 - in spite of numerous domestic
and foreign pleas - and was not happy when the charge against Major Akinyemi
was changed from ‘Treason’ to ‘treasonable felony’. His displeasure
was that the lesser charge guaranteed that even if guilty he would not be
executed. (Never a man to forget old grudges, he stubbornly refused
to release the Major from Prison ten years later, even after he completed his
sentence!)
In time,
Abacha’s poor management skills and lack of professional respect undermined him
with the caucus of junior and middle ranking officers that brought Babangida to
power. As the Chief of Army Staff, he was even allegedly personally
insulted by then Major Sambo Dasuki, a one-time ADC to the President - an
incident that eventually led to the Major’s first “protective exile” to the
United States on course. Clamour began that Abacha
be removed as Army Chief to make way for a more professionally sound
officer. I vividly recall an officer (now late) tell me back then
that “Abacha is spoiling the Army.” Naturally, once his blood was
sensed in the water, other ambitious senior Army Officers began eyeing his job,
notably Brigadier (later Major General) Joshua Dogonyaro who had also been a
key insider in the coup that propelled Babangida to power. Not far
behind were other Officers of the Regular One- (1) course at the Nigerian
Defence Academy who felt that their time had come to take over the leadership
of the Army from foreign-trained Officers. Such Regular One Officers
included Saliu Ibrahim, Aliyu Gusau, Oladipo Diya, etc.
Abacha’s
reaction to all this was to accuse Babangida of deliberately underfunding the
Army so as to make him (Abacha) unpopular with the troops. Things
were bad enough at one stage that a secret meeting of insiders outside the
context of the Armed Forces Ruling Council had to be held at Ikeja Cantonment
to smooth things over. Sources claim special financial arrangements
were made to placate Abacha and allay his suspicions, while alternative
mechanisms - like adhoc Task Forces - were later created to ensure
that funds actually reached operational units, bypassing the Ministry of Defence.
Nevertheless,
clamour continued for Abacha’s removal. Eventually, General Babangida concocted
a dicey two step scheme to do so. The scheme involved the
initial removal of Lt. General Domkat Bali as concurrent Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff and Minister of Defence. In this
scenario, Babangida became the Defence Minister while Abacha was to
simultaneously hold the positions of Chief of Army Staff and Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Step Two (2) would involve Babangida giving
up the Defence Minister position, and then later enticing Abacha to take the
Defence Minister position in combination with the position of Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff. In exchange, Abacha would vacate the position
of Chief of Army Staff.
This
delicate two step process, initiated on December 29, 1989, was complicated by
negative reactions to the step one removal of Lt. General Domkat Bali and the
perception that the changes affected the religious balance of power in the
military. Bali himself refused to accept his demeaning redeployment
as Minister of Internal Affairs, where he would take over from Brigadier John
Shagaya, a junior officer from the same Langtang area of Plateau
State. Instead he chose to retire ten days later.
In April
1990, citing a laundry list of complaints, junior officers led by Lt. Col. G
Nyiam, Major Saliba Mukoro and Major Gideon Orkar staged an attempted coup,
which eventually failed. One of their complaints was “The
shabby and dishonourable treatment meted on the longest serving Nigerian
General in the person of General Domkat Bali, who in actual fact had given
credibility to the Babangida administration”.
By all
accounts, most of the credit for rallying the resistance and crushing this coup
attempt goes to Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha, who was at that time the Chief of Army
Staff and concurrent Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. After
the rebellion was crushed, Abacha went on radio to reassure the country. Among
other things, he said:
"I, Lieutenant-General Sani Abacha, Chief of Army Staff, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, have found it necessary to address you once again in the course of our nation's history. In view of the unfortunate, development early this morning, I'm in touch with the CGS, Service Chiefs, GOCs, FOCs, AOCs, of the armed forces and they have all pledged their unflinching support and loyalty to the federal military government of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida who is perfectly safe and with whom I am in contact…………..……….No amount of threat or blackmail will detract the federal military government's attention in this regard. We are set to hand over power to a democratically elected government in 1992. I wish to assure all law-abiding citizens that the situation is now under control and people should go about pursuing their lawful interest.
Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.Thank you."
General Abacha’s role in saving the Babangida regime in 1990 bought him huge
stock, not only with Babangida himself but also with a significant number of
other “IBB Boys”. It marked the beginning of the rise of Sani Abacha
and the beginnings of his own independent client network, separate from the
umbilical cord that tied him into the maternal Babangida
bandwagon. His own independent network would later become known as
“Abacha Boys”, based mainly, but not exclusively, around officers from the Kano
area.
After a
lull during which Babangida was very nervous and lacked confidence, he later
resumed the old plan to replace Abacha as Chief of Army Staff. In
September 1990, after two batches of executions of “Orkar coup convicts” had
been carried out, Babangida ceded his position as Minister of Defence to
General Abacha who was to combine it with his position as Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Some observers feel that an unwritten part of this
new arrangement was that Abacha would be left alone to do as he pleased with
defence funds while Babangida ran the rest of the government. To
crystallize the new “space” created for General Abacha as the “Defence Czar”,
he stayed behind in Lagos when Babangida moved to the new capital of Abuja in
1991. It was as if the country had two governments.
 |
| Maj. Gen. Chris Alli (retd.) |
Abacha
retained the combined positions of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defence
Minister until August 26, 1993. After the events of April 1990,
Babangida was often quoted as referring to him as “Khalifa”, meaning
“successor”. Meanwhile, it should be noted that although Vice-Admiral Aikhomu was
transitioned from the office of Chief of General Staff and made the
Vice-President in 1990 to President Babangida, that slot was actually initially
proposed to Chief Ernest Shonekan, a civilian United African Company (UAC)
Executive.
THE
POLITICAL COUNT DOWN
Others
have written extensively about the political countdown and endless transition
of the Babangida regime. As is well known, the date of the final handing over
of power was shifted from 1990 to 1992 and then 1993. I shall
present a brief overview and highlight those aspects that show the hand of
General Abacha as a behind the scenes manipulator.
Based in
part on the report of the Political Bureau, which was originally set up in
1986, a two-party system (one "a little to the right" and the other
"a little to the left.”) was created in October
1989. They were the National Republican Convention (NRC) and
the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Both parties were run and financed by the
Government, which also arrogated to itself the right to write their party
constitutions. The constitutional context was the 1989 Constitution
(Decree #12 of 1989), based on work done by a Constitution Review Committee,
ratified by the Constituent Assembly and amended by the Armed Forces Ruling
Council. Among the eleven amendments imposed by the AFRC, three were
defence and security related. One removed the National Assembly’s
control over national security because, (according to the AFRC), it
"exposes the chief executives and the nation to clear impotence in the face
of threats to security". The second deleted certain
provisions establishing an Armed Forces Service Commission to supervise
implementation of the federal-character principle. The third
amendment removed Section 1 (4) of the draft constitution, which had outlawed
coups and classified them as criminal.
Initially,
based on Decree #25 of 1987 amended by Decree # 9 of 1989, there was
a ban on all former politicians and top officeholders since 1960, particularly
those previously found guilty of abuse of office. However,
both decrees were repealed in December 1991, initially under pressure from
‘northern elders’ but ultimately to ‘create a level playing field for all
ethnic groups’. Similarly, based on Decree #19 of 1987 and amended
by Decree #26 of 1989, the plan was for presidential elections in November
1992. However, as a result of alleged malpractices during party
primaries in Sept 1992, primaries were cancelled altogether in October 1992,
major contenders frozen out, and the timetable shifted to 1993. Local, State
and National committees of both parties were dissolved and replaced by
caretaker committees. The Babangida government later announced that they would
be audited.
The
driving principle behind all of this was Babangida’s fear of powerful,
financially independent politicians and his secret desire to plant handpicked,
“controllable” newbreed politicians in state government houses and legislative
positions all over the country as a civilian base for a diarchy which he would
head at the center. Those who lost out in the cancellation of the
1992 Presidential primaries and were banned included late Major General
Yar’Adua (rtd) who won the SDP nomination hands down, and Chief Olu Falae;
Alhaji Adamu Ciroma and Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi were about to go in for a run-off
for the NRC nomination. They too were banned.
 |
| Maj Gen. J N Dongoyaro |
A few
weeks later, on November 17, 1992, General Babangida dissolved the AFRC and,
after a pregnant pause, created the National Defence and Security Council
(NDSC) on January 2, 1993. A civilian Transitional Council was also
set up to replace the Council of Ministers and win back waning public
confidence in the “transition program” following the failed Presidential
Primaries. Its Chairman was Chief Ernest Shonekan, also known as
“Head of Government”. Empowered by Decree #54 of 1992 Constitution
(Suspension and Modification) [Amendment], the Transitional Council shared
joint responsibility with the National Defence and Security Council to ensure a
smooth and successful handover to civilians. It was after all of
this that Alhaji Bashir Othman Tofa and Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola
later emerged as the Presidential contenders from the NRC and SDP
respectively. Strangely, though, neither men internalized the bitter
experience of men before them like Shehu Yar’Adua, Olu Falae, Umaru Shinkafi,
Adamu Ciroma and Bamanga Tukur, all of whom had been led on by Babangida but
ultimately betrayed at the end.
All of
this was being monitored by the security services - as well as General Sani
Abacha, who later told confidants that Babangida had been toying with the idea
of ruling Nigeria for 30 years. When Chief Abiola first showed
interest in running for the Presidency, certain “IBB Boys” (including Abacha)
expressed concern and approached Babangida to find some way to ban Abiola from
taking part. However, based on a security report which falsely
projected Alhaji Babagana Kingibe as the likely winner of the SDP Presidential
primary convention in Jos, Babangida assured his concerned “military boys” that
Abiola would not prevail and thus there was no need for fear. On the
other hand he simultaneously assured Abiola that he could run for office if he
so wished and would have no problems if he won fair and square. He
did not, as far as is publicly known, tell Abiola at that early stage that
there were restive northern officers opposed to his political ambitions, nor
did he tell his “caucus” officers that he had given his word to Abiola that he
could run for office. Interestingly, Abiola himself was independently
familiar with most members of the Babangida military caucus, either as business
associates or as a financial sponsor of previous coups (in 1983 and 1985) in
which they had played key roles.
As things
turned out, to the consternation of military officers - like Abacha - who were
opposed to Chief Abiola, Abiola narrowly won the SDP nomination at the Jos
convention, overcoming determined opposition from a motley group of SDP
Governors and disgruntled former aspirants. However, security sources
reported allegations of massive vote buying. Concerned officers approached
Babangida to use the report as an excuse to ban Abiola and stop the process at
that stage before it evolved to formal national
elections. Meanwhile, as the June elections came nearer, against a
backdrop of anti-military agitation by students and workers groups, General
Olusegun Obasanjo and Chief Anthony Enahoro publicly expressed doubts over the
sincerity of military’s intention to leave power. Caught between an
undercurrent of public suspicions that he had a “hidden agenda” and behind the
scene pressure from some powerful elements of his military caucus to scuttle
the transition again, Babangida initially resisted the military
pressure. Alhaji Baba Gana Kingibe emerged after difficult
negotiations as Abiola’s running mate while Dr. Sylvester Ugoh was chosen as
Tofa’s Vice Presidential candidate.
It must
be mentioned, however, that the voice of the military was by no means uniform.
There were officers, like Lt. Gen Salihu Ibrahim, General Ishola Williams,
Brigadier MC Alli, Colonel Abubakar Umar and a few others who genuinely wanted
a disengagement of the military from politics. Some people
claim Lt. General Oladipupo Diya was also not in favor of the military
perpetuating itself at this stage. Other officers preferred one
candidate versus the other, while a small clique did not want to leave power
for either candidate. This clique included Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro,
Brigadier David Mark, Brigadier Stephen Anthony Ukpo, Brigadier John Shagaya,
Brigadier Halilu Akilu and a few others, all of whom were “IBB
boys”. What is really fascinating is how General Abacha concealed
his real motives and intentions from most military officers. At the
few senior officer conferences he attended, Abacha would typically remain
quiet. He preferred to express his strong views to Babangida directly and
privately, while quietly mobilizing opinion behind the scenes and maintaining
discrete contact with civilian leaders of thought who were opposed to the elections
in general and to Chief Abiola specifically. Meanwhile, to those
unfamiliar with their inner tensions, he positioned himself as the guarantor of
the Babangida regime. Further on in this essay, the strategic
brilliance of Abacha’s concealment will be apparent. Major General
MC Alli, for example, says that Abacha “had the patience of a hook-line
fisherman or a bush hunter, and the memory of an elephant and a native cunning
to match.”
In
addition to this cacophony of discordant but troubling military voices there
were powerful civilian pressures, notably from then Sultan of Sokoto, Ibrahim
Dasuki as well as other Emirs who allegedly did not like or trust either Tofa
or Abiola. In the background, personalities who had been banned or schemed
out from contesting as a result of government fiat were also opposed to the
elections. These included late Major General Shehu Yar’Adua and
Alhaji Abubakar Rimi. Funny enough Alhaji Bashir Tofa who was also a
candidate, supported by some elements within the NRC, also joined the bandwagon
to boycott and/or cancel the elections. Then there were mischievous
campaigners, like the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) which wanted the
military to hold on to power. All these internal groups and persons
working hard to scuttle the elections altogether were opposed by foreign
countries like Britain and the US which wanted the military to leave
power.
Nevertheless,
on June 10, 1993, ignoring ouster clauses in Decree #13 of 1993 and Decree #19
of 1987, Justice Bassey Ikpeme of the Abuja High Court granted a motion brought
by the ABN to restrain the Electoral Commission (NEC) from conducting the
election. However, citing lack of jurisdictional authority, General
Babangida initially chose to ignore the court, which is why the NEC went ahead
to conduct the election on June 12, which was later said to be ‘free and fair’.
Nowa Omoigui
nowa_o@yahoo.com
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