In 1978, the movie "Power Play", a fictional
account based on the book "Coup d'Etat" by Edward Luttwak, was
released in various versions, English and French. It was directed by
Martyn Burke. In the movie, encouraged
by Dr. Jean Rousseau - an intellectual with military ties - a repressive
civilian regime was overthrown by a group of middle ranking conspirators in the
Army including Colonels Anthony Narriman, Raymond Kasai, Zeller and Barrientos;
Majors Anwar, Minh, Dominique and Aramco; and Captain Hillsman even as
they were being closely monitored by Blair, the suspicious Chief of Government
Security.
The coup succeeded, ably planned and coordinated by Infantry
Colonel Narriman, who nevertheless had to completely rely on Colonel Zeller's
Tank regiment for the decisive assault on the Presidential Palace - the
significance of which will be clear later. The conceptualization,
recruiting, planning, and implementation of the coup was not without ups and
downs. There were various manifestations of internal rivalry and
treachery necessitating mutual surveillance and even suspicion among the
conspirators. It was necessary at one point to kill an officer who was
contacted for the coup but bluntly refused to be recruited, even proceeding to
make a radio report to Security HQ. In another part of the movie the
reliance of the Unit Commander on his RSM to ensure that troops on a so
called "exercise" would not mutiny once they found out what was
actually happening was glaringly demonstrated. A breach of operational
security necessitated a decision to deliberately sacrifice Colonel Barrientos
as a decoy to throw the Chief of Security (Blair) off the scent of the
others. The government knew something was in the works but had no
details of the real plot.
Convinced that the external environment was right and that
an internal window of opportunity had been established to allow for
mobilization of units without giving away the game to security organs, the coup
was finally launched from the coordinating center at the War College with the
code word "Arora". In carefully timed sequences, various units
dashed to their primary and secondary objectives, some to arrest key military
and political figures, others to seize strategic centers of communication,
public buildings, airports, radio stations, road junctions etc.
Considerable effort was made in the movie to dramatize road-block
confrontations between loyal and disloyal units, some of which were mobilized
via frantic phone calls from key figures in the regime without going through
the regular chain of command - which had been disrupted by early morning
arrests and other methods of neutralization.
A serious attempt to put down the coup was made by Blair by
calling in a loyal air-portable battalion based outside the capital.
However, this effort was neutralized by a decision to park armoured vehicles on
the runway of the destination air-base near the capital. This prevented
the planes bringing in loyal troops from landing. An attempt by the
incoming para-commander to bluff his way in by claiming to be out of fuel was
called by a nervous young officer in the control tower. One group of soldiers
led by Military Intelligence Captain Hillsman shot its way into Blair's
National Security HQ and destroyed all its records, turning the place upside
down, irritated by the pervasive and abusive nature of its methods. In
reaction, Blair wryly pointed out that once the new coup regime settled down it
too would need a security set up, no matter what it thought of the former
regime. However, the punch line of the movie was the brilliant
illustration of the coup-within-a-coup scenario when Tank Colonel Zeller
exploited the fact that Tanks from his own Unit were in control of the
Presidential Palace to wrest leadership of the coup from Infantry Colonel
Narriman.
Why have I gone through the trouble of explaining all
this? Because I have reason to believe that in the early eighties, the
movie "Power Play" was circulated among a highly restricted circle of
Army Officers in Nigeria and was the guiding resource used in planning key
aspects of the coup against Major General Buhari - as will be evident when we
begin to discuss operational issues.
THE PLAYERS OF AUGUST
At strategic, operational, and tactical levels a large
number of general staff, field grade, company grade and non-commissioned
officers made August 27, 1985 possible. Some were physically involved in
military operations on D-Day; while others partook in the elaborate game of
deception and disinformation that preceded the coup. However, as in all
coups there were overlapping concentric rings or tiers of involvement with the
lowest echelons being brought into the picture within the last 6 - 24 hours of
the operation, in some cases by being misled as to the real nature of what was
going on.
KEY PLAYERS IN SUPPORT OF THE COUP INCLUDED (BUT WERE NOT
LIMITED TO):
1. Major General Ibrahim Babangida - Chief of Army Staff
(COAS)
2. Brigadier Sani Abacha - GOC, 2nd Mechanised Division,
Ibadan
3. Colonel JT Dogonyaro - Director, Department of Armour,
Army HQ
4. Colonel Aliyu Mohammed Gusau - former Director, Defence
Intelligence Agency
5. Lt. Col. Halilu Akilu - Director of Military Intelligence
6. Lt. Col. Tanko Ayuba - Commander, Corps of Signals
7. Lt. Col. David Mark - Military Governor, Niger State
8. Lt. Col. John Nanzip Shagaya - Commander, 9th Mechanised
Brigade
9. Lt. Col. Chris Abutu Garuba - Commander, 34 Self
Propelled Artillery Brigade, Jos
10. Lt. Col. Raji Alagbe Rasaki - Commanding Officer, AHQ
Garrison and Signals Group, Lagos
11. Col. Anthony Ukpo - Deputy Director, Defence
Intelligence Agency, Lagos
12. Major John Madaki - Commanding Officer, 123 Guards
Battalion, Ikeja
13. Major Abdulmumuni Aminu - Military Assistant to the COAS
14. Major Lawan Gwadabe - just back from US Armour School,
Fort Knox, returning to 245 Recce Battalion where he was the former Commanding
Officer
15. Major Abubakar Dangiwa Umar - General Staff
Officer (1), Department of Armour, AHQ, then Chairman Federal Housing Authority
16. Major Mohammed Sambo Dasuki, Staff Officer, HQ Corps of
Artillery ( son of Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, who later became the 17th Sultan of
Sokoto. Major Sambo himself later became the National Security Advisor to the
former President Goodluck Jonathan).
17. Major Maxwell Khobe-Commanding Officer, 245 Recce
Battalion, Ikeja
18. Major UK Bello-Commanding Officer, 202 Recce Battalion,
Kaduna
19. Major Kefas Happy Bulus-Commanding Officer, Armour
Headquarters Company (201-Administrative-Unit) Ikeja
20. Major Sule Ahman, Supply and Transport, Ikeja Cantonment
21. Major Musa Shehu (2ic to the Commanding Officer, Recce
Battalion in Jos)
22. Captain Nuhu Umaru- 2ic, 202 Recce Battalion, Kaduna
In support of the Key players a chorus of other company and
field grade officers also played various supportive roles. These included (but
were not limited to)
1. Lt. Col. Ahmed Daku
2. Lt. Col. Abubakar Dada
3. Major IB Aboho (Staff Officer at Defence Intelligence
Agency)
4. Major Friday Ichide (Staff Officer to Colonel Dogonyaro)
5. Major Simon Hart
6. Captain M. Bashir (Lagos operations, in support of Bulus)
7. Major S.B. Mepaiyeda
8. Captain Victor Scott Kure (physical security for the
COAS).
NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (NCOs) in the Armoured corps who
were crucial to the mobilization of armoured vehicles in Lagos include
1. WOII Sule Ayinla
2. WOII Billy Adekunle
3. WOII Army Sweet
4. WOII Yerima
5. S-Sgt Bazaria Kabara
6. Sgt. Hitler Bongo
7. Corporal Sule Owoicho, and others.
In addition there was another mixed tier of crucial but less
mission critical enablers. Some were "aware" but not
"active". These included:
1. Brigadier Peter Ademokhai (Director of Army Staff Duties
and Plans)
2. Brigadier Abdullahi Bagudu Mamman (Director of Army
Training and Operations)
3. Brigadier YY Kure (GOC 82 Division, Enugu)
4. Brigadier Ola Oni (GOC, 1st Division, Kaduna)
5. Lt. Col. John Inienger, Commander, 4th Mechanized
Brigade, Benin
6. Lt. Col. Tunji Olurin, Commander, 1st Mechanized Brigade,
Minna
7. Lt. Col. A. Abubakar, Commander, 3rd Mechanised Brigade,
Kano.
Although they had no operational commands, a number of
Military Governors formed part of the BODY OF OPINION in the military that
encouraged the palace coup, reflecting the wide nature of the plot and near
total isolation of Generals Buhari and Idiagbon. They included (but were
not limited to):
1. Brigadier Garba Duba (Sokoto State)
2. Brigadier IOS Nwachukwu (Imo State)
3. Brigadier Jeremiah Timbut Useni (Bendel State).
ON THE OTHER HAND, KEY PLAYERS IN SUPPORT OF THE REGIME
INCLUDED:
1. Major General Muhammadu Buhari, C-in-C
2. Major General Tunde Idiagbon, Chief of Staff, SHQ
3. Major General Mohammed Magoro - Minister of Internal
Affairs
4. Alhaji Rafindadi - Director General, Nigerian Security
Organization
5. Lt. Col. Sabo Aliyu - Commander, Brigade of Guards
6. Major Mustapha Haruna Jokolo, ADC to the C-in-C
OFFICERS WHOSE LOYALTY TO THE REGIME WAS STRONG ENOUGH THAT
THEY HAD TO BE PRESUMED HOSTILE AND NEUTRALISED INCLUDED:
1. Brigadier Salihu Ibrahim, GOC 3rd Armoured Division, Jos
2. Commanding Officer, Recce Battalion, Jos
C. Nowa Omoigui
C. Nowa Omoigui
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