In his
fine book “Epic Retreats – From 1776 to
the Evacuation of Saigon”, Stephen Tanner analyses retreat under pressure
in seven military campaigns. They are General George Washington’s retreat from
New York in 1776 during the American revolution, Napoleon’s retreat from Russia
in 1812, and the great retreat of the Nez Perce Indians of the American West in
1877. Others are the evacuation of British expeditionary troops from
Dunkirk in 1940, retrograde operations of the 1st Panzer army in the
Caucasus in 1942, and the harrowing retreat of the American 8th Army from
the Pusan perimeter in Korea in late 1950. Lastly, he reviewed the
chaotic evacuation of Saigon in 1975 by American forces retreating from
Vietnam.
However,
the specific accounts of fighting withdrawals discussed in Tanner’s excellent
book are by no means the only great examples from which serious students of
military history can draw lessons. In my humble opinion, two specific
examples of breakouts from encirclement deserve particular emphasis. They
are:
1.
The breakout of General W. J. Slim’s Burma Corps from Japanese encirclement at
Rangoon and 900 mile retreat to Imphal (in India) under pressure in 1942.
2.
The break out of the 1st US Marine Division under Brigadier General Lewis
B. “Chesty” Puller from Chinese encirclement at the Chosin reservoir, under
sub-arctic conditions in mountainous terrain during the Korean War, between
November 27th and December 9th, 1950.
It is
with these accounts, among others at the back of my mind, that I now return to
the subject of this essay.
Choices open to the 16th Brigade at Owerri
Faced
with encirclement, the 16th Brigade had a number of choices:
First,
they could continue their attack northwards, deep along the original axes
hoping to attain the initial grand objectives of ‘Operation OAU’ and relieve
their sister Brigades in the process. As noted previously, this option
was briefly pursued and then terminated.
Secondly,
they could hold their position in Owerri and environs and defend encircled, as
they did for many months. This was based not only on their original
operational orders in September 1968 but also the direction of AHQ, confirmed
by a “stand and fight” radio signal from the C-in-C, Major General Gowon
himself in February 1969. It did seem that higher national pride
(not to mention the need to maintain the aura of the 3MCDO and protect Colonel
Adekunle’s image) was involved in the decision not to allow Owerri to be
abandoned. Military factors in favor of this option included the
built in advantage of defending an urban area, equipped with armored vehicles
(which the besieging Biafrans did not have). These vehicles
included Saracen Armoured Personnel Carriers, Ferret and Saladin Armored cars,
which gave Etuk a fire power and mobility advantage using “interior lines” for
rapid support by force transfer from his core support area of all round
front-line positions in the “hedgehog”. In any case, if and when
he had to break out he could rupture the encirclement by sheer
armored force. In support of this optimistic thinking was the initial
assumption that the Brigade could be supported by air, reinforced and relieved
before certain destruction by the Biafran armed forces. The absence
of Biafran air power and the curious initial Biafran strategy of attacking with
one infantry Brigade at a time from only one direction in a sequential manner
rather than a simultaneous all round assault encouraged such thinking.
All Etuk had to do was “jab” with his front-line infantry positions and support
artillery before delivering a powerful “counter-punch” using armored vehicles
concentrated on the attacking force at the point of threatened penetration. The
last factor that gave Etuk initial confidence was the federal effort to
para-drop supplies, supported by occasional strafing and bombing of Biafran
positions by NAF L-29, Mig-17 and Ilyushin fighter jets and bombers.
However,
the Biafrans soon settled in for an alternative strategy. In between infantry
assaults, harassing artillery fire and long range snipers gradually reduced the
16th Brigade by continuous external pressure through attrition. This
approach enabled the besieging Biafran units to conserve men and perhaps
redeploy them for emergencies in other fronts. But it had the
disadvantage of using up a lot of ammunition in an endless orgy of repeated bombardments,
which, although murderous and highly effective, were ultimately insufficient to
compel Etuk to surrender. It also allowed the siege to drag on. The
“penetration” attempt by Colonel Achuzia failed because it used only one
frontal axis. Eventually, 14 Division Commander, Colonel Ogbugo Kalu,
supported by Major General Madiebo, armed with intimate knowledge of Etuk’s
hopeless situation, correctly chose to attack, penetrate and exploit along
multiple converging axes with little fear that Etuk – desperately short of men
and supplies - could inflict punishment in retaliation. This combination
of fire and maneuver eventually forced Etuk to choose between surrender,
displacement, or complete destruction. When that point was reached, then
Lt. Col. EA Etuk, with the support of his second-in-command, Major AT Hamman,
decided they would ignore the suicidal orders of the 3MCDO HQ and AHQ to “hold
until relieved.” They decided they would either break out or exfiltrate
to the rear, in the direction of friendly 3MCDO forces.
Indeed,
Biafran sources are of the opinion that Etuk considered this line of action at
least three times. Two of these occurred in March when he first realized
encirclement was total on or about March 7th, and then later in the month had
to beat back ferocious efforts by the “S” Division to penetrate and divide his
forces. Russian and German forces often did this to encircled enemy
units during WW2. However, on each occasion impatient Biafran units
rushed into the Owerri pocket in frontal pursuit to take advantage, only to be
badly beaten back when Etuk suddenly reconfigured his armor for counter-attack.
There is
some evidence that Biafran units used the technique of selective reduction of
strong points. On February 10th, for example, Ojukwu claims that 500
Russian automatic rifles and 100 boxes of ammunition were secured from one of
the 16th Brigade’s defensive positions. Madiebo does not, however,
make any comment that such a vast haul of weapons was secured. In any
case, organized systematic selective reduction targeted at large groups of key
battlefield assets did not occur. This would have involved choosing
one of Etuk’s main ‘teeth’ arm detachments, such as armor, for example, (or
artillery) and then destroying that first (as a whole) before focusing on other
combat and combat support elements. One reason was that Etuk usually withdrew
his armored vehicles back into center of the Owerri pocket after using them for
a counter-attack. He never left them open. The other reason was the
shortage of appropriate anti-tank weaponry. It does, however, seem that
there were efforts at reduction by
infiltration which involved penetrating the perimeter with small commando
units designed to isolate small elements of the 16th brigade from their
parent unit.
During
pauses between attacks, such as was the case when Ojukwu called off Achuzia’s
penetration attack, Biafran Commanders supported their attrition strategy with
continuous reconnaissance probes and psychological operations (psyops).
Examples of psyops include the case of the female Captain who
regularly showed up in full view of federal troops to hail “Biafra Kwenu” and
the choice of nighttime to do most of the shelling of federal positions in
Owerri. In addition, inadvertently routing the final approach to over-fly
Owerri of early morning relief aircraft bringing ammunition to Uli-Ihiala
airstrip before daybreak sent an unmistakable message to the besieged
forces. They also had to live with the knowledge that most of the
federal para-dropped ammunition and food meant for them were going to their
tormentors. They even had to fight for the little they got!
Then there were the sniper shots, slowly but surely killing all the leadership
figures in the Brigade. All of this was backed up by electronic measures
such as federal communications interception. On the flip side,
Ojukwu visited Biafran units besieging Owerri at least twice in the month of
March, raising morale and getting involved in tactical decisions.
Relevant developments outside Owerri
On the
federal side and international front, other developments ultimately impacted
the Owerri situation. At the February meeting in Lagos of
divisional commanders mentioned earlier, a semblance of coordination was
urged. But deep mistrust and rivalry remained. Colonel Adekunle,
for example, did not tell his fellow divisional commanders (ie Colonels Shuwa
and Ibrahim Haruna) in the 1st and 2nd divisions the full extent of
his Owerri dilemma. Instead, the meeting focused on resolving the
question of which Division would be given the task of taking Umuahia, following
Adekunle’s disaster in October 1968 when he tried doing so on his own to beat
Shuwa to it and end the war.
Therefore,
rather than instructing the 1st Division to relieve the 16th Brigade
directly by attacking Owerri from Okigwe which is 30 miles away (as the crow
flies) in the north-easterly direction, Shuwa was told to veer southwest to
take Umuahia, then administrative capital of Biafra. This clarified an old
dispute with Adekunle but did not directly address the Owerri situation.
In retrospect, although Umuahia was highly significant, if Shuwa had
successfully attacked Owerri (rather than Umuahia) in early 1969, in
coordination with a southern assault on Owerri from Port Harcourt by 3MCDO,
both divisions would have relieved the beleaguered 16th Brigade. They
would also have divided Biafra into two, separating the Biafran capital at
Umuahia from its resupply airfield at Uli-Ihiala in the west. Chances are
that the war – with its horrendous losses - may have been shorter.
The fall
of Umuahia to the 1st Division will be discussed in detail in a future
essay. In summary, Colonel Shuwa tasked the commanders of 1 and 2 Sectors
(later called Brigades) of the 1st Division to take Umuahia and Bende
respectively. Under the command of 1 Sector Commander, Lt. Col. ADS Wya,
the plan for the fall of Umuahia – code-named Operation Leopard - was drawn up
by his Brigade Major, Major Abdullahi Shelleng and the Sector Deputy Assistant
Quartermaster General (DAQMG), Major Mamman Jiya Vatsa.
Meanwhile,
the other brigades of Adekunle’s 3MCDO division had reorganized and recaptured
Mkpom, Usung-Ubum, Ikot-Abia and Ikot Obom on February 3rd, followed on March
20th and 27th by the recapture of Umudike and Aba Ala earlier lost in
the Biafran counter-offensive of 1968. The Colonel General Staff at 3MCDO
HQ at this time was Major George Innih while Lt. Col. Emmanuel Abisoye, a
former 2 Sector Commander with the 1st Division, was in charge of 3MCDO
(rear) in Lagos, securing supplies for front-line units “by any means
necessary”.
On March
27, 1969, with the support of a squadron of armoured vehicles under Captain
Garba Duba, 11 Field Squadron of Nigerian Army Engineers under Captain Gida
Inakusu, “Q” Battery of Nigerian Army Artillery under Captain AB Mamman, and 1
Field Ambulance, five infantry battalions launched the assault on
Umuahia. These battalions, namely the 4th, 21st, 25th, 44th, and
82nd were commanded by Major Ado Mohammed (later replaced by Lt.
Steve Samaila Yombe), Major YY Kure, Lt. Balarabe Haladu, Major IB Babangida
(later replaced by Major MJ Vatsa) and Major Ibrahim Bako respectively.
NAF fighter-bombers later assisted in close air-support although there were a
few unfortunate incidents of deadly ‘NAF friendly fire’ at Abriba and Uzuakoli.
A Zambian
delegation had visited Biafra from March 13 – 15 followed two weeks later by
the British PM’s visit to Nigeria. When the objective of ‘Operation
Leopard’ became evident, Ojukwu started desperately mobilizing soldiers and
resources from all corners of what remained of Biafra (including Owerri) to save
Umuahia, eventually stalling but not stopping Col. ADS Wya’s advance in two
weeks of fierce fighting. During the time, nevertheless, Ezi Alayi, Ovim,
Amoyi, Ndi Ihube, Uzuakoli, Isikwuato, Umuokorola and Bende fell to the
1stDivision, while elements of the 3rd MCDO took back Umuomayi and Okuenyi
on April 4th. This was followed by the recapture of Obetete on April 5th which
had been lost only 24 hours earlier. On April 13th, 3MCDO lost Obokwe
again, typical of its extremely labile situation since October 1968.
Biafra’s final offensive to retake Owerri
Beginning
with his visit to Uzuakoli, followed by the precautionary evacuation of the
Biafran government from Umuahia to Nkwerre, near Orlu on April 4th up
until the fall of Bende on April 14th, Ojukwu became increasingly concerned
about the fate of Umuahia, where his bunker was located. According to
Madiebo:
“By the 14th of April, it had become obvious
judging from the situation on the ground, that Umuahia was going to be
lost. It was also clear that such an event would destroy completely
the will of the Biafran people to continue the war. It was then that Colonel
Ojukwu told me of the need to revive the Owerri operation on the off-chance
that we might score a victory there to counter-balance the loss of
Umuahia. The idea was to share the few resources available into two to
try and clear what was left of Owerri before it was too late. The whole
idea was a calculated risk worth taking if the Head of State who alone knew
what ammunition the nation had, thought so.
On the 18th of April, therefore, the Owerri
operations were reopened. As I was still at Umuahia, I did not know
exactly what was available for the offensive. However, the plan of the
operation which was sent to me for approval, showed that the 60 Brigade was
again to clear the right side of the town up to the Clock Tower and including
the Holy Ghost College, the Catholic Cathedral and the Progress Hotel.
The 52 Brigade, now under Major Igweze, was to have another go at Orji and the
northern part of the town, down to the Public Works Department and the
Government Secondary School. Elements of “S” Division under command of 14
Division in the absence of Onwuatuegwu, who was still at Umuahia, had the task
of advancing through Egbu and Nekede into Owerri, as far as to the motor park.”
Far away
in Monrovia, Liberia, the OAU consultative committee was meeting on April
17th. No one knew that history was about to be made on an African
battlefield. Remnants of the 16th Brigade of the 3MCDO
that had held Owerri since September 16, 1968 and was at least partially cut
off for almost six months since November 1st, and totally besieged since March
14th, were about to break out. Etuk was finally persuaded not just by
Biafra’s equally historic final offensive to retake Owerri, an act that in turn
had been prompted by the impending fall of Umuahia to federal units under Col.
ADS Wya, but by what transpired inside Owerri on April 19th.
April 19th, 1968: The Final DC-3 overflight and death
of Major A Ted Hamman
On April
19th, Captain Francis Mokonogho and his DC-3 crew lifted off from Port Harcourt
airport for yet another routine tactical airdrop over Owerri. But,
unknown to them, fate beckoned. They flew right into a Biafran
offensive. Biafran anti-aircraft gunners were no longer in the mood to
accept the free aerial gifts from the federal government, nor were they going
to allow Etuk the luxury of any more ammunition or food, no matter how
small. Thus, they shot at the plane furiously, forcing Mokonogho to abort
its final approach and turn around to Port Harcourt with its cargo. He
barely made it back. The DC-3 was badly riddled with bullet holes.
It would be the last attempt by the 3MCDO to resupply its beleaguered
brigade.
Back in
Owerri, Etuk, now at his wit’s end, was faced with the penetration of Biafran
units, so close in one axis that they were nearly upon his HQ. He called
his trusted second in command (2iC) and Brigade Major (Hamman) aside for urgent
consultations. They agreed – without reference to 3MCDO HQ or AHQ -
that a last ditch effort to breakout towards the rear with all they had was
only the only credible option. Surrender was out of the question.
As of
this time, the surviving troops of the 16th brigade had acquired the
“thousand yard stare.” As described by a survivor of the American break
out from the Chosin reservoir in Korea, the stare results from a combination of
tiredness, sleeplessness, and fear, combined, paradoxically, with a strong will
to survive. When men get into that condition, they are fighting for no
one but themselves and their buddies, not any country or imaginary ideal.
For many months, the Brigade had endured chronic sleep deprivation, repeated
mortar and 105mm artillery barrages, short, but repeated violent firefights
back and forth in and out of foxholes and buildings with shot guns, rifles and
machine guns. Practically every building in the town had been
destroyed. Then there were the deaths of numerous colleagues, impromptu
burials, personal injuries, near death experiences, rain, hunger, cold, heat,
insect bites, separation from family, the emotional highs and lows of relief
over-flights and DC-3 air drops, the stench, and worst of all, a suspicion that
they had been abandoned.
According
to Colonel Etuk (rtd),
“My decision to withdraw wasn’t proper. The Army
Headquarters should [ordinarily] give me the go-ahead but I did [without
authority] and said let me be court-martialled when I am out with my
troops. [If] I didn’t do that, it would have meant complete elimination
of the whole troops and that was what Ojukwu was waiting to do. If not through
hunger it would have been through torture by whatever means he chose to use.
But the Army Headquarters did little or nothing to get me as a Brigade
Commander out of that place. What sort of battle organization is that? So
I said to myself, ‘When I come out let them put me on trial.’ But they
didn’t do it; maybe they knew that that was the only way to save the few lives
I was able to…..”
“…..the rebels had penetrated into the town where my
headquarters was situated and so the firing was so close; as we are sitting
here you will just hear deafening sounds. One should not stay at a position for
too long for the time may turn out to be enough for the enemy to kill you….”
“So one Sunday morning, when the rebels were almost at
my headquarters and we were doing nothing because there was nothing we could do
then – no ammunition, the men were gone, no weapons – I called the attention of
others and said to them:
“We have to pull out of this place to see what we can
do next week to save a few lives remaining”
So we set out towards Emmanuel College. We were
all determined to get out of the place, be it a cook, a washerman; in fact,
every one of us with or without a weapon. As we left, within 30 minutes
after the decision, I heard a cry,
“Oga, come oh! Oga come oh! Dem don kill Oga
oh!”
Behold, he was shot right there. The man was
gasping for breath. He had a very large wound. If the road had been opened and
if we had immediate medical attention, possibly his life might have been
saved. There weren’t even drugs. The doctor I had was just sitting
and watching while the man died.
“…before the poor boy died, he [Major Hamman] said,
“Oga, Allah, Allah, if I see Adekunle I will finish
him. Adekunle is the man that has caused this.”
I said, “Well, we cannot say, but all we should be
thinking is to be able to leave this place if it is possible.”
Coming as
it did at the tail end of the siege, after a preliminary decision had been made
to plan a break out, the death of the competent and popular Major Ted Hamman
was absolutely devastating for unit morale. It stretched the cohesion of
the unit to the limit and sorely tested the command and leadership skills of
Etuk. The next day, April 20, 1969, Ojukwu made an entry in his diary,
documenting the Biafran interception of weak federal radio transmissions from
Owerri alerting 3MCDO HQ of Major AT Hamman’s death. However, 3MCDO HQ
did not notify AHQ of the development. For the Biafran side, Hamman’s
death was a signal that before long the 16th brigade might simply
collapse.
Meanwhile,
according to Colonel Etuk (rtd):
“The death of that young man forced me to take a
decision of praying to God that if He is the God that delivered the children of
Israel from Egypt then He should deliver my troops. Of course, God
delivered us.”
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