Nov. 17th Take Over: The Abacha's Classic Game Play

Late Sani Abacha

FROM JUNE 12 UNTIL AUGUST 26

On June 16, Professor Humphrey Nwosu announced - after results for 14 of the 30 states were already known  - that the NEC would suspend announcing election results.  The results increasingly pointed toward an apparent win by Chief Moshood Abiola, pending appeals to higher courts against lower court injunctions.  The entire result was later released by a pressure group called the Campaign for Democracy (CD) suggesting that Abiola won the majority of votes in 19 states while Tofa won 11 states.   However, pressure from key Army factions continued behind the scene. 

General Babangida left Abuja and retreated to Minna for urgent consultations with elements of his original 1985 military coup ‘caucus’.   The majority of these elements (including Abacha), had become thoroughly fed up with his previous assurances that Abiola was not going to make it past the Jos convention.  They were now faced with the reality of an impending Abiola Presidency. 

Practically holding him hostage, they reportedly gave him the option to choose between annulling the elections or leaving office voluntarily short of which, it is alleged, he and Abiola might be killed.   While all of this was going on, strange items of correspondence were circulating alleging that if Moshood Abiola were to be allowed to take office, he would purge the military, move the capital back to Lagos, and take other actions deemed threatening to vested interests.  Arguments were reportedly made in certain circles that Babangida was, by act of benign neglect, about to destroy the legacy of the Sardauna of Sokoto and yield political and ultimately military power to an ethnic region that already dominated the country economically.  This was amplified by interesting explanations that Abiola could not be ‘controlled’, that he was owed large sums of money by the federal government which he would now “unethically” control, that he had many wives and concubines etc.  Thrown into the mix were arguments about the controversial Jos convention of the PDP at which he allegedly bought votes, and the basic unfairness of preventing those who won the party primaries in September 1992, from contesting.  One school of thought felt that in fairness, since Abiola had gone through the electoral process and spent large sums of money, he ought to be paid off for his expenses and then advised as a friend to avoid politics and stick to business.

According to Professor Omo Omoruyi, (The Tale of June 12, Press Alliance Network London 1999, page 165) General Babangida said:

“Sani (meaning General Sani Abacha) is opposed to a return to civilian rule.  Sani cannot stand the idea of Chief Abiola, a Yoruba, becoming his Commander-in-Chief at all; Sani seems to have the ears of the Northern Leaders that no southerner especially from the Southwest should become the President of this country. Sani seems to rally the Northern Elders to confront me on the matter.  Where do I go from here?  They do not trust me. Without Sani, I will not be alive today; without the North, I would not have become an officer in the Nigerian Army and now the President of Nigeria……..”

Dr Ernest Shonekan, Head ING

“I don’t want to appear ungrateful to Sani; he may not be bright upstairs but he knows how to overthrow governments and overpower coup plotters.  He saw to my coming to office in 1985 and to my protection in the many coups I faced in the past, especially the Orkar coup of 1990 where he saved me and my family including my infant daughter.”

“Sani, you know, risked his life to get me into office in 1983 and 1985; if he says that he does not want Chief Abiola, I will not force Chief Abiola on him….”

On June 21st, Justice Dahiru Saleh of the Abuja High Court voided the election even though the appeal by the NEC was pending at the Court of Appeal.  Formal announcement to the nation of the cancellation followed on June 23rd, after a nocturnal military meeting the day before of “IBB Boys” at the Presidential Villa.  During the meeting most military officers rejected a negotiated compromise to resolve the impasse, preferring all out annulment.

Shortly thereafter, a state of Military Alert was announced, and the Chief Army Staff, Lt. General Salihu  Ibrahim went around military formations in the country to explain the annulment.  According to Major General MC Alli (rtd), who was at that time Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), most soldiers were unhappy about the annulment for three reasons.  Firstly, they were fed up with the domination of a small clique of officers who had been in power since 1983. Secondly, “in spite of General Babangida’s ‘settlement’ or material bribes, soldiers wanted to return to their professional roles”.  Thirdly, many were upset about their deployment to Liberia to be killed like animals without national consensus or proper logistic support.  But they had little choice, as a result of command influence, but to go along with it, at least on the surface. Meanwhile, according to the former DMI, security operatives were “busy constructing overt and covert threats to the life of Chief MKO Abiola”.

Protests and riots erupted, especially in Lagos and other parts of Chief Abiola’s home region of the country.  In response, General Sani Abacha gave marching orders to the Governor of Lagos State, Sir Michael Otedola, to restore order or risk exposing his citizens to the fury of the Nigerian Army.  Less than twenty-four hours later troops poured into the streets of Lagos and shot hundreds of unarmed demonstrators indiscriminately - on Abacha’s orders. Meanwhile the military became very unpopular and officers even feared wearing their uniforms publicly. 

Following the annulment, General Obasanjo (rtd) suggested that Babangida set up an interim Presidential Council comprising former Heads of State (excluding Babangida) to negotiate the transition to a future permanent form of government.  This plan would retain democratic structures at State and local levels, as well as the National Assembly at national level, but the National Executive would be an interim government responsible to the Presidential Council.  Babangida did not like the idea of a Presidential Council without him but liked the notion of an Interim National Government as an exit strategy.

A committee under Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro, meanwhile, urged new elections under new rules as Babangida had indicated in a speech to the nation on June 26.  This proposed new Presidential election was allegedly to be conducted before August 27, 1993, even though the government statement dissolved the NEC which would have been charged to conduct such an election.  Babangida viewed this as a trap aimed at him and quietly maneuvered to slip out of it.

Initially, the SDP predictably rejected any plans for a new election and Abiola meanwhile refused to give up his “mandate”.  However, after the usual Nigerian cajoling and bribing, political leaders of the SDP independently distanced themselves from Moshood Abiola as well as Governors and Legislators originally elected on SDP ticket.  The SDP, under Chief Tony Anenih and Alhaji Sule Lamido, then agreed on July 7, 1993 to an unelected Interim National Government (ING) in which they would collaborate with the NRC under Hammed Kusamotu and Tom Ikimi as well as President Babangida, to the exclusion of Abiola, the apparent winner of the June 12 elections.   Anenih’s actions caused a rift in the SDP that was later said to be resolved on October 11, well into the life of the ING.

Abacha (left) and Babangida

This development, which was the result of Babangida’s personal initiative, left Babangida with the challenge of determining how he would tiptoe around his military sharks to guarantee his personal safety and exit from power as well provide military backing to the legitimacy of the ING.  The only way he could have done this successfully was to assume full operational and policy control of the reigns of the defence and security establishments which meant he had to find a way to continue as Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence after August 27, 1993.  Unfortunately, he had dribbled his own military backers once too many and was unable to get support for such a “Pinochet type” arrangement from them.  He did not trust them; they did not trust him; and neither did they trust themselves.  It increasingly became clear that Babangida’s personal political agenda and that of the Nigerian military officers who brought him to power in 1985 were divergent.

To freeze Abiola out, the government released spates of decrees. These included, but were not limited to Decree #39 of 1993, also known as Presidential Elections repeal Decree; Decree #40, also known as Transition to Civil Rule (Amendment); Decree  #41, also known as Presidential Election (Invalidation of Court Order) Decree. Media organizations like The Punch, Concord Press, Sketch, Abuja Newsday, Ogun State Broadcasting Corporation and The Observer were proscribed.

Then a Tripartite Committee comprising Military, Government, and political Party representatives was set up on July 31, 1993, to decide how to manage what was left of the transition. The military was represented by Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro and Lt. Gen. Aliyu Gusau Mohammed, along with Brigadiers Mark, Shagaya and Ukpo.    This configuration pointedly excluded most members of Abacha’s “Lagos group” and provides some insight into Babangida’s thinking and Abacha’s cunning. Dogonyaro and David Mark groups were neck deep in ING organizational intrigues, which Babangida half-heartedly hoped to manipulate in order to guarantee a military role for himself after August 27.  Meanwhile Abacha was quietly consolidating and networking within the military, probing for weaknesses and lining up his ducks in a row.  But Abacha was crafty enough to allow some overlap.  Brigadier David Mark, for example, was initially simultaneously in Abacha’s  “Lagos Group” as well as being in the “IBB Group.”  In this manner a casual observer would superficially view the network of groups as one continuum of  “IBB-Abacha Boys” while Abacha quietly worked underground to crystallize his own clique.  Abacha firmly believed in the concept of keeping one’s enemies even closer to one than one’s friends, until he was ready to strike. 

The government was represented by Admiral Aikhomu (Vice President), Chief Ernest Shonekan of the TC (as “Head of Government”), Mr. Akpamgbo of the Justice Ministry and Alhaji Abdulraman Okene of the Ministry of Internal affairs, among others.   The NRC was represented by Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, Mr. John Nwodo, Chief Tom Ikimi, and Mr. Eyo Eyo Ita. The SDP was represented by Mr. Patrick Dele Cole, Chief Jim Nwobodo, Alhaji Olusola Saraki, Chief Dapo Sarumi, Mr. Joseph Toba, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi, and Major General Shehu Yar ‘Adua among others.

In this confused situation, General MC Alli, then DMI says he raised the possibility of overthrowing General Babangida with Army Chief Lt. Gen Salihu Ibrahim, who was reluctant to support such a move for a variety of professional, political and practical reasons, including his deep distrust of General Abacha.  Next, Brigadier MC Alli approached the Defence Minister General Sani Abacha with the same idea.  Abacha’s main concern was whether the Army Chief, Salihu Ibrahim, would back such a move.  Alli lied to Abacha by saying he had not yet approached Salihu Ibrahim.    Caught between two key officers who did not trust one another, Alli initially backed off.  But as the situation further deteriorated and Army prestige was at an all time low, Alli again approached Abacha, this time at home, in the presence of Lt. Gen. JT Useni. Again Abacha chose to be obdurate, taciturn and reflective. But Alli saw through him and concluded - rightly - that Abacha had some kind of personal design that he was not yet ready to spring, preferring for General Babangida to leave the scene first, peacefully.   In my view Abacha was probably gauging MC Alli’s intentions and deciding whether or not to trust him because - as we shall see later - he had already secretly tapped some officers to begin the delicate process of recruiting allies for his final drive to power.   Simultaneously other dynamics may have been at play between Generals Babangida and Abacha.  One unconfirmed account says that although they had a “pact”, their wives did not get along, and that Mrs, Babangida did not relish the thought of him handing over to General Abacha.  Meanwhile other pro-IBB and anti-IBB military interest groups were scheming, including some core “IBB Boys” who basically wanted to implement a self succession plan, after which professional officers in the military would be purged through a process of being set up and eliminated.   There was also a last ditch effort to get the National Assembly to “draft” Babangida in some sort of role to plug the apparent vacuum following annulment but this effort failed after, it is rumored, money had already changed hands.

On August 2, 1993, the Army Chief, Lt. Gen. Salihu Ibrahim told senior officers of the Army in Lagos that difficulties in arranging a new Presidential election before August 27, 1993 had persuaded the government, with the backing of the two parties and foreign countries, to form an Interim National Government (ING). The ING would organize elections and carry out government responsibilities.  Officers discussed options for full civilian government composed of the two parties, a mixed civilian-military interim regime or a full temporary military regime.   Those present recommended that Babangida stay no longer than August 27, 1993, and that officers from all three services should work out the details for transition. Such officers should not have held political positions in the government.  They also recommended that the National Assembly be on recess while the ING was active and that the two political parties be self financing.  The interesting thing about this process of military consultation on the Transitional Program was that it was parallel to the Tripartite Committee mentioned earlier.

On August 3, faced with real and imagined threats to his life and with no hope of getting Babangida to rescind his decision on the June 12 matter, Chief Moshood Abiola left Nigeria for Europe.

Shonekan

On August 17, General Babangida informed the National Assembly that he was stepping aside.  His Service Chiefs did not accompany him to the National Assembly, which was a breach of protocol and an indicator that he was fast losing control of the military.   On that same day, which happened to be his birthday, senior officers from all three services met in Lagos and reaffirmed that Babangida could not continue in office. They did not, however, appoint a successor to replace him, nor did they make room for him to play the role of a Commander-in-Chief during an interim government.   This “oversight”, which Babangida was not pleased about, was very convenient for Abacha’s game plan.  On the strength of recommendations of the Tripartite Committee, the government then established the Nwabueze Panel. It was tasked to draft a constitution for the proposed ING.  The panel included Professor Ben Nwabueze, Mr. C. Akpamgbo (Attorney General), Justice P. Nwokedi, Professor Uvieghara, and Dr. Azinge.  In those dangerous days, officers who used to be freely admitted into Babangida’s courtyard with their security details were now required to be disarmed and to leave their details as far away as possible.  There was at least one such incident involving General Abacha himself.

On August 25th, with options for a safe exit closing fast, General Babangida settled on Chief Ernest Shonekan as his candidate for the Chairmanship of the proposed ING.  Shonekan, incidentally, was not only Yoruba like Abiola but also from Abeokuta in Ogun State, like Abiola.  Lt. General Aliyu Gusau Mohammed, then the National Security Adviser, reportedly influenced his appointment and the British government supported it.   The Nigerian military as an institution had nothing to do with his appointment. 

Professor Omoruyi opines that Shonekan agreed, as a condition of his appointment, not to reopen the June 12 matter. He also allegedly made a commitment to assist in preventing Yorubas from forming a united front on the issue.   Another curious ‘agreement’ was that Shonekan would not move into the official Presidential Villa in Abuja but would instead stay at the Presidential Guest House.  The main Villa was to be left vacant.

Another interesting decision General Babangida made in his confused state of mind was to leave General Abacha behind as the Secretary of Defence and Vice Chairman of the ING, reportedly as “an insurance against coups” and to ensure unity of the military in backing the ING.  In other words, genuinely concerned about the safety of the Hen House, Babangida asked the Fox to guard it.    To counter-balance Abacha, however, Babangida planned to appoint Lt. Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro as the Chief of Defence Staff.  Abacha would guide “policy” while Dogonyaro would take charge of “operations”.  This curious arrangement was actually a default for which Babangida had no serious options, except perhaps Brigadier David Mark.  Once he lost the backing of the Armed Forces to continue in either a military or political role after August 27, he had to rely on an unstable alliance of those he had relied on all along to keep power.

On August 26th, 1993, a retirement parade was held at the Eagle Square in Abuja for General Babangida.  Following the parade, Babangida - miffed at their lack of backing for his continuation in office as the C-in-C - announced the retirements, along with his, with effect from August 27, of all his Service Chiefs and announced the appointment of Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro as Chief of Defence Staff.   The service chiefs retired were Lt. Gen. Salihu Ibrahim (COAS), Air Vice Marshall Dada (CAS), Vice Admiral Preston Omatsola (CNS), Vice Admiral Murtala Nyako (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff) and Alhaji Aliyu Attah (IGP).  Following this announcement by Babangida, the DMI (Brig. MC Alli) met with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defence Minister, General Abacha in his bedroom and advised that the retirements made by Babangida be rescinded to help stabilize the tense situation between the Armed Forces and Babangida on one hand and the Nigerian public on the other.  Abacha listened patiently, counselled patience, and advised that “there was need to consolidate military authority before further action.”

What Abacha did next was a classic move.  He met with the “retired Service Chiefs”, empathized with the way they were treated and offered to extend the effective dates of their retirements until September 17th.   Then, the next day, with their support, he backdated the date of Babangida’s retirement from the Army to August 26th, a step which rendered Babangida’s pronouncements from the 27th invalid.  Then he later rescinded Dogonyaro’s appointment as Chief of Defence Staff, arguing that three northerners, (Abacha as Defence Secretary, Dogonyaro as CDS and Aliyu Mohammed Gusau as COAS) should not ‘unfairly’ monopolize top jobs in Defence.   He offered Lt General Oladipo Diya, Commandant of the National War College and a Yoruba from Abiola’s home Ogun State, the position of Chief of Defence Staff.  This was a cynical move by Abacha, who, as one of his former close confidants told me, had little regard for Diya personally, and most Yoruba officers in general.  But Abacha needed to isolate Dogonyaro, and had larger designs on the political class, particularly Yoruba leaders of thought who he was going to use Diya to pacify. Therefore, the “Yoruba” strategy was useful  -for now.

THE INTERIM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (ING)

The transition from Babangida to Shonekan was codified by a number of decrees. Decree No. 59 of 1993 ended the Babangida administration whilst Decree No. 61 created the ING. Thus, at about 3.30p.m, on August 26, 1993, Ernest Shonekan was sworn in as the new “Head of State and President of the ING” by the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Mohammed Bello, at the Presidential Villa, Abuja.  He was not, however, sworn in as the “Commander-in-Chief” of the Armed Forces!  This “oversight” was also deliberate.   Another interesting detail was that Decree #61 of 1993 that established the ING identified General Abacha by name as the Vice-President, Defence Secretary and “Senior Minister.”  The “Senior Minister” was empowered to succeed the President of the ING in the event of resignation or other untoward event.  Thus Abacha was Shonekan’s designated successor and Shonekan had no operational control of the Armed Forces.

Other members of the ING were:

Agriculture and Natural Resources: Professor Jerry Gana

Commerce and Tourism: Chief Mrs.Bola Kuforiji-Olubi

Communications: Chief Dapo Sarumi

Education and Youth Development: Professor Abraham Imogie

Finance: Alhaji Aminu Saleh

FCT Administrator: Maj.Gen.Gado Nasko

Foreign Affairs: Chief Matthew Mbu

Secretary of State (Foreign): Alhaji Saidu Isa

Health and Human Services: Prince Julius Adelusi-Adeluyi

Internal Affairs: Chief Ezekiel Yesufu

Industries: Chief Ignatius Kogbara

Information and Culture: Mr. Uche Chukwumerije
Justice: Mr. Clement Akpamgbo SAN

Petroleum and Mineral Resources: Chief Don Etiebet

Secretary of State (Petroleum): Alhaji Ibrahim Ali

Labour and Productivity: Prince Bola Afonja

Power and Steel: Alhaji Hassan Adamu
Secretary of State (Power and Steel): Alhaji Oladunni Ayandipo

Police Affairs: Alhaji Abdullahi Mahmud Koki

Science and Technology:  Professor Bartholomew Nnaji
Transport and Aviation: Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu

Water and Rural Development: Alhaji Isa Mohammed

Works and Housing: Mr.Barnabas Gemade

Chairman, National Planning Commission: Mr.Isaac Aluko-Olokun (in lieu of Professor Sam Aluko)

Establishment and Management Services:  Mr. Innocent Nwoga

States and Local Government Affairs: Alhaji Sule Unguwar Alkali

Secretary to ING: Alhaji Mustapha Umara

National Assembly Liaison Officer: Alhaji Abba Dabo (House of Representatives)

National Assembly Liaison Officer: Dr. Samuel Ogboghodo (House of Representatives)

National Assembly Liaison Officer: Senator George Hoomkwap (Senate).

A number of military era decrees were then abrogated.  However, two days later the National Labour Congress (NLC) began a nationwide strike to protest fuel scarcity.

Shonekan addressed Nigerians on August 31st.   He had begun the process of releasing most of those detained for their involvement in pro-June 12 riots like Chief Gani Fawehinmi, Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti and Mr. Femi Falana. He re-opened some Universities that had been shut down and lobbied the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the NLC to suspend industrial actions.  To the military, Shonekan promised to start phased withdrawals from Liberia.

Even as Shonekan was making these lofty pronouncements, Abacha was well on his way.  It was on September 3rd that he publicly announced what had already transpired behind the scenes.  Lt-General Oladipo Diya was his replacement for Lt. Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro as CDS, Air Commodore John Femi was to replace Air Commodore Nsikak Eduak as Chief of Air Staff while retaining Lt-General Aliyu Mohammed as Chief of Army Staff, and Rear Admiral Suleiman Seidu, as Chief of Naval Staff.  Simultaneously he ordered the Military Task Force on Petroleum to restore normal supply of fuel to marketers within 24 hours. Two days later, the killing of seven Nigerian soldiers serving the UN Peace-keeping Force in Mogadishu, Somalia, was announced.  It resulted in a fact-finding tour led by Brigadier-General Cyril Iweze. On September 13th, Defence Headquarters issued a curious clarification over the recent Army postings, saying it had no political undertone.  Spokesman Colonel Fred Chijuka said a similar exercise was underway in the Navy and the Air Force. A week later, Chijuka was again making another statement, this time to announce the appointment of new Divisional Commanders and the retirement of Lt-Gen. Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro. With his position made untenable by Abacha, Dogonyaro “voluntarily” retired from the Army, alerting the country in the process that Abacha was in the opening phase of an all out assault on democracy.  As a coup merchant himself he should not have had any difficulty reading the signs.

On the political front, meanwhile, the calculation that Shonekan's appointment as Head of the ING would split the Yoruba people and make it easier to consign the June 12 election to the rubbish heap of history failed. Political threats against Shonekan began as soon as he took office and his house even had to be protected from arsonists.   The Governors of Oyo, Ogun, Osun and Ondo States, for example, refused, at least in public, to recognise Shonekan as the Head of State. They and other Yoruba opinion leaders also requested Yoruba speaking elements in the ING to resign their appointments. The legality of the ING was also challenged in court.  Pro-democracy rallies resumed.  To douse this flame, Shonekan, who had earlier agreed as a condition of his appointment not to raise the June 12 issue, and even stated on September 28th that the ING will not do so, was advised by some to establish the Mamman Nasir panel to investigate June 12.  He announced this on October 1st, even as security men were arresting waves of pro-democracy supporters.  Two days later, in a storm of controversy in the Press, members of the SDP in the ING threatened to pull out, claiming that they had only accepted to serve initially because they thought they were supporting a Palace coup to oust the former President Ibrahim Babangida. Meanwhile the National Assembly was locked into an internal battle over efforts to repeal the decree that annulled the June 12 election in the first place.  Both Shonekan and Abiola were touring the country to raise support for their respective agendas.  Abiola filed a court motion to declare the ING illegal.

Shonekan was also later accused (without evidence) of trying to bribe opposing members of the National Assembly in an attempt to gain legitimacy and expand his national support base.

As far as the Army was concerned, Shonekan relied on his personal friendship with Lt. Gen Aliyu Gusau, former National Security Adviser and new Chief of Army Staff. One unconfirmed account suggests that both Gusau and Rear Admiral Suleiman Seidu of the Navy may have discussed the possibility of retiring Abacha with Shonekan.  If true, it would have been interesting indeed to see how this would have transpired in practice.  All the Service Chiefs had clearly treated Shonekan with disdain.  For example, during the Passing out Parade at the Nigerian Defence Academy that year, Shonekan was not accompanied by any of the Service Chiefs.   Such an alleged but presumably unsuccessful effort on the part of Gusau and Seidu against Abacha, therefore, if true, would have had the effect of marking both men for subsequent retirement when Abacha started his final push into Aso Rock.

Long before this time military officers had begun settling down into various groups and cliques for and against Babangida, for and against Abiola, and for and against themselves. What later became known as the Sani Abacha Lagos group or caucus, comprised various combinations among officers like Brigadier Ahmed Aboki Abdullahi, Brigadier Bashir Magashi, Brigadier M Chris Alli, Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi, Brigadier Patrick Aziza, Brigadier Tajudeen Olarenwaju, Brigadier Ibrahim Gumel, Brigadier David Mark, Air Commodore MA Johnson, Rear Admiral FBI Porbeni, Colonel Lawan Gwadabe and Lt. Col. Sambo Dasuki, among others.   This group often met in the guest house of Brigadier Bashir Magashi at Ikoyi.  It is pertinent to mention that Brigadier MC Alli - the former DMI who later became GOC, 1st Division and then COAS - was “invited” into the group by Brigadier Ahmed Aboki Abdullahi, not by General Abacha.  Nevertheless it seems apparent that Abacha must have engineered it, appreciative of Brigadier MC Alli’s confidential visits to his office and home all along.

By

Nowa Omoigui

nowa_omoigui@yahoo.com