 |
| Gen. Gowon & his service chiefs |
Cutting
off the 16th Bde in order to kill it
Following
the fall of Port Harcourt to federal troops of the 3MCDO on May 19th, there was
an urgent need for the Biafran separatist government to establish another
airport through which weapons could be flown in. Thus, on the
main road from Owerri to Ihiala, the long straight stretch between Mgbidi and
Uli was widened to 25 meters and modified into a 2,600-meter long runway, along
with a parallel taxi-way. This airstrip, capable of handling up to 30
large aircraft every night, code-named “Annabelle”, but better known as the
Uli-Ihiala airport, became operational in August 1968 and would later assume a
mythic stature in the story of the Nigerian Civil War (for details, see future
essay on the Uli-Ihiala Airport). Meanwhile, Major General Emeka Ojukwu
was exhorting Biafrans to resort to guerrilla warfare in a fight to the
finish. He was quoted as saying:
“We shall all have to return to our provinces and
villages. We shall turn out and harass the enemy at every turn and chase
him out of our land.”
Indeed
the Biafran delegation to the peace talks in Kampala walked out on May 31st,
1968. In support of Ojukwu’s position, another unnamed Biafran officer
told the British journalist, John de St. Jorre,
“If you gave us the choice of 1000 rifles or milk for
50,000 starving children, we’d take the guns.”
Set
against this apparent determination to continue fighting, it was through the
Uli airstrip that the first large consignment of French weapons to Biafra began
arriving in late August, consisting of 2000 rockets and millions of rounds of
ammunition delivered serially in 20-ton aliquots of ordnance every night.
This occurred shortly after Czechoslovakia, Holland, Italy, France and Belgium
banned arms sales to Nigeria, hoping to force the pugilists to the peace table
and prevent further fratricide. At this time, an average of 10,000 men, women
and children were reportedly dying every day in Biafra, mostly from
starvation. The Nordchurchaid relief airlift operation to Biafra had only
just begun even as Robert Goldstein, Public Relations Representative of Biafra
in the USA was resigning. He was protesting Ojukwu’s rejection of land
routes through Federal and Biafran territory as a means of getting urgent
relief shipments to starving civilians. Ojukwu had laid down a condition
that not only would he not accept mercy land corridors for food aid
(supervised by the International Red Cross, World Council of Churches etc)
without a complete ceasefire, but that an airlift was the only
solution to feed the starving. What Ojukwu wanted was a mechanism by
which food aid could be used as a cover for weapons imports (particularly at
night) without the prying eyes of the Federal Government. Hence the
preference for airlifts over road haulage even if it meant blocking emergency
shipments of food already waiting at Nigerian ports.
The
situation in Biafra in September 1968 was, therefore, very fluid. On one
hand, the French had started making good on promises to supply weapons and
ammunition. But international pressure to reach an accommodation with
Nigeria to protect starving civilians was continuing. At the OAU meeting that
took place in Algiers on September 13th, Nigeria won a diplomatic victory when
the continental body passed a pro-Nigerian resolution basically declaring its
opposition to secession.
The
Biafran delegation to the meeting, consisting of recognized figures like Nnamdi
Azikiwe, Michael Okpara, Kenneth Dike, Francis Nwokedi and others subsequently
conducted a crucial meeting with the French observer delegation from Foccart’s
office. They wanted France to agree to an unrestrained military
commitment to Biafra, in which enough weapons to assure victory over Nigeria,
would be supplied, rather than just enough to defend the core of Biafra against
Nigeria’s “Operation Tall Man”, Gowon’s final offensive of 1968. The
French delegation refused, and stipulated that they would not increase
the current level of commitment unless Biafra was able to
independently attract additional diplomatic recognition from more African
countries. It was a Catch-22 situation.
It was on
this basis, therefore, that the Biafran OAU observer delegation in Algiers
(except Nwokedi, who dissented) sent a cable back to Emeka Ojukwu in
Biafra. They advised that in view of the recent fall of Aba and Owerri,
and French ambivalence, Biafra – faced with large numbers of starving people -
should negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis by responding to Nigeria’s offer
of guarantees and re-integration of Igbos. Ojukwu’s reaction, however,
was to accuse them all of treason and order the delegation to return home at
once. This was the point at which Ojukwu parted ways with long-standing
Igbo politicians like Azikiwe and Okpara. A follow-up letter sent from
Paris on September 25th by Nnamdi Azikiwe to persuade Ojukwu to negotiate
– in order to save lives - was also rebuffed. A few days later, on September
27th, to outflank the old political warhorse, Ojukwu convened his appointed
Biafran Consultative Assembly and got a “mandate” to keep fighting.
A week
earlier, on September 24, the International Military Observer Team in Nigeria
(OTN) had started work, invited by Major General Gowon of Nigeria, to evaluate
whether Nigerian troops were indeed committing genocide. The Team
consisted of General Negga Tegegne of Ethiopia, Major Slimane Hoffman of
Algeria, Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz of Poland, along with Major Generals Arthur
Raab, Henry Alexander and W.A. Milroy of Sweden, UK and Canada,
respectively. Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson later took General
Alexander’s place. On October 2nd, 1968, a day after Okigwe was taken by
elements of the 1st Division to coincide with Nigeria’s independence
anniversary, the OTN published its first interim report.
The
Biafran Army takes the Offensive
Thus
armed with a fresh “mandate” to continue fighting and awash with new weapons
from France, the Biafran Army began its counter-offensive. It is
important, however, to note that the apparent large consignments of french
weapons were not without problems. Quite often the wide variety of
ammunition delivered would not match available weapons.
Nevertheless,
the successful campaign to retake Oguta and Egbema oil fields, push federal
troops back from Inyiogugu to Amafor on the left, and from Egbema to Ebocha
bridge on the right flank of Owerri forced the 16th Brigade to deploy
widely to protect its flanks. This stretched it out considerably,
increasing its vulnerability.
Taking
note of the caveat that Biafran ‘Brigades’ had no more than 1000 men
each, the following Biafran units were deployed around the Owerri
salient:
The 60 Brigade under Colonel Asoya, between
Owerri-Ihiala and Owerri-Port Harcourt roads,
The 52 Brigade, under Colonel Chris Ugokwe, between
the Owerri-Ihiala and Owerri-Umuahia roads,
The Third Brigade of Colonel Ogbugo Kalu’s 14
Division, between the Owerri-Ihiala and Owerri-Umuahia roads,
The 63 Brigade under Colonel Lambert Ihenacho, between
the Owerri-Umuahia road and the Imo River, and
The 68 Battalion detachment from the “S” Division,
under Major Ikeji, flexibly based at Emekuku, near Owerri in support of 14
Division.
According
to former Biafran Army Commander, Major General Madiebo,
“The task of surrounding Owerri and gradually
destroying the enemy inside it was going to be a gigantic one, and would take a
very long time, considering the fact that ammunition supply to the troops was
normally small and most irregular. For that reason, the whole operation
was divided into three major phases.
The aim of the first phase was to box in the
enemy on all sides as much as possible into Owerri town, and sever all his routes
to the rear except for the Owerri-Port Harcourt main road. It was
necessary to leave that major line of communication open for the enemy,
otherwise we would scare him too soon, and compel him to take necessary
precautions before we were fully prepared to deal the final blow. For
that phase, 52 Brigade was to push enemy back in all its areas of
responsibility to within one mile from Owerri. Its special tasks during
that phase were to clear Egbu, Orji and Orogwe. 60 Brigade was to clear
all areas right of Port Harcourt-Owerri road and then maintain a strong
defensive line all along the side of that road from Irete on their left to
Umuakpu on their right. In addition, the Brigade was to deny the enemy
the use of Elele-Umudiogu-Ubimi road, thereafter. The 68 Battalion of “S”
Division had the task of moving through the left flank of 63 Brigade to clear
all areas held by the enemy on the left side of Port Harcourt-Owerri road
between Naze and Umuakpu. The 63 Brigade was to remain in its defensive
positions but prepared to provide reinforcements for places where they were
needed for exploring success.
On the successful completion of the first phase, we
expected to see enemy concentrate heavily inside Owerri town, and thereafter
having as his only link to the rear the main Port Harcourt road. On our
side, we expected to find our troops who were widely dispersed in defensive
locations, better concentrated and in a position to operate more
effectively. If and when that happened, it would then be the signal for
the beginning of the second phase of the operation.
In the second phase, the sole aim was to move
swiftly in strength with all that was available and seize the Port Harcourt
road between Avu and Umuakpu, and thus seal off Owerri. During that phase
60 Brigade was to move to take Obinze and Avu and link up both towns and
exploit southwards to Mgbirichi where they would join up with 68 Battalion
elements. The 68 Battalion itself was expected to seize the thinly
defended towns of Umuakpu and Umuagwo and, having linked them up, was to move
northwards to Mgbirichi to make contact with 60 Brigade. It was clearly
obvious that if the second phase was successful the reaction of the enemy
inside Owerri would be very violent indeed. For that reason, the task of
52 Brigade during that phase was merely to prepare troops to beat back enemy
counterattacks both in 60 Brigade and 68 Battalion areas.
The third and final phase of the operation
was to descend on the encircled enemy inside Owerri and destroy him while
preventing him from breaking through southwards. For the final phase, the
60 Brigade was to clear the right half of the town up to the clock tower.
The 52 Brigade was to tackle the left side of the town while the 68 Battalion
was to defend the Port Harcourt-Owerri road and flanks right and left of it.”
The Plot
Thickens
Although
assisted by heavy rains, poor federal logistics and coordination along with
overextended lines of communications, Madiebo’s plan for the encirclement of
Owerri was by no means a lightning strike. Because of the relatively
limited combat resources available to him, it was designed to be a slow process
– aided no doubt by federal ineptitude. To facilitate Biafran troop
support during this ambitious scheme, soldiers were expected to live off the
land, harvesting what they could lay their hands on to supplement provisions
from the Biafran Food Directorate. Careful preparations were made even as
other developments favourable to Biafra were occurring elsewhere. In the
last two weeks of September, for example, Colonel Adekunle, in an effort to get
there before Colonel Shuwa’s 1st Division, and at the same time present
Major General Gowon with an Independence day present, made a disastrous effort
to capture Umuahia. He lost the equivalent of four or more battalions in the
process, trapped and destroyed as a result of insecure lines of communication
and supply. By mid-October advance Biafran units were within five
miles of Aba, probing along the Umuahia-Aba road. This was when the
proposal to change Colonel Adekunle as GOC, 3MCDO and/or split the division
into two was first broached with Major General Gowon, who initially refused the
recommendation of AHQ partly for political reasons. Thus, Adekunle felt
vindicated and made no efforts to adjust his tactics in light of the terrible
experience at Umuahia. The stage was thus set for the Owerri disaster.
The 3MCDO
Division had previously been reorganized after the initial fall of Aba and
Owerri. Brigades were grouped into four (4) sectors. The 15 and 16
Brigades in the Oguta-Owerri axis comprised Sector 1 under Col. Godwin Ally,
who had transferred to the 3MCDO from the 2nd Division where he had
commanded the 7 Brigade at Asaba. The 14 and 17 Brigades were grouped in Sector
2 under Lt. Col. Alani Akinrinade – another former Brigade Commander in the
2nd Division who left that division after clashing with Colonel Mohammed
over the Onitsha debacle and had himself experienced a disaster at Onne.
The 12, 13 and 18 Brigades - all badly mauled at Umuahia - were in Sector
3 under Lt. Col. Alabi-Isama. Lastly, a Sector was created in Calabar for
rear administrative purposes. It was under the command of Lt. Col. Ayo-Ariyo.
While
Major General Gowon was distracted by rear internal security dilemmas like the
Omopupa and Agbekoya “anti-tax” riots in the West, repositioning and
battlefield preparation for the first phase of Madiebo’s master plan to
surround Owerri was being implemented gradually but surely. The first sign of
trouble detected by then Lt. Col. Etuk was when he observed that whenever he
sent his quarter-master (QM) from Owerri back to Sector and Divisional HQ at
Port Harcourt for supplies, the QM would often be ambushed and his supplies
retrieved by small Biafran patrols.
According
to Col Etuk (rtd),
“Each time he was coming back he would be ambushed. At
times he escaped and a lot of goodies he collected from them would be shared by
the rebels and the balance he would bring to me. So I reported back to my
Divisional Commander, Adekunle. He didn’t take the matter seriously and
this continued until when supplies were no longer coming. I couldn’t
communicate with the outside since the battery of my radio was dead. I couldn’t
talk to anybody.”
By
November 1st, Etuk’s second-in-command, Major AT Hamman, who was leading those
elements of the federal 16th Bde responsible for protecting its southern
flank, was already filing radio reports saying his line of communication was
threatened. In fact, it is said that the International Military Observer
Team mentioned earlier was at one time briefly trapped inside Owerri with Etuk
and his boys. In desperation, a heavily armed 120-man federal rifle
company was emergently airlifted from Lagos to Port Harcourt, according to an
account provided by Major General Oluleye (rtd). When the Relief Company
arrived, however, it found itself enmeshed in the internal politics of the
3MCDO. Just as he did against other Divisions when dealing with the Army
HQ, Colonel Adekunle’s Brigade Commanders were fighting one another for access
to ammunition and fresh troops, so they would often file false casualty,
ammunition, and battlefield reports with Division HQ in order to gain
advantage. Rather than deploy the federal company as a unit to link up
with Major Hamman and Lt. Col Etuk at Owerri, therefore, Adekunle split up the
force into little bits and shared them out among his warring Brigade
Commanders. Eventually, only fifteen (15) soldiers were given the task of
securing the Port-Harcourt-Owerri road to link up with the 16th Brigade!
On the
Biafran side, while still trying to infiltrate the Midwest, Ojukwu announced in
November that he had dismissed eight (8) white mercenaries, including Colonel
Rolf Steiner, following allegations of indiscipline and piracy, including the
waylaying of CARITAS relief supplies. Steiner apparently encouraged his
special 4th Commando Brigade to commandeer not only food and drink, but
also women. These acts did not go down well with regular Biafran units
who were already seething with envy over Ojukwu’s preferential treatment of
Steiner and his unit. In fact, according to Mr. Jensen of Radio Denmark,
Steiner had been ordered to use the 4th Commando Brigade to lead
“Operation Hiroshima” – the unsuccessful Biafran attempt to recapture Onitsha.
When he lost over half of his troops in that operation, Steiner accused Ojukwu
of murdering his men and slapped him in anger. But for Ojukwu’s intervention
Steiner would have been shot immediately by Ojukwu’s bodyguards. He was,
however, arrested and then expelled from Biafra the following day.
Brigadier Conrad Nwawo took over command of the 4th Commando
Division. [Nwawo is a former Nigerian Defence Attache in London. He was
the one who secured the surrender of Major CK Nzeogwu to Major General Ironsi
in January 1966, and was the last Commander of Midwestern 4th Area Command
prior to the Biafran invasion of the Midwest in August 1967.]
After
this “house-cleaning” in the High Command, on November 27, the “Umuahia
Brigade”, which was actually a special 500-man battalion led by Major Njoku,
repulsed a federal attack launched from Awka toward Agulu and Adazi
junction. Njoku completely destroyed the 81 Battalion of the
1st Division in the process. The significance of this battle
is that Nnewi, Ojukwu’s hometown, as well as Uga Airport were directly
threatened. If federal forces had prevailed, the HQ of the Biafran 11
Division would have been put out of business. With these loose ends tied up,
then Colonel Ogbugo Kalu’s 14 Division was finally ready to move on Owerri.
The 63 Brigade under Colonel Lambert Ihenacho launched a diversionary attack
aimed at Elelem and Eziama on December 3rd. The main thrust of the first
stage of the Biafran siege of Owerri later began on the 5th of December
1968, led by the 60 Brigade under Colonel Asoya. During the first week of
the operation, 50,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 200 rounds of 105-mm howitzer
shells, 300 rounds of mortar bombs, 20 rounds of anti-tank rockets, along with
grenades were supplied to the Biafran units involved. All of this
ordnance was thrown against Etuk’s 16th Brigade in one week or less as
they were dug in and around Owerri.
According
to Madiebo,
“60 Brigade moved with a battalion each on three
fronts. On the left, a battalion moved to clear Izombe and Obudi.
From there, while a part of it moved to clear Ogbaku on the Ihiala road, the
rest of the battalion moved to Ofogwe. From the centre, another battalion
moved from the area of Okwuzu and Mgbede and took Obigwe and, shortly after,
were in full control of Okuku. This particular move was so swift that the
enemy Battalion Headquarters at Obudi did not realise for some time that it had
been cut off together with most of the battalion sub-units. Thus many
enemy soldiers and vehicles, which were either moving to Obudi or returning
from there fell into our hands in the area of Okuku. The third battalion
of 60 Brigade moving on both Ohoba-Umukanne road and Asa-Awarra road, took
Umuakpu quite easily. Thus, in the first three days, the 60 Brigade had
completed their tasks in the first phase, resulting in the clearing of several
hundreds of square miles of enemy occupied territory. 68 Battalion was equally
successful in clearing all enemy held areas left of the Port Harcourt road down
to Mgbirichi, thus establishing a permanent link with the 63 Brigade. The
68 Battalion success left us completely in control of all areas southeast of
Owerri town down to Owerrinta Bridge to a depth of about ten miles. The
52 Brigade facing the enemy forward concentrations made only small gains as
expected. Once or twice they cleared Orji but lost it again. At the
end of one week, the first phase was considered to be over and the results,
particularly in 60 Brigade area were very encouraging.”
On the
diplomatic front, however, all was not well with the Biafran
leadership. Raph Uwechue, Biafra’s envoy in Paris, resigned in
protest against Ojukwu’s approach to leadership. Meanwhile, on the
battlefield the 16th Brigade regrouped and fought back. For example,
Abiaka was retaken on December 19, while Avu and Afrola were regained on
December 29, even as Imu-Ikwe was being seized by Biafran
troops.
The fits
and starts of French ordnance supply and inability to use captured but
incompatible federal ammunition had compelled Madiebo to make changes in his
original plans. He proceeded to carry out the second phase “with only one
brigade fighting at a time, and as soon as its objectives were completely
attained, the next brigade or formation would start”. In other words, a
rolling choreographed offensive (like the first week of American attacks on
Iraq during the 2nd Gulf War), rather than a decisive coordinated massive
application of force exploiting the principle of momentum.
Therefore, 60 Brigade began by once again assaulting Avu and Obinze while other
units adopted a defensive posture. Each time, though, elements of the
16th Brigade would successfully counter-attack from Owerri, using armored
personnel carriers, Ferrets and Saladin vehicles.
For this
reason Madiebo decided to modify stage two (2) of his plan by cutting off the
Port-Harcourt-Umuahia road further southwards. Along these lines,
beginning on January 6th, early in the New Year (1969), the 60 Brigade took
Umuakpu, Umuagwo and Omanelu from Umukanne on their right, while 68 Battalion
detachment of “S” Division, under Major Ikeji seized Obinze. Every
attempt, though, to retake Avu from Obinze was beaten back by Etuk.
At this
point, Madiebo recalls,
“By the end of the day we were controlling over 20
miles of the road which was before then the last link between Owerri and Port
Harcourt, thereby having the enemy brigade at Owerri completely
surrounded. In order to ensure that the enemy on both sides of the
corridor did not link up ever again, we used several hundreds of civilians to
render that stretch of road absolutely impassable using mines, ditches and
heavy trees felled across the road. Thereafter, the 68 Battalion which
had grown gradually and been renamed the 68 Brigade, took charge of the defence
of the Port Harcourt road (inclusive) westwards to 63 Brigade, while the 60
Brigade defended eastwards to Orashi River. From the 8th of January,
1969, the enemy began his counterattacks to reopen the road. These
attacks, which came from the Port Harcourt end, persisted for several months
unsuccessfully until we cleared Owerri town itself.”
The
Biafran units involved were, however, experiencing some internal
difficulties. Fatigue from the month long offensive, ups and downs with
logistic support and illness resulting from hunger and inadequate clothing
undermined morale. But the effort was continued by determined
Biafran troops urged on by their commanders. On January 15, 1969 the
final phase “to clear Owerri” was launched. 60 Brigade was to take the Holy Ghost
College, the Cathedral and the Progress Hotel after which it would swing
rightwards toward the Clock Tower and Motor Park, destroying the bridge over
the Otamini river in order to prevent armored
counter-attacks.
However,
once they came upon abandoned Federal supplies of ammunition, food and clothing
near the Holy Ghost College, rather than maintain hot pursuit, hungry and naked
Biafran troops ignored their commanders. They stopped short of the
Otamini Bridge not only to eat but also to “evacuate enemy abandoned
food” and “change into the newly captured uniforms”. But while they
happily savored the liberated food and clothing a federal armored
counter-attack across the Otamini Bridge swept them out of Owerri back to the
previous jump-off lines at their trenches in the perimeter. This became
the established pattern. Every week, Biafran units would launch a number
of attacks in a vicious dialogue of attack and counter-attack with Etuk, all
the while hoping that the 16th Brigade would eventually run out of
ammunition. On January 16th, the 16th Brigade retook
Afaha-Ise. But a week later on January 23rd, Otoro fell to Biafran
units. The next day, on January 24th, a new federal offensive – including
air strikes - was launched by the AHQ. But by January 29th, having
sifted through the maze of Biafran propaganda on one hand, and the serious
internal problem of false reporting by federal officers on the other, it became
apparent to senior federal commanders in Lagos that Owerri was indeed
encircled, except for small breaches here and there.
On
February 7th, federal L-29 Delphin armed jet trainers, Mig-17 fighters and
IL-28 Ilyushin Bombers destroyed Umohiagu village near Owerri – prompting yet
another round of international press accusations that Nigerian (and Egyptian)
pilots were indiscriminately bombing civilian targets while supposedly mounting
military operations to relieve Owerri and take Umuahia. Outside the
immediate War Theater, Nnamdi Azikiwe published a 14-point peace plan during a
speech at Oxford on February 10th. A few days later a US Congressional
delegation visited Biafra just as Maurice Foley, UK undersecretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, was openly accusing Nigeria in the House of Commons in London
of indiscriminate bombing. After Umohiagu, for example, federal jets went
further to level the village of Ozu Abam. Meanwhile, the Nigerian
Chief of Staff (Army), then Brigadier Hassan Usman Katsina called an urgent
“coordination and unity” meeting in Lagos of all federal divisional
commanders. As of that time rivalries between the various Divisions
had become very bad. Each division was procuring its own weapons
independently from Europe and sending “patrols” to mount surveillance at the
Lagos Port for incoming Arms Shipments. They even laid siege on the
Shell depot at Apapa in order to corner fuel supplies for themselves.
Weapons and fuel meant for other divisions were often hijacked.
After
this “peace meeting”, Major General Gowon finally paid his long awaited first
official visit to the warfront in late February, during which he encouraged Lt.
Col. Etuk to “hang in there”. Determined efforts were being made to
relieve the beleaguered 16th Bde, just as Russian warships visiting Lagos
were feting the public. Interestingly, bothered by international
accusations the NAF HQ issued instructions to NAF units on March 5th, ordering
them to avoid bombing civilians. Nevertheless, bombing continued. In
an article published by the UK Guardian on March 13, 1969, for example, Harvard
Professor Mayer wrote, among other things:
“Hospitals, schools, refugee camps and markets have
been and are being systematically attacked by the Nigerian Air Force. We
witnessed such attacks and saw hundreds of casualties from previous
attacks. The red crosses are now camouflaged on the roofs of the
hospitals (and on the roofs of the headquarters of the International Red Cross)
because they obviously attract bombing and strafing, even when (if not
particularly when) the hospital buildings are isolated and far from any town,
cross road or any installation even remotely of military significance.
Refugees – most of them children and many of them elderly, all of them famished
– who number at least four million – have to be fed at night because during the
day feeding lines were systematically strafed by MIG 17s of the Nigerian Air
Force or bombed by its Ilyushins.”
But by
March 14th in spite of strong efforts to reopen the Omanelu-Umuakpu and
Elele-Ubimini-Awarra roads the Biafran encirclement of Owerri was
total. Without airdrops, the 16th Brigade was completely cut
off. Gradually but surely it was being cut to pieces. Yet another
among many Biafran efforts to wipe out the 16th Brigade began on March
15th, when two additional battalions of the “S” Division were transferred from
the Aba sector to Owerri. Ojukwu overruled Madiebo’s proposal to
concentrate all the battalions of the “S” Division - under Colonel Onwuatuegwu
- move through 68 Brigade area and attack Etuk from the rear. He reportedly
preferred a direct frontal assault from Emekuku in the northeast. After
heavy casualties, this unwise attempt stalled against fierce federal
resistance, combined with some command and staff problems with Onwuatuegwu’s
outfit.
Thus,
Onwuatuegwu was asked by Ojukwu to cede command of part of the “S” Division to
Colonel Joe “Hannibal” Achuzia. Using the “S” Brigade under Major Atumaka,
Achuzia broke through federal lines at Egbu and reportedly got within a mile of
Owerri City Center after heavy casualties. At this point Achuzia wanted
complete control of the entire “S” Division in order to sustain his momentum.
However, Onwuatuegwu refused, and both men almost shot one another, drawing
their handguns. Ojukwu then ordered Onwuatuegwu to cede complete divisional
control to Achuzia for one week. But all subsequent bloody attempts
by Achuzia to take Owerri failed. The “S” Brigade Commander, Major
Atumaka died in the process along with many other Biafran soldiers.
At this point Ojukwu ordered all frontal assaults by Achuzia to stop, restored
Onwuatuegwu to his command of the “S” Division, and asked Madiebo to revisit
the old plan of hitting Etuk from the rear.
Meanwhile,
on March 24th, Haiti recognized Biafra. On March 29th 1969, Prime
Minister Harold Wilson of Britain paid a visit to Nigeria during which the
issue of indiscriminate bombing was again discussed with the federal government
- leading to the eventual replacement of many Egyptian pilots. Allegedly,
in the absence of stand-off precision-guided munitions, most of those involved
were neither good shots nor were they willing to risk their lives attacking
well defended military targets in another man’s war. So they “offloaded”
on civilian targets and then returned to base to file false bomb damage
assessments. However, it cannot escape suspicion that some bombing raids
were calculatingly deliberate, aimed at the Biafran Organization of Freedom
Fighters (BOFF), an irregular-fighting outfit that had thoroughly infiltrated
civilian areas, as well as Relief Organizations suspected of providing cover
for weapons shipments.
On March
31st, 1969, referring no doubt to Achuzia’s breakthrough at Egbu, Ojukwu made
an entry into his Diary saying that “70%” of Owerri Town was now in Biafran
hands following an assault by the 14 and “Thunder” Divisions. (“Thunder”
Division was how Ojukwu sometimes referred to what many others called the “S”
Division, perhaps to distinguish it from an earlier secret military formation
also called the “S” Division, a special personal security unit dedicated to his
protection.) Biafran Engineers constantly monitored desperate Nigerian
radio transmissions by wireless intercept. Citing additional
“reconnaissance reports”, Madiebo claims that “the enemy was so short of food that he was compelled to kill most of
his Biafran prisoners of war and civilian detainees inside Owerri because there
was not sufficient food with which to feed them.“ There is no
independent confirmation of this assertion.
 |
| Col Achuzia |
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