LAGOS,
JULY 29, 1966
After
being alerted, first by Lt. Col. Muhammed, then Lt. Col. Gowon, Captain Garba
and Lt. Tarfa secured the Federal Guards Barracks at Obalende, better known as
'Dodan Barracks'. It is named after a town called Dodan in the Arakan peninsula
in Burma where Nigerians fought back in World War 2. They rounded up
all Igbo soldiers and locked them up in safety. Not a single Igbo
soldier in that unit lost his life. Garba and Tarfa overcame a challenge
by a northern soldier called Adamu Lamurde who emotionally threatened to kill
them both if he was not allowed to avenge the death of Brigadier Maimalari by
liquidating the Igbo soldiers in the unit. Indeed, this achievement was one of
the very few successes of northern officers against northern NCOs seeking
revenge. Garba later got a letter of commendation and
appreciation from Col Hilary Njoku, his erstwhile Brigade Commander,
when all the Igbo soldiers including Sergeant Vidal, Private Oligbo, Private
Calistus Chukwu and others in the unit eventually arrived back safely in the
east.
After
Lt. Col. Gowon completed the first round of calls to Army commanders in Lagos
early that morning, a decision was made to establish an operations room at the
Police HQ on Moloney Street in Lagos. Brigadier B. Ogundipe, then
Chief of Staff, SHQ, was joined by acting Police IG Kam Salem,
Commodore Wey of the Navy, Lt. Col. Gowon (Army COS), Lt. Col. Anwuna (PSO I),
and Major Mobolaji Johnson. Although he had previously served as
DAQMG at the 2nd Brigade in Apapa under late Brigadier Maimalari, on this day
Johnson was a fish out of water because he was supposed to be the
second-in-command to Lt. Col Akahan at the 4th battalion 100 miles away in
Ibadan where junior officers had run amock. However, he had long
since settled down as Lagos military administrator. The commander of
the 2nd battalion at Ikeja could not be reached.
Meanwhile,
Lt. DS Abubakar had arrived from Abeokuta with his troops of ferrets, only to
run into an ambush mounted by troops from the 2nd battalion under Lt. Longboem
at Ikeja from which he was very lucky to escape. Longboem had
recognized him at the last minute when he stuck his head out of the hatch.
Apparently Lt. Nassarawa had forgotten to alert the boys that Abubakar was
coming with ferrets on Muhammed's orders. Anyway, once this
misunderstanding was resolved, Muhammed deployed DS Abubakar to Abalti
Barrracks for "mopping operations". This essentially meant
that Muhammed was now in control of Ikeja, Dodan and Abalti Barracks as well as
the airport. Indeed, Sergeant Dickson's boys took control of two BOAC VC10
aircraft at the airport and ordered the Captains to fly northern families of
soldiers back to Kano before returning to Lagos to pick commercial passengers. The
soldiers involved had been completely taken in by frivolous rumors of a
"second Igbo coup" and, like northern civil servants, wanted to get
their families away.
After
a quick appreciation, a decision was made by Brigadier Ogundipe to scrap
together a fighting force from Army HQ elements commanded by an Igbo Captain.
They were to go to Ikeja and try regaining control of the airport, by then
under the control of Sergeant Paul Dickson of the 2nd
battalion. This group advanced right into an ambush of machine gun
nests along Ikeja road, losing about 30 soldiers in the process. In
the confusion, two expatriates (including the General Manager of Bata Shoes in
Lagos) were killed in cross-fire.
Lt.
Col. Gowon volunteered to go to Ikeja Barracks to negotiate with the rebellious
troops. By this time he and Brigadier Ogundipe were already aware from reports
coming from Ibadan that General Ironsi and Colonel Fajuyi had been snatched
from Major Danjuma and were probably dead. When he arrived at Ikeja some
reports say he was initially detained, but there is no corroborative evidence
that this really occurred. Aghast at what he saw, he was, however, said to have
issued orders in support of Muhammed's earlier orders that there should be no
more shooting. This order was quickly sidelined by northern soldiers
who proceeded to use other methods, not firearms, to slaughter their victims.
Daggers and other more primitive contraptions for ritual murder became weapons
of choice. In one illustrative case, northern soldiers at Ikeja
airport took Captain Okoye, then based at Abalti Barracks but enroute to the US
on a course, tied him to an Iron cross, whipped him unconscious and then left
him to die in the guardroom. Okoye was suspected of being an
informant for the Igbo underground network in Lagos.
About
this time, first Major Johnson and then Brigadier Ogundipe himself gave an
order to a northern NCO deployed to the Federal Guards Company. The soldier
blatantly said he would not take orders from the Brigadier unless approved by
Captain JN Garba. So, Captain Garba was sent for and came to the Police
HQ. He was initially interrogated by Lt. Col. Anwunah, searching for
information about what was happening in the country. Garba then
aggressively confronted Anwunah with the grievances of northern soldiers and
why they had struck. When Anwunah reported Garba's intransigence to
Ogundipe, Ogundipe told Garba:
"I wish you
boys had waited. I have just received the report about the January
coup this morning and it's on my table right now. Try to talk to
your friends in Ikeja, and I am sure we can settle this matter, even at this
stage."
Capt.
Garba, now placed in a difficult position, went back to his office to make
a call to Murtala Muhammed in Ikeja and brief him about what had
just transpired. Muhammed endorsed Garba's actions and instructed
him to maintain contact. Garba says he later discovered that
Ogundipe had been bluffing about the report.
Meanwhile,
Brigadier Ogundipe made a public broadcast on Radio Nigeria at 2:30pm which was
repeated in 30 minute cycles until about 8:30pm:
"As a result of some trouble by dissidents in
the army, mainly in Ibadan, Abeokuta and Ikeja, the National Military
Government has declared a state of emergency in the affected
areas. Consequently, the following areas have been declared military
areas under the Suppression of Disorder Decree of 1966: Ibadan, Ikeja and
Abeokuta. Military Tribunals have been considered and accordingly
set up. Curfew has been declared in the affected areas from 6:30
pm. The National Military Government wishes to state that the
situation is under control and hopes to restore peace and tranquility very
soon. The government appeals to the public for cooperation in its
effort to restore law and order in the affected areas."
At
about 3pm, though, Ogundipe sent for Garba again and instructed him to
contribute a platoon to a second assault force which he was sending to dislodge
the boys at Ikeja. Garba notified Muhammed at Ikeja and then contributed a
platoon to Ogundipe under one 2/Lt. Osuma (then known as "Usman")
with separate orders that should he be ordered to shoot at fellow soldiers he
was to refuse and return to base. 2/Lt. "Usman" did
exactly as he was told before subsequently escaping from Lagos on August
1st himself. When he got back to the east, he used his real name
(Osuma) to request that his property be sent back to him there. Needless to say
that Ogundipe's second attempt to establish military supremacy had failed.
Meanwhile
phone calls and signals were coming in from other parts of the country,
including Enugu (from Lt. Col. C. Ojukwu, the governor). At one
point Ojukwu was able to speak to Lt. Col. Gowon at Ikeja. It is
said that Gowon told him that he was no longer a "free
agent". Ojukwu encouraged Ogundipe to keep fighting even though
he himself at one point escaped from Enugu to Onitsha from where he was calling
Ogundipe. The rebels later made Brigadier Ogundipe aware that they
would only accept Captain JN Garba as his intermediary for
negotiations. Meanwhile, angry about the phone calls from
Ojukwu, Lt. Col. Muhammed began making plans to march on Enugu -
from which he was eventually restrained.
LAGOS,
SATURDAY JULY 30, 1966
At
about 0600 hrs, Capt. JN Garba was ordered back to Police HQ. Over
the course of that day he made three trips back and forth to Ikeja on behalf of
Brigadier Ogundipe, including one trip in which his vehicle was even shot at by
northern troops. Emotional demands were made back and forth,
including initial declarations that they no longer wanted to share barracks
with Igbo soldiers, and demands that either the North be allowed to secede or
that the Unification decree be repealed with a return to the position before
January 15 under a civilian government. As John de St. Jorre put it,
"It was the northern soldiers, roaming around outside the conference room
in their dark, satanic mood, who were the ultimate arbiters of
power".
It
was during this back and forth ado that Gowon is said to have been pressurized
by the soldiers at Ikeja to participate in the discussions and lead them as the
senior northern officer. This may have been assisted by calls from Kaduna and
Kano by Lt. Cols Hassan Katsina and Mohammed Shuwa. Having been alerted
overnight of goings on, Ojukwu had now joined the chorus of phone calls and
signals coming in from other parts of the country seeking
clarification. He was even able to speak to Lt. Col. Gowon at Ikeja.
Another
authority (Kirk-Greene) claims that Gowon’s change of status from government
messenger to rebel representative occurred when Ogundipe declared that he could
not accept the proposals being put forward by northern soldiers and wanted to
remove himself from the negotiation seeing as he could not exert his authority
over them. Indeed Captain Alfred Gom had bluntly told him that they no longer
wanted to deal with him or the SHQ at all. More recently, Gowon has
revealed that main grouse the mutinous soldiers at Ikeja had against dealing
with and accepting orders from Ogundipe was that he had sent two separate
assault teams to attack them. General Olusegun Obasanjo, however, thinks an
additional reason was that Ogundipe "did not belong". According to
Biafran propaganda, a northern flag was even flown at this point over the Ikeja
Barracks, but no other independent source, local or foreign has ever confirmed
this allegation.
Meanwhile
Lt. DS Abubakar of the 2 Recce Squadron Abeokuta and his troops of Ferrets were
ordered from Lagos to Ikeja Barracks. But he was first ordered to secure Carter
Bridge which was when he told the notorious Sergeant Lapdam to man the
checkpoint while he left for Ikeja. Lapdam later shot Major Ibanga
Ekanem, Provost Marshall, who was on his way to SHQ, allegedly with a list of
northern officers who were behind the revolt. [As a Captain, Ekanem
survived injuries sustained in combat as an officer in the 4QNR in Katanga
during Congo Operations in 1961]. Quite a few other soldiers (and
possibly civilians) were also killed on Carter Bridge and at least two southern
airforce officers later rescued from him. When Lt. DS Abubakar got
to Ikeja, as reported in the Army's official history, Col. DS Abubakar (rtd)
recalls that one of those who was most strident about separation was Lt. Nuhu
Nathan who reportedly told Gowon:
"Let
us all leave now - we all go back if we cannot form a
confederation".
Gowon
replied: What is that word you mentioned"?
Nathan
said "Confederation", to which Gowon retorted: "What
does that mean"?
As
Nathan proceeded to explain, Lt. Malami Nassarawa said "I have an
encyclopedia". DS Abubakar explains that "They brought an
encyclopedia and Gowon saw the meaning of confederation in it. He was about to
buy the idea - thank GOD the British High Commissioner and some of the permanent
secretaries advised against it." DS Abubakar says 'the British
High Commissioner said: "If you dare do this kind of thing -
confederation - that is the end of you". So that is why we came
back to federalism.'
Others
who were present include Lt. Col. Murtala Muhammed, Major Shittu Alao and
Captain Baba Usman.
While
Captain Garba was away on his second visit to Ikeja, Federal
Permanent Secretaries met with Brigadier Ogundipe at the Police
HQ. He told them that the soldiers at Ikeja were neither willing nor
ready to assume responsibility for running the country at that
point. On his part he was not ready to do so either unless he
had both legal and military backing. Although he had suspicions that
Ironsi was already dead he was not absolutely certain. To
compound Ogundipe’s position, the Attorney General , GC Onyiuke advised him
that there was no provision for an acting Supreme Commander in the
Constitution, as amended by Decree No. 1 of 1966. Having rendered
this advice, Onyiuke left Ogundipe at the Police HQ and then proceeded to
depart Lagos for safety. Others did too, abandoning him and Wey
there with no clear answers.
During
Garba's third visit to the Ikeja Barracks he was accompanied by the delegation
of senior civil servants including Musa Daggash, Abdul Aziz Attach, HA
Ejueyitchie, Yusuf Gobir, BN Okagbue, Ibrahim Damcida, Allison Ayida, Phillip
Asiodu, along with Justice Adetokunbo Ademola, acting Police IG Kam Salem, Sule
Katagum, Muktar Tahir, Justice Mohammed Bello, and Ali Akilu. When
Garba arrived at Ikeja with them, he confirms that Muhammed was the
"leading personality" in the room, doing most of the talking until he
suddenly turned to Gowon and said: "You are the senior, go
ahead." This acquiescence may have been influenced by other
senior northern officers as noted previously, citing seniority. DS
Abubakar recalls that there was certainly an argument about who should take
over and Major Abba Kyari was even briefly mentioned. However, after
Gowon took over the discussions, Muhammed kept interrupting until Gowon had to
turn to Muhammed and say: "Look,
it's either you have deferred to me and will allow me carry on this discussion,
or you have not, and you can continue." Garba pointedly
recalls that Allison Ayida, permanent Secretary for Economic Development,
forcefully insisted that Nigeria not be broken up and kept repeating this view
"despite the fact that Murtala was from far from receptive to such a view;
instead he was constantly telling Ayida, his eyes red with rage, in effect to
shut up."
After
complex informal negotiations brokered by Lt. Col. David Ejoor, Military
Governor of the Midwest, involving Commodore Wey and Lt. Col Hassan Katsina,
Gowon was finally quietly sworn in late that day, Saturday July 30, 1966, at
Ikeja but he did not make an announcement to the nation until Monday August
1st. He spent the time notifying senior Police officers like Kam
Salem and Hamman Maiduguri, getting information and consolidating his 'control'
over other parts of the country - except, as later became apparent, the eastern
region. In an interview with Elaigwu, Gowon described his
emotions when he was anointed as C-in-C as follows:
“Honestly,
I felt as if I was under a battle. I had a feeling of death -
virtually choking me. I felt my throat go dry
immediately. I was cold and yet sweating. If I could then
I would have run away. But two things kept me on - one, a strong
belief in God who had seen me through the Congo and two, a number of questions
I kept asking myself - ‘Are you not a man? Are you not a soldier?
‘What would people and history say of you?’ ……My first objective was
to restore discipline in the army and to prevent killings. I called
the soldiers, and as I stood on the rostrum, tears were in my
eyes. I was angry and at the same time moved. I told myself that if
I cried, the soldiers would have had me. I took courage and
addressed them. I told them that if I heard of any more killing,
they should also remember that I was a soldier, and that I could and would,
kill.”
In
his speech to the nation on August 1st, Gowon said, among other things:
“This
is Lt. Col. Y. Gowon, Army Chief of Staff, speaking to you……I have been brought
to the position today of having to shoulder the great responsibilities of this
country and the armed forces with the consent of the majority of the members of
the Supreme Military Council as a result of the unfortunate incident that occurred
on the early morning of 29th July, 1966…..”
“………As
a result of the recent events and the other previous similar ones, I have come
to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this
wise, as the basis of trust and confidence in our unitary system has not been
able to stand the test of time. I have already remarked on the issues in
question. Suffice to say that, putting all considerations to test -
political, economic, as well as social - the base for unity is not there or is
so badly rocked, not only once but several times. I, therefore, feel
that we should review the issue of our national standing and see if we can help
stop the country from drifting away into utter destruction….”
”All
members of the armed forces are requested to keep within their barracks except
on essential duties and when ordered from SHQ. Troops must not
terrorize the public, as such action will discredit the new National Military
Government……”
“….I
promise you that I shall do all I can to return to civil rule as soon as it can
be arranged. I also intend to pursue most vigorously the question of
the release of political prisoners. Fellow countrymen, give me your
support and I shall endeavour to live up to
expectations. Thank you.”
Shortly
thereafter, on the same day, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, Military Governor of the East,
made a counter-broadcast from Enugu. The next morning Gowon signed
an instrument of pardon for Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Chief Anthony Enahoro, and
others who had been convicted and jailed in September 1963 for treasonable
felony, conspiracy to commit a felony and conspiracy to effect an unlawful
purpose in 1962 with the object of forcefully removing Alhaji Tafawa Balewa
from office as Prime Minister.
On
August 3rd, Lt. Col. David Ejoor made a public speech as the Military Governor
of the Midwest, in support of the new regime. Likewise, on August 4,
Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo, Military Governor of the West, broadcast his support
for the new government as Gowon was addressing a press conference at the Lagos
City Hall. Gowon was later to announce his plans for return to civilian
rule four days later, followed the next day by a meeting of delegates
representing the Regional Military Governors.
However,
Gowon or no Gowon, northern NCOs were still running amock killing people
arbitrarily, even threatening northern officers who stood in their way. Lt. DS
Abubakar was very nearly shot at Ikeja airport in this manner by one Edward
William allegedly for "hiding some Igbo
people". Lagos Garrison Commander, Lt. Col. Eze, barely
escaped a mob of northern soldiers on August 2nd but his staff officer,
Captain Iloputaife, was not so lucky. Indeed, a few days after the
mutiny, a northern corporal at Ikeja summarized his own motives for the mutiny
by telling Norman Miners: "The Ibos killed our leaders in January; they
were taking all the top jobs; we had to get rid of them. Now we have only got
Northerners in this barracks; all the Southerners have run
away." In fact northern NCOs and soldiers were in the habit of
taking uniforms of dead Igbo officers and NCOs and wearing their ranks. On
August 8, all Igbo soldiers at the Army workshop in Yaba were
expelled. But as the nation was to find out, the worst was yet to
come. Colonel DS Abubakar (rtd) recalls:
"At
that time, if an Other Rank does not like the face of another person he will
just kill him like an animal and nobody will do anything."
But
it would be simplistic to presume that some northern officers did not take part
in the killings in Lagos. Lt. Nuhu Nathan, for example, was later
personally credited in eastern publications with the execution of some Igbo
soldiers at Ikeja. There were undoubtedly others.
KADUNA,
JULY 29 WEEKEND, 1966
The
weekend of July 29, 1966 was not the first time northern soldiers had
contemplated action in the North. As previously noted, quite
aside from tensions during the Platoon Commanders Course, when there were false
rumors of Lt. Col. Hassan Katsina’s arrest by General Ironsi in Lagos after the
promulgation of Decree #34, northern soldiers surrounded the Kaduna airport
waiting to see who would alight from his returning plane. Things
were so tense that Hassan ordered his ADC, then Lt. Ugokwe (Recce), not to step
out of the plane before he did, lest he be shot because he was Igbo.
On
June 15, there was a false alarm in Kaduna when the sound of planks being
offloaded from a Goods Train at the Train Station was misinterpreted as rifle
shots. According to Madiebo, all hell broke loose as northern and
southern officers and men at the Brigade HQ (including the commander, Col.
Bassey) fled in different directions asking themselves: “Who is
doing it this time?”
During
Ironsi’s trip to Kano in July, Lt. Garba Duba of the 1st Recce Squadron
had been tasked to take a troop of Ferrets from Kaduna to Kano to provide
security for Ironsi, only to find himself stopped and nearly arrested in Zaria,
accused by furious northern infantrymen and civilians of betraying the North by
providing security for Ironsi in Kano. After much ado, he was
allowed to proceed. Later on when Ironsi was scheduled to arrive at
the Zaria Civil aerodrome, enroute to Kaduna, there was an accidental discharge
from an armored car in his receiving security detail. Therefore,
upon finally arriving at the Officers Mess at Kaduna, all Army officers were
rigorously searched before being allowed entry to meet the
C-in-C. The situation was anything but normal.
Anyhow,
on July 29, Major General Ironsi telephoned the 1st Brigade HQ in Kaduna
at about 0730 hrs to alert the Brigade about events in Ibadan and seek
help. He revealed that as of that time he had not been able to get a
helicopter sent from Lagos. This was most likely because there were
no night flying helicopter capabilities in Nigeria then and certainly no night
landing facilities at the government house, not to mention the fact that any
such Police helicopter would likely have been shot down by disloyal troops that
had already ringed the premises. They were even armed with a 106 mm
recoilless rifle which could have destroyed any helicopter. As it were, a
helicopter did eventually show up, but it was too late for the General although
his son was smuggled out of Ibadan by the Police in the third Class compartment
of the Train to Lagos.
The
substantive Brigade Commander, Lt. Col. W. Bassey, was on leave. The
acting Brigade Commander, Lt. Col. Phillip Effiong was away, engaged in
community outreach. The Governor, Lt. Col. Hassan Katsina was also
away on tour. Ironsi spoke to Major Samuel Ogbemudia, the Brigade
Major, who in turn informed him of prevailing tensions in
Kaduna. Two nights before he had arrested Lt. Buka Suka Dimka in a
drunken state trying to break into the armoury after he had earlier been
spotted going from house to house of northern officers passing
messages. After checking with Lt. Col. Hassan Katsina, he locked Dimka
up until he could be sober enough to be interrogated. During
interrogation Dimka denied any wrong doing and accused Ogbemudia of mistreating
him because he was a northerner. He was later released. Other
northern officers and NCOs had also been spotted milling around army facilities
apparently aimlessly, essentially “casing the joints” and quite a few were
briefly detained. Although it was not yet apparent, a few
southern officers had already been kidnapped on the 28th and were later
killed “attempting to escape.”
Lt.
Col Alexander Madiebo, Commander of Artillery Regiment, whose aircraft had
departed Lagos 10 minutes before Sergeant Dickson’s boys seized the airport,
acting on Lt. Col. Murtala Muhammed’s orders, was in Kaduna on July
29th. For some reason, Anwunah had failed to alert him of the
mutiny when he found out about it in Lagos at about midnight. Having
been met at the Kaduna airport by one of the Brigade Staff Officers (Captain
Dilibe) he was apprised of developments in other parts of the
country. Madiebo took charge as the senior officer on the spot and
contacted Lagos. The person on seat at military intelligence was
none other than Captain Martin Adamu who denied that anything unusual was
occurring. But Madiebo wasn’t fooled. He ordered Ogbemudia to order
all units to surrender their weapons and have them locked up in unit armouries
which were then to be guarded by mixed combinations of northern and southern
troops. Some units refused, citing fear of being attacked. One
notable example was the 3rdbattalion under Lt. Col. I. C. Okoro (an easterner)
whose Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM), one Ahmadu Bello, a northerner, advised
against the move. Okoro told Madiebo that he had extracted a pledge
of loyalty from his troops at a muster parade. He went further to
say that Bello advised that the entire battalion be disarmed except a platoon
specially selected by Bello himself.
Ogbemudia
recalls that although the day started out well, things became increasingly
tense as it progressed and news began filtering in from the
south. Initially, it was not clear whether the coup was a northern
counter-coup or the rumored so called radical “Plan 15” Igbo
coup. Indeed even foreign news media were not so sure
initially. The New York Times reported that radical Igbo officers
were leading a revolt against Ironsi. This confusion was later
clarified in Kaduna as signals poured in from Ibadan and Lagos. Madiebo
recalls that T/Major C.C. Emelifonwu, DAQMG, openly condemned the
apparently northern inspired coup in the south to the hearing of Major Abba
Kyari of the Artillery regiment who disagreed. Although subsequently
accused in eastern publications of chairing private tribunals to condemn Igbo
soldiers to death, Kyari was, however, later to save the lives of many
southern officers and men in Kaduna when northern troops
mutinied.
At
this point, though, Madiebo contacted Lt. Col. Ogbugo Kalu, then Commandant of
the NMTC to discuss options. At about 1330 Lt. Col.
Madiebo, Lt. Col. Kalu, T/Major Emelifonwu, S/Major
Ogbemudia and T/Major A.D. Ogunro met in Lt. Col. Effiong’s
house. Unfortunately, the commander of the
3rd battalion, Lt. Col. Okoro did not attend. He completely misjudged
the threat, perhaps misled by his long service in that battalion and assumed
bonds of loyalty forged in combat, bonds which had long been shattered by the
events of January 15. As far back as June 1961, then Captain
Okoro served in the same 3rd battalion (then called 3QNR) at Kamina in the
Congo under then Lt. Col. ABM Kavanagh. In late July that year, the
amiable Okoro was in charge of a regimental welcoming parade
for Katanga President Moise Tshombe. When they met,
Tshombe was said to have spoken French to Okoro, who promptly replied in
Igbo!
Later
that night, at a pre-midnight party at the Brigade Officers Mess, a young
officer who had just completed a course at the NMTC, T/Capt. I.U. Idika was
summarily executed, having refused all entreaties by Madiebo to
leave. Following this ‘signal’, Lt. Col. Okoro was shot
dead at midnight of July 29/30 in front of the 3rd Battalion guardroom,
allegedly by Lts. Dimka and Dambo, after being lured there by his RSM
(Bello). After dispatching a LandRover to take his corpse to the
military hospital, the group - joined by others, including Lt. Sani
Abacha - disarmed the quarter guard, rallied the battalion for a muster parade
on the hockey pitch where easterners were separated, and then locked them up in
the guard room (if they were lucky). Then they went hunting for
others at the Brigade HQ and in their homes. Initial arrests were
guided by lists of so called “jubilators” who had allegedly taunted them or
celebrated in the days after the assassination of the
Sardauna. Those northerners who had attended “January Victory”
parties had used the opportunity to take names of their southern
hosts. Many were shot immediately, but six were taken to the
undamaged Guest House at the late Northern Premier’s Lodge, wined and dined,
given a visual tour of the damage wrought by Major Nzeogwu’s 84 mm Carl Gustav
anti-tank guns, then interrogated about the alleged “Plan 15 Igbo coup”, before
being made to kneel in front of a portrait of the Sardauna and bow in awe (“yi
gaisuwa”). Then they were led out and executed before their corpses
were then transported to locations along the Jos, Lagos and Kachia roads and
either left for hyenas to devour or shoddily buried.
After
being hunted down, those who were spared the Premier’s Lodge ‘pre-operative’
treatment were simply trucked out to mile 18 on the Kaduna-Jos road where they
were shot (allegedly under Captain Ahmadu Yakubu’s supervision) and
then reportedly robbed of personal belongings. The process was not
totally successful, however, because thankfully, some who feigned death were
able to crawl away to safety. Interestingly, others were protected
by Captain Swanton and the same RSM Ahmadu Bello who had earlier set Okoro up
for his execution at the outset of Kaduna operations. When
guardrooms were too congested or unsafe, eastern, (particularly Igbo) soldiers
and officers were taken to the Kaduna Prison for safe keeping.
Madiebo,
Kalu, Okon, Ogbemudia and many others eventually escaped back to their home
regions from Kaduna, while some, like Major Olusegun Obasanjo were later
smuggled to Maiduguri for safe-keeping. But others were not so
lucky. As the days progressed, however, it was clear that there
was inconsistency in the degree of discrimination being made between
southerners or “jubilators”. T/Capt. L.C. Dilibe (Staff Officer,
1st Bde), T/Major Emelifonwu (DAQMG, 1st Bde) and T/Major Ogunro
(Chief Instructor, NMTC) were murdered. Major A. Drummond, half cast
Igbo-Scot, was killed on Sunday July 31st. Major OU
Isong (Commander, 1st Recce Squadron) who had actually expressed
skepticism about the January 15 coup, risking death at the hands of Major
Nzeogwu, was also killed during the July rebellion in Kaduna, among
others. The details of his death have never been fully clarified but
the young northern officers in his squadron at that time include Lts. Ibrahim
Babangida, Garba Duba, Sunday Ifere and others.
After
hitchhiking with Igbo contacts across the North, Madiebo escaped across the
Benue bridge at Makurdi by hiding in a water tank dressed in a firesuit,
avoiding capture by a detachment of the 5th battalion commanded by Captain
Daramola during the penultimate leg of his relay race back home. Ogbemudia’s
escape from death at the hands of Lt. BS Dimka was partly made possible by
Major Abba Kyari and Lt. Col. Hassan Katsina. Hassan himself had
allegedly been briefly detained by mutinous troops and then released, only to
be falsely accused of being behind the whole plot (along with Ali
Akilu). It was already known that Dimka was not happy that
Ogbemudia had arrested him earlier, although Dimka did not know that it had
been sanctioned by Hassan who had his ears to the ground. When,
therefore, Dimka was making plans to gather soldiers to seize him, and was
talking carelessly about Ironsi’s phone call and its implications, Ogbemudia
was tipped off and advised in the nick of time to escape. A
landrover was immediately provided which Ogbemudia jumped into (armed with an
SMG) and sped out of town (without bothering to pack) chased by a landrover
load of northern soldiers led by the Lieutenant.
Dimka’s
group pursued him to Kontagora where he refueled, barely eluding them at the
fuel station. But they refused to give up, chasing him all the way
to Jebba, crossing the Niger Bridge behind him, sometimes
shooting. They followed him all the way to Owo in present day Ondo
State where he ran out of fuel, abandoned his vehicle and scaled a six foot
fence into dense jungle. At that point they gave up and began their
journey back to Kaduna. Ogbemudia later hitched hiked back to Benin
City laying low for some time, moving from house to house until things cooled
down. The strange thing is that Major Ogbemudia was Nzeogwu’s deputy
at the NMTC in January and had been asked by Nzeogwu to take leave so he
would be out of station during the coup. Nzeogwu did not take him
into confidence. In fact, for a brief moment after discovering - at
a road block - that there was a coup in progress led by his boss, Ogbemudia
considered moving against Nzeogwu but was stuck with his desperately ill
daughter who had to be taken to hospital. But paradoxically,
here he was in July barely escaping death from Dimka, who was convinced that he
was part of the so called “Plan 15”!
Indeed,
Ogbemudia was not the only example of this paradox. There were many
others. Then Major H. Igboba, who barely
escaped death on July 29 (as a Lt. Col. and CO of the 2nd battalion ), had
led one of the companies from the battalion that helped in crushing the January
mutiny along with Major Anago (a Camerounian) both under Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon
who was transitioning in to replace Hilary Njoku. Njoku, for unclear
reasons, was still at his post even though already posted
out. But Igboba fully cooperated with Gowon, who in turn, was
supporting Ironsi. In fact, according to Ben Odogwu, Chief of
Biafran Intelligence, Col. Igboba later met his death at the Benin Prison in
September 1967 at the hands of ex-January 15 mutineers he had manhandled in
detention after they were arrested in Lagos.
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